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Using four African countries (Botswana, Kenya, South Sudan and Zimbabwe), as case 
studies, this interdisciplinary qualitative study sought to investigate how the political 
economy of the state-society complex affects public spending on child protection. To 
achieve this objective, a multi-disciplinary conceptual framework was constructed, 
premised on the hypothesis that decisions on the size and composition of budget 
allocations to child protection are influenced by several political economy variables. After 
exploring a wide range of literature on the subject, and noting the outspread of political 
economy as a subject, the study focused on three composite variables notably: (i) 
prevailing socio-cultural and legal constructions of childhood, (ii) fiscal politics throughout 
the budget cycle, and (iii) how the state is structured and power exercised in order to drive 
national development agendas.  
Public budgeting is not a mere economic and mathematical process, it is also 
deeply political, influenced by a mosaic of forces within and outside the state. Whether a 
government decides to increase or cut spending on health, military, transport or child 
protection, everything boils down to political choices. These choices are mediated by 
economic and political interests of those in positions of power, prevailing incentive 
systems, power-relationships between and amongst various structures of government, 
dominant socio-cultural views as well as the governance and decision-making cultures, 
among key factors. The study concluded that instead of viewing under prioritisation of 
child protection in government budgets as a purely technical problem, researchers should 
seek to understand the political economy of decision-making on how available resources 
should be allocated and utilised. More than ever before, child-focused organisations must 
be deliberate in regularly assessing and shaping socio-economic and political forces that 
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Introduction and Background of the Study 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Using four African countries - Botswana, Kenya, South Sudan and Zimbabwe – as case 
studies, this interdisciplinary qualitative study sought to critically examine how the political 
economy of the state-society complex affects public spending on child protection. The 
key question that this study explored is whether, and how, politics, economic interests 
and prevailing constructions of childhood influence budgeting for child protection. The 
relevance of a political economy approach to an inquiry on public spending on child 
protection is aptly captured by Norton and Elson (2002:6), who observe that the process 
of public budgeting “is essentially political, rather than a purely technical one”.  
The political nature of public budgeting arises from the complex and intertwined 
nature of internal and external forces seeking to influence budget decisions in furtherance 
of the interests of people behind them, mostly politicians. These interests are mediated 
by the governance culture, existing laws, and other structural factors such as the 
demographics of a country and social norms about childhood (Mason 2005; Norton & 
Elson 2002; Wildavsky 1984). It is this complexity and “messiness” of the public budgeting 
sphere which invokes the use of the term “state-society complex” in this study (Wildavsky 
1984:12). Cox (1983:6-9) describes the term state-society complex as a system of 
overlapping and multi-dimensional relationships and interactions, formal and informal, 
which shape functions and development trajectories of a state. The interactions involve a 
wide range of actors within a state and those affected by it. Concurring with Cox (1983), 
Mitchel (2006:36) further observes that the relationships and interactions are usually 
amorphous and ever-changing.  
The research belongs to what the author posits as third-generation child protection 
studies, which aim to investigate contemporary issues within such epistemological 
frameworks and socio-economic contexts as political economy, globalisation, and 
urbanisation. In the author’s characterisation, first generation studies were primarily 




interventions and strategies (Riaan 1998; Lachman & Poblete 2002; Wessells et al. 
2012). These are largely descriptive in tone, focusing on the what, how and when of child 
protection. The second-generation studies sought to dig deeper into the practice itself, 
looking at diverse contexts, to better understand underlying issues, pathways of change 
and ways of enhancing the impact of interventions on children (Munro 2011; O’Kane & 
Moore 2012; Young et al. 2014; UNICEF 2010; Wulczyn et al. 2010). Second generation 
studies consider issues such as equity, gender, age, and geographic perspectives of child 
protection. First and second-generation studies aim to enrich the practice of social work 
as well as the promotion and protection of children’s rights (Linde 2014; Riaan 1998; 
White 2002). While the distinctions help understand the scope and depth of studies in 
each category, in practice, there are huge overlaps between the three and the dividing 
lines are amorphous. 
Considering that the focus of the study is on third-generation studies, it is important 
to further highlight key features. To start, third-generation studies challenge the 
confinement of child protection to social work and related policies. Second, child 
protection is posited as something beneficial, not only to children but to entire families 
and economies (Child Fund et al. 2017; Fang et al. 2015). Lastly, the studies deliberately 
attempt to establish theoretical links between child protection and other academic 
disciplines, including but not limited to economics, political science, theology, and 
philosophy (Wodon et al. 2018).  Whilst it is true that child protection falls within the realm 
of children’s rights and social work, it is certainly linked to other disciplines (Child Fund et 
al. 2017; Evans 2010; Taylor 2018).  
Typical of third-generation studies, this investigation purposefully delves into 
relatively underexplored political economy perspectives on child protection budgeting. 
The study has been inspired by an emergent literature seeking to link child protection with 
economic and political development. Among others, Child Fund et al. (2017), Fang et al. 
(2015), and Wodon et al. (2018) have quantified the macro-economic consequences of 
not investing in child protection. Wodon et al. (2018: 09) estimated the loss in life-time 
earnings arising from below expected participation in the labour market by women due to 
child marriages (before the age of 18) to be US$ 126 billion for all African countries. Nation 




and South Africa, which have revealed the negative impact of abuse and violence against 
children on economic productivity, health, educational outcomes, and national 
development (Mitra et al. 2020; Pereznieto et al. 2014; Wodon et al. 2018). The above 
studies are seminal for rightly pointing out the astronomical impacts of harms to children 
on social and economic development. The above authors should be credited for leading 
the way in establishing the conceptual links between child protection and economic 
development. But, while the studies make a significant contribution to child protection 
policy and practice, they do not sufficiently investigate the treatment of child protection in 
government budgets, which is the focus of this study. But, before going any further, how 
should child protection be understood? 
1.1 What is child protection? 
 
Considering that child protection is a central construct in this study, it is of paramount 
importance that a working definition is provided. UNICEF (2006:01) defines child 
protection as “preventing and responding to violence, exploitation, and abuse against 
children – including commercial sexual exploitation, trafficking, child labor and harmful 
traditional practices, such as female genital mutilation/cutting and child marriage”. While 
this definition is widely accepted by most practitioners, it has been criticised for being 
adult-centric by failing to highlight the importance of child participation and the 
interconnectedness of children’s rights (Collins et al. 2021). In most definitions of child 
protection, children are regarded as victims, effectively underplaying their agency and 
increasingly active role in the fight for, and promotion of their rights to protection (Collins 
et al. 2021; Peleg 2018).  
UNICEF’s definition corroborates with those of other child-focused organizations. 
Save the children (2009:02), for instance, postulates that the goal of child protection is “to 
promote, protect and fulfil children’s rights to protection from violence, abuse, exploitation 
and neglect as expressed in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) and other human rights, humanitarian and refugee treaties and conventions, 
as well as national laws”. FHI 360 put forward a much simpler definition positing that it is 




Toussaint 2012: iii). Harms to children come in various forms including beating, flogging, 
sexual abuse, neglect, subjection to inhuman and degrading treatment, corporal 
punishment, denial of services, and abandonment (Medrano & Tabben-Toussaint 2012; 
Save the Children 2009; UNCRC 2006; UNICEF 2006, 2008). The above, and other 
harms have catastrophic impacts on children’s “lives and their physical, mental and 
emotional well-being” (Medrano & Tabben-Toussaint (2012: 01). Children often face 
multiple and overlapping harms (Save the Children 2009). In this study, harms to children 
shall be conveniently called child maltreatment. 
         The fact that child maltreatment occurs anytime and everywhere: in the home, at 
school, in the community, and even play centers demands actions not only from state 
parties but also from private institutions, communities, households, and children 
themselves (Collins et al. 2021; Landgren 2005; Peleg 2018; World Vision International 
2021). Of course, being a primary duty bearer, the government has the responsibility to 
develop appropriate policies, laws, plans, institutions, and programs to create a protective 
environment for all children (Landgren 2005; Medrano & Tabben-Toussaint 2012; Save 
the children 2009). Governments should also be involved in the empowerment of children 
and enhancing the capacities of families, communities, and public institutions such as 
schools, police, and courts to respond to child maltreatment (Terre des hommes & Child 
frontiers 2012). But child protection does not begin and end with the government; families, 
media, civil society, and private businesses also play critical and complementary roles 
(Save the Children 2009; UNCRC 2007). Effectively, this means that child protection 
efforts should be multi-faceted and multi-sectoral; involving several institutions, 
processes, and actors, in all spheres – formal and informal, and rural and urban (MLGRD 
2019; Save the Children 2009; UNICEF 2008). But, the right to child protection should be 
understood alongside others, given interconnectedness of rights (Collins et al. 2021; 
UNCRC 2003). 
         Interventions and services to prevent and respond to child maltreatment are 
delivered through a combination of law, human rights, institution, community, and family-
based approaches (Medrano & Tabben-Toussaint 2012; Terre des hommes & Child 




in a coordinated fashion, if every child is to live in a safe and protective environment (Terre 
des hommes & Child frontiers 2012).  The multiplicity of measures, and the imperative for 
their coordination, have given rise to the notion of ‘systems approach' to child protection 
(Save the children 2009; UNICEF 2008) to be discussed in detail in Chapter Three. It is 
only through a continuum of actions involving government, families, public and private 
institutions, and children themselves that a sustainable protective environment for all 
children can be created (Collins et al. 2021; Terre des hommes & Child frontiers 2012). 
       While seeking to keep all children safe from maltreatment, child protection demands 
a laser focus on children who are most deprived and vulnerable to certain protection risks. 
These include children without appropriate parental care, living on the streets, with 
disabilities, in contact with the law, working, on the move, heading families, and living 
below national poverty lines (Medrano & Tabben-Toussaint 2012; UNCRC 2006; UNICEF 
2006). In addition, “internally displaced or migrant and refugee children, including 
unaccompanied children, girls, children affected by conflict or disaster, orphaned children, 
and children belonging to a minority group” should also be targeted (ACERWC 2018:32). 
For each of the categories of children, gender dimensions should be considered to identify 
the unique vulnerabilities of girls and boys. By targeting specific groups of children, child 
protection efforts aim at reducing their vulnerability to maltreatment, tackling social 
exclusion, and enhancing their life chances to live a happy and productive life (Landgren 
2005; UNICEF 2008). However, Terre des hommes and Child frontiers (2012:10) cautions 
against “reducing children to specific categories”. Instead, they advocate the provision of 
a standard package of protective services to all children, holistically. 
It is also important to note that the creation of a strong protective environment for 
all children – where children are also active agents – is not a walk in the park. Oftentimes, 
child protection involves “struggles” against deeply entrenched childhood practices as 
well as policy and operational bottlenecks (Save the Children 2009: 02). Save the children 
is most probably right for bringing the ‘struggle dimension’ if one considers the quantum 
of campaigning and advocacy initiatives at national and global levels against harmful 




In conclusion, a few key points should be penned down about the meaning of child 
protection, weaved from the foregoing brief conceptual expose to guide the rest of the 
study. First, child protection entails a wide range of measures primarily aiming at 
preventing and or responding to child maltreatment as pointed out by UNICEF (2006, 
2008). However, it is important to indicate upfront that there exist numerous tensions, 
contradictions, and disconnects especially between the minority and majority world 
conceptualisations of what constitutes child maltreatment (Collins et al. 2021; Ndofirepi & 
Shumba 2014). As the study shall show later, the boundaries of child maltreatment are 
hotly contested, and many a times socially constructed (Okoli 2009). Thus, in reality, the 
meanings of child protection are unsurprisingly wide apart, ranging from a welfarist to 
rights-based conceptions; with some people considering everything to do with children as 
child protection (Collins et al. 2021; Linde 2014; Mitchel 2006).  
Second, the measures to preventing and responding to child maltreatment can be 
institutional or individual, public or private, and formal or informal, because child 
maltreatment happens everyone (Save the Children 2009; UNICEF 2006, 2008). This 
underscores the multidisciplinary and cross-sectoral nature of child protection (Landgren 
2005). Third, contemporary child protection recognises the role of children as active 
agents in the promotion and fight for their right to protection. This is a departure from the 
19th and 20th century definitions which were adult-centric, positing children as victims 
(Collins et al. 2021). 
 Lastly, the measures to tackle harms to children require significant 
contextualisations and adaptations, which van Breda & Pinkerton (2020: 02) call 
“localisation within globalisation”. Practitioners should avoid the temptation of copying and 
pasting interventions across geographies. Open dialogue and negotiations amongst 
different people groups at the local, national and global level regarding the scope, 
relevance, and effectiveness of measures is key (Collins et al. 2021; van Breda & 
Pinkerton 2020). Unfortunately, as argued by van Breda & Pinkerton (2020:01) the 
dialogue is often constrained by unequal power-relations, resources, and skewed access 
to information and other services. With this short brief conceptual overview, the section 




1.2 Study Setting 
 
The setting of the study is sub-Saharan Africa. As alluded to, four countries - Botswana, 
Kenya, South Sudan and Zimbabwe – situated in the region of East and Southern Africa 
(ESA), have been purposefully selected for the study. Among the four countries, at one 
extreme there is Botswana - a middle income country - which is relatively stable politically 
and economically. On the other end, there is South Sudan which is one of the most 
politically unstable countries in the world, torn apart by war. The Fund for Peace (2018), 
ranked South Sudan as the most fragile (1/178) country in 2018. In between Botswana 
and South Sudan, there is Kenya - a lower middle-income country that has high poverty 
levels, human insecurity, and high-income inequality despite noticeable economic growth 
(Njonjo 2013) and Zimbabwe, a once promising country, many of whose development 
indicators have regressed over the past two decades (2000-2020), due to democracy and 
governance challenges (Moore 2014; Raftopoulos 2013). The four countries provide an 
appropriate contextual continuum within which child protection is usually studied, that is, 
development setting (stable economically and politically) to complex emergencies (very 
unstable economically and politically). By selecting countries in different economic and 
political situations, the study is well placed to assess the extent to which political economy 
of public spending on child protection vary, if at all, with changes in socio-economic and 
political context.   
1.2.1 Development setting  
A defining characteristic of a development setting is the existence of a government that 
is, or is at least perceived to be, able to coordinate and implement its development 
agenda, including on matters of child protection (Penrose & Takaki 2006). Amongst the 
four countries, Botswana is a typical development setting. Based on the State Fragility 
Index (Fund for Peace 2018; Hart et al. 2015) as well as the Mo-Ibrahim Index that 
assesses the quality of governance in Africa, Botswana is the most politically stable of 
the four countries, followed by Kenya, Zimbabwe, and lastly South Sudan. Since political 
independence from British colonial rule in 1966, Botswana has held regular elections, 




democracies in Africa (Jerven 2014; Moipase 2008). Conditions of stability are usually 
conducive for effective public finance management (Gasper et al. 2018). 
In theory, a development setting allows for collaboration and development of 
synergistic relationships between communities and state structures in the creation of a 
protective environment for children (CPWG 2012; UNICEF 2012). Furthermore, it 
presents an opportunity for governments to develop robust national child protection 
systems (Burkle 1999; UNICEF 2015d), linked to other sectors such as security, health, 
education, and social protection (Landgren 2005). However, as the study shows, this is 
not always the case: weak child protection institutions and underfunded programmes are 
found in countries such as Botswana, where human and economic development 
indicators are improving. One need not belabour the point that child abuse and 
exploitation happens in all situations, including of political stability and economic 
prosperity (Maundeni 2010; Save the Children 2009; UN 2006). Violence against children 
has nothing to do with a country’s economic status or whether it is peaceful or at war. The 
only difference is in the form, prevalence, and intensity. Whilst in conflict situations 
violence is often lethal and perpetrated by external attackers, in politically stable 
situations, it is often under-reported and sometimes seen as acceptable (UN 2006; 
UNICEF 2018). Bullying, corporal punishment, sexual abuse, baby-dumping, and child 
trafficking are examples of common child protection challenges in peaceful and stable 
countries such as Botswana (Maundeni & Malinga 2010; MLGRD 2019). Child protection 
risks are however not necessarily the same as in fragile/emergency contexts such as 
South Sudan (Nascimento 2015; Save the Children 2009).  
1.2.2 Emergency Setting  
An emergency setting is a situation where normal functions of the government are 
disrupted and capacity to deliver services constrained due to shocks such as war, severe 
droughts, flooding, mass-migrations, and economic collapse (Burkle 1999). An 
emergency is described as complex when the prevailing situation threatens livelihoods 
due to reduced state capacity to prevent further suffering of the people (Nascimento 
2015). High levels of violence as well as breakdown of the rule of law and other 




of governance systems is usually seen in the collapse and decay of institutions, health-
related outbreaks, increased danger for minority groups and widespread starvation 
(Landgren 2005; UNICEF 2016c). Out of the four case study countries, South Sudan 
typifies a complex emergency setting.  
Emergencies increase the vulnerabilities of children to abuse and exploitation 
(ACERWC 2014; UNICEF 2016c). At the same time national governance, policing, 
financing, and accountability systems – required for effective child protection – collapse 
(Landgren 2005; Penrose & Takaki 2006; UNICEF 2016c). Potential risks to children 
associated with armed conflict include violence, abandonment, rape, neglect, lack of a 
safe family environment, and denial of access to services such as education, health, and 
social assistance (Burkle 1999; UNICEF 2016c; Wessells 2011). The suffering that is 
associated with the humanitarian crisis usually forces families and children to adopt 
dangerous coping mechanisms such as unsafe migration, child prostitution, child labour, 
and child marriages (Burkle 1999; Kostelny et al. 2014). Humanitarian situations also 
drain state resources, which in turn limit a state’s capacity to effectively plan and deliver 
sustainable child protection services (Burkle 1999; IMF 2015; Save the Children 2009; 
UNICEF 2015c). Other pressing needs during humanitarian crises such as security, food 
assistance, and management of refugees have the potential to crowd out funding for child 
protection (Save the Children 2010). Furthermore, normal processes of prioritisation of 
resources are compromised as seen in South Sudan between 2013 and 2018 (UNICEF 
2016c).  
Child protection in armed conflict situations is a delicate and complex matter 
(Nascimento 2015). It is delicate in the sense that risks and interventions can be 
politicised and access to services by children and their families denied by warring parties 
(Penrose & Takaki 2006). The complexity arises from the multiplicity and gravity of 
violations as well as the “increasingly political and militarised nature of humanitarian 
action” (Nascimento 2015:01). When humanitarian action is militarised, conflict is bound 
to make both formal and community-based child protection mechanisms difficult to 
implement. If party to the conflict, host governments often fail to offer a protective 




a major role in delivering child protection interventions (CPWG 2012; Save the Children 
2009; UNICEF 2016c).  
1.3 Political and Socio-Economic Context of Selected Countries 
 
In political economy, context – whether social, economic or political – is everything. This 
is because context affects the structure and functioning of the state and how public 
resources are managed and distributed (Alesina & Perotti 1994; Bharadwaj 1994; DFID 
2009). The political, economic, and social context has a strong bearing on public finance 
management in each country as well as the intensity and direction of fiscal politics (DFID 
2007, 2009; Gasper et al. 2018; Wildavsky 1984). The macro-economic context of each 
of the four countries is briefly described in the paragraphs which follow.  
  Economically, as highlighted earlier, Botswana is described as one of Africa’s 
success stories (IMF 2020, Jervan 2014; Moipase 2008; Stiglitz 2002). The growth of 
Botswana’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP), 
2017 international dollar, from $4,552 in 1980 to $15,282 in 2020 is cited as evidence of 
this success (IMF 2020). Botswana’s economic growth story is partly because of “growth 
enabling macro-economic policies such as an uncontrolled exchange rate, open trade 
policy and good corporate governance” (Jerven 2014:19-20). Botswana has a human 
development index (HDI)1 of 0.71, with 1 being highly developed and 0 being least 
developed (UNDP 2018). Of the four selected countries, Botswana has the lowest 
population, estimated at 2.3 million in 2017, compared to the other three case study 








1 The HDI is composite indicator of human development whose constituent parts are life expectancy, expected and 




Figure 1: Gross domestic product per capita, 
(In purchasing power parity, 2017 international dollar) 
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2020), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2020/October/ 
 
Despite economic growth and stability, there are several protection concerns in 
Botswana. A recent survey on violence against children estimated that 28.4 percent and 
43 percent of female and male children in Botswana, respectively experience physical 
violence before the age of 18. The same report revealed that the prevalence of sexual 
violence prior to age 18 was 9.3 percent for females and 5.5 percent for males, of which 
1.8 percent and 0.2 percent accounted for physically forced sex amongst females and 
males, respectively (MLGRD 2019:13). Although real figures are not known due to a 
paucity of data, corporal punishment is reportedly very high (Maundeni 2010). Partly 
because of HIV and AIDS, an estimated 10 percent of the national child population in 
Botswana is orphaned (Ibid).  
Although Kenya has embraced growth promoting policies, it is caught up in a 
myriad of political and social development challenges including ethnic clashes, insecurity, 
and politics of regionalism (Lumumba 2008; Mueller 2008). In 2020, Kenya’s GDP per 
capita in purchasing power parity (2017 international dollar) was estimated at $4,724 (IMF 
2020). Lumumba (2008) has argued that politics in Kenya has been poisoned by 
corruption, ethnicity, and severe contestation of elections. The contestation is so intense 
that candidates “die to win” an election at all costs (Mueller 2011:99). In 2018, Kenya was 

















































2018). Amongst the four case study countries, Kenya has the highest population, 
estimated at about 49 million in 2017 (World Bank 2008).  
Children in Kenya suffer various forms of abuse and exploitation. The Kenya 
Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) estimates that there are 1,010,000 children 
aged between 5 and 17 years working for pay, profit or family gain (NCCS 2014:13). 
Harmful practices such as female genital mutilation (FGM), girl child compensation and 
child marriage are prevalent in Kenya, despite being outlawed. FGM, for example, is 
widely practiced in several Kenyan communities: among the Somali (97.6 percent), the 
Kisii (96.1 percent), and the Maasai (73 percent) (GoK 2014:65).  
South Sudan, one of the most fragile countries in the world, has been ravaged by 
episodes of war, humanitarian crises, and lack of robust public institutions (IMF 2014; 
Kameir 2011; UNICEF 2016c). Due to the war, South Sudan faces severe child protection 
risks. It is estimated that 13,000 children were recruited into armed groups between 
December 2013 and July 2014, with 700,000 children displaced (UNICEF 2016c). At least 
4700 children were separated from their families. A total of 1200 schools were closed 
(ACERWC 2014:13), with at least 2566 girls sexually abused during that period (UNICEF 
2016b). Armed conflict is the single most dangerous threat to children’s survival, 
protection. and development in South Sudan.  
South Sudan seceded from its northern neighbour, Sudan, in 2011. As of June 
2020, the country had not held national elections. In 2013, civil war broke out, along tribal 
lines, due to political differences between President Salva Kiir from the Dinka Tribe and 
his deputy, Riek Machar, from the Nuer tribe. De Waal (2014) has argued that it was not 
surprising that civil war broke out because the new independent state was built on shaky 
ground, and held together by a “militarized, corrupt and neo-patrimonial” government 
(2014:347). According to De Waal (2014: 347-348) the South Sudan governance system, 
since 2011, has provided an example of a kleptocracy in Africa, which is “turbulent, 
militarized and monetised”.  Such an environment is not conducive for proper budgeting 
and development of a robust national child protection system. Hart et al. (2015) argue 
that countries such as South Sudan end up depending on donors to finance child 




two warring parties, but its implementation is fraught with so many challenges beyond the 
scope of this study.  
From a human development point of view, South Sudan is one of the least 
developed countries in the world. The HDI value of South Sudan was estimated by UNDP 
(2018) to be 0.38 in 2017. Due to war, the GDP per capita in purchasing power parity 
(2017 international dollar) for South Sudan, tumbled from $1194 in 2013 to $836 in 2020 
(Figure 1). The decline in GDP had a corresponding effect on national revenue 
generation. The country relies on oil, which contributed over 73 percent of total 
government budget for fiscal year 2018/19 (UNICEF 2019) to finance government 
operations. However, oil has become the main driver of conflict in Sudan (Kameir 2011). 
The situation in South Sudan typifies a ‘natural resource curse’ whereby despite the 
abundance of oil and gas which should ideally move a country forward, “absolute poverty, 
environmental degradation, corruption and widespread conflicts” have persisted (Chol 
2016:42).  
Although Zimbabwe has been relatively peaceful since attainment of political 
independence from British colonial rule in 1980, besides the mass killings in Matabeleland 
in the mid-1980s by the Zimbabwe National Army which the government has never 
admitted to (Moore 2015:6), the country has suffered from various political and 
humanitarian crises which became pronounced after 2000 (Moore 2015; Raftopoulos 
2013). Due to multiple humanitarian and economic crises, characterising life in Zimbabwe 
from 2000, many children were forced into prostitution, child marriage, child labour, and 
into living on the streets (MoWAGCD 2016; Muridzo & Malianga 2015). In 2014, the 
Zimbabwe Youth Council, a state body which coordinates youth development matters, 
revealed that an estimated 290,984 children between 15 and 17 years and 29,887 
between the ages of 5 and 15 were engaged in economic activities for more than 3 hours 
a day (ZYC 2014:22). It is estimated that 12,000 children live and work on the streets of 
Zimbabwe (MoLSS & UNICEF 2010:07). Moore (2014b:04) observed that the crises in 
Zimbabwe have been driven by “primitive accumulation”, and unbridled use of “power and 
coercion” by the ruling elite. The military-aided change of government in November 2017, 
from the hands of the long-time ruler Robert Mugabe to his former deputy, Emmerson 




Economically, as recently as March 2021, Zimbabwe has been facing several 
challenges including hyper-inflation, cash shortages, erratic fuel and electricity supply and 
food insecurity. The economy is shrinking again after a modest rebound between 2010 
and 2014. On balance, the economy has not significantly changed for the past 30 years. 
In 2020, Zimbabwe’s GDP per capita of $2,443 in purchasing power parity (2017 
international dollar) was slightly over six times less than that of Botswana (IMF 2020). 
Between 2001 and 2008, at the height of the economic crises, the GDP per capita 
drastically declined by about 37% (World Bank 2019). The HDI value of Zimbabwe was 
estimated by UNDP (2018) at 0.53, with total population forecast by the World Bank 
(2018) to be 16.5 million.   
Before concluding this section, it is important to briefly highlight on the impacts of 
the coronavirus pandemic on all four countries. The pandemic which hit the whole world 
in 2020, but first discovered in 2019 in China, increased the vulnerability of children to 
abuse and exploitation in all four case study countries. In Kenya, for instance, the 
pandemic led to an increase in teen pregnancies and child marriages. In one county of 
Machakos alone, 4000 girls reportedly visited clinics to seek antenatal services between 
January and May 2020 (Plan International 2020).  In Zimbabwe, the cases of violence 
against children, including beating and flogging at home, considerably increased in 2020 
compared to the previous year (Martin & Ahlenback 2020). The same occurred in 
Botswana and South Sudan. 
 School closures and other lockdown measures to contain the coronavirus (which 
causes the COVID-19 disease) increased contacts of children with abusers within their 
homes and the communities they live. At the same time, access to child protection 
services, including those delivered through school and other platforms became limited 
(Bhatia et al. 2020). The coronavirus pandemic added to many other pre-existing shocks 
in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) most notably war in South Sudan, Cyclone Idai in 
Zimbabwe, droughts in Botswana, as well as locusts’ invasions and droughts in some 
parts of Kenya. All the above shocks are known to increase child poverty and elevate the 
risk of negative coping mechanisms such as early marriage, child prostitution, child 
trafficking, and unaccompanied migration (Wessells 2015). In the final analysis, all this 




systems during and after the pandemic. With this background, the next section discusses 
the problem statement.  
1.4 Problem Statement 
 
At a time when many children in all four selected countries suffer from various kinds of 
abuse, neglect, exploitation and violence, child protection is “notoriously under-funded” in 
government budgets (Save the Children 2010:17) and “the level of investments is still far 
from being sufficient” (World Vision International 2021: v). The “lack of political will and 
investment in child protection by national governments and donors” is the greatest 
obstacle to tackling child maltreatment (Ibid).  A budget is the most important tool at the 
disposal of government to deliver public services such as child protection (Cangiano et 
al. 2013; OHCHR 2015; UNCRC 2016). Without committing resources through their 
budgets, child protection policy commitments remain empty promises. Given the 
magnitude of child maltreatment in the four case study countries, there is an urgent need 
for governments to accelerate actions to put in place appropriate legislative, 
administrative, institutional, budgetary, and other measures to protect children from abuse 
(UNCRC 2016). In line with Article 4 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
adopted in 1989, state parties should do everything in their power, and to the maximum 
extent possible within available resources to implement children’s rights (UNCRC 2003). 
The question begging an answer is whether governments in the selected countries are 
taking issues of child protection seriously, as measured by the size of human, financial 
and technical resources they commit to this, and if not why? 
In their assessment of the child protection system in Zimbabwe, Chibwana and 
Gumbo (2014:07) observed a “yawning gap” between the making of child protection 
policies and their implementation due to “inadequate resourcing” arising from the under-
prioritisation of child protection in public budgeting. An Africa-wide study by the African 
Child Policy Forum (ACPF) also revealed that whilst government spending on education 
and health has steadily trended upwards, spending on child protection is trailing behind 
(ACPF 2018). Government agencies such as the National Council for Children’s Services 




protection laws and strategies is being hampered by “limited resources” (NCCS 2011:19). 
In its preamble, the National Plan of Action for Orphans and other Vulnerable Children 
(NAP for OVC) in Zimbabwe (2010-2015), also noted that “lack of resources is the main 
barrier towards the implementation of children’s rights” (UNICEF & MoLSS 2010: 09).  A 
global study on investment in children conducted by Save the Children also reached the 
same conclusions and noted that of all the critical child-focused sectors and programmes, 
child protection is one of the “least funded” (Pereznieto et al. 2011:43).   
The underfunding of child protection by governments and donors is particularly 
acute during emergencies. Globally, funding to address violence against children 
accounts for a paltry 0.96 percent of total official development assistance (World Vision 
International 2021:v). Time series analysis by Save the Children (2010:03) on public 
financing of child protection in conflict and humanitarian contexts concluded that funding 
is “too little and too late”. The analysis was based on data collected from the Financial 
Tracking Service (FTS)2, involving countries mainly from Africa and the Middle East. The 
Global Child Protection Cluster (2008; 2010) also confirmed that child protection is usually 
the least funded item in most Consolidated Appeal Processes (CAPs).3 The case of South 
Sudan is illustrative of this point. Whilst humanitarian assistance in the form of food aid 
received 67 percent of requested funding in the 2015 CAP, only 32 percent of requested 
child protection funding was received (OCHA 2017). 
Determining and analysing the reasons for the underfunding of child protection 
became the primary motivation for this study. In several meetings and workshops that the 
researcher attended in his professional capacity, which discussed issues related to public 
investments in children, lamentations about the underfunding of child protection were 
common. In Botswana and Kenya, for example, several stakeholders decried the 
underfunding of orphan care support, child justice courts, case management systems, 
institutions of care, and training of social workers, to mention only a few areas. Despite 
 
2 The Financial Tracking Service (FTS), managed by the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), is 
a global online and real time database of humanitarian funding needs and international contributions. It captures official 
development assistance (ODA) as well as international contributions from private philanthropists. 
 
3 The Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) is a tool, basically a joint proposal, used by the United Nations through the 





these incessant lamentations, there was hardly any publicly available research which 
critically and comprehensively investigated the reasons behind under-funding of child 
protection in government budgets. At best, what was available are budget briefs to 
estimating spending on child protection programs (Avati et al. 2018; KIPPRA 2020; Save 
the Children 2015; UNICEF 2018b) and workshop-based critiques and reflections, which, 
from the researcher’s experience, tend to be superficial, speculative and fudged, blaming 
everything on the government for lacking the political will to invest in child protection. 
What was glaringly absent from such assertions was a detailed examination of how the 
lack of political will has affected public spending on child protection.  
With this backdrop, there are numerous fiscal paradoxes from the available 
literature that prompted this investigation: why, for example, do allocations to child 
protection increase at a slower pace than education, agriculture, health, and security 
spending? Why is it that the under-funding of child protection is also a problem in 
countries doing well economically, such as Botswana? Why is the little funding to child 
protection earmarked to a few programs? These are some of the questions that concerns 
this study.  
1.5 Goal and Objectives of the Study 
 
The main goal of the study is to investigate how the political economy of the state-society 
complex affects public spending on child protection in selected African countries.  
Guided by this goal, the specific research questions that this study seeks to answer are: 
• To what extent do socio-cultural and political constructions of childhood and 
children’s rights influence decisions on public spending on child protection? 
• How do configurations and functioning of the state machinery, including fiscal 
decentralisation, affect public spending on child protection? 
• How do interests, power, class alliances and constructions of hegemony by 
political elites and other stakeholders affect public spending on child protection? 
• How can a political economy approach be effectively applied to improve public 




1.6 Rationale for the Study  
 
Until recently, studies on child protection have been confined to social work and, to some 
degree, children’s rights - especially in the past two decades. There are countless studies 
situated in social work which examine the underlying drivers, manifestations and impacts 
of abuse, neglect, exploitation, and violence against children (ANPPCAN 2014; Barnett 
& Wedge 2009; Davis et al. 2014; Wessells 2015). In several of these studies, child 
protection is treated as a social, technical, and politically neutral subject, which should 
not become entangled with ‘dirty’ politics and dragged into the world of economics. Such 
treatment is potentially misleading in that it runs the risk of creating a false impression 
that child protection has nothing to do with politics, but only about care for a specific 
demographic group because of its vulnerability (Boakye-Boateng 2010; Jenks 2005). Yet, 
it is dangerous to insulate child protection from the political and economic environment in 
which it is embedded (White 2002).  
By failing to situate the discussion on public spending on child protection within the 
prevailing political and economic context, analyses of public spending on child protection 
have run the risk of being superficial (Boyden & Dercon 2012). A purist characterisation 
of child protection, arising from insulation from politics, economics and other structural 
factors, including globalisations of development paradigms, is likely to result in a 
misdiagnosis of underlying drivers of abuse, neglect and exploitation – and of the reasons 
behind observed funding patterns. Subsequently, this may lead to unsustainable, piece-
meal and issue-based child protection interventions, and flawed resource allocation. 
Understanding contextual realities is an imperative in development and formulation of 
child protection interventions and budgets (Folscher & Allan 2014; Kropiwnicki 2012; 
Lachman & Poblete 2002). If considering that child protection is influenced by several 
variables within and outside a given polity then unravelling political economy forces at 
play in the allocation of available national resources is non-optional. White (2002:14), 
using Bangladesh as a case study, questions the technical way in which some studies 
have approached child protection matters and warns against the “abstraction” of children 
from their contexts. Such abstractions may result in governments and civil society 




poverty and exploitation. White’s (2002) views build on earlier conclusions by Pupavac 
(2001:101) that many writers on children often “de-emphasize the influence of the wider 
social, economic and political circumstances” behind the underdevelopment of children 
and their continued abuse and exploitation. Drawing from observations by authors such 
as White (2002) and Pupavac (2001), this study seeks to find explanations to observed 
patterns of public spending on child protection in selected countries through a pollical 
economy lens. This study pitches child protection as an interdisciplinary socio-economic 
development issue which is as much a sociological as it is an economic and political 
matter.  
Inspired by Norton and Elson (2002) and Wildavsky (1984) the study hypothesises 
that the most plausible explanation of observed trends in public spending on child 
protection lies with the politics and economics of budgeting in each country, as well as 
social constructions of childhood that are linked to conceptualisations of child protection 
(Mason & Steadman 1997;  White 2002). As Norton & Elson (2002) and Wildavsky (1984) 
separately argued, budgeting is as much a political as it is a technical process - subject 
to a range of influences, interests and power-plays. DFID (2007) also argues that to better 
understand public budgeting one should appreciate the politics at play, including incentive 
systems underpinning decision making. DFID (2009) later used this conclusion to 
promote the use of political economy analysis (PEA) as a tool to assess the influence of 
economic and political forces on how public resources should be distributed. However, 
as Pupavac (2001:108) observed, there is an “absence of discussion of power relations” 
when it comes to child protection spending.  
1.7 Significance of the Study 
 
This interdisciplinary study is significant in many respects. First, its strength, and possible 
uniqueness, is that it comprehensively discusses child protection through a political 
economy rather than a social work lens, as is normally the case. There are hardly any 
scholarly works utilising a political economy approach to examine reasons behind the 
under-funding of child protection, except to understand the prevalence of harms to 




(Bachman 2000; Okoli 2009) and female genital mutilation (Chesnokova & Vaithianathan 
2007; Ouedraogo & Koissy-Kpein 2019).  
Second, the study explores the topic in both humanitarian and development 
settings. In most cases, researchers focus on one setting. Third, the study proffers 
concrete suggestions on how a political economy approach can be used to influence 
decisions on public spending on child protection. This way, the study hopes to extend the 
utility of political economy studies beyond their usual confines notably: developmental 
problem analysis and risk and vulnerability assessments (DFID 2009; Green 2012).  
Fourth, the political economy perspective explored in this study enriches the 
systems approach to child protection, which emphasises a holistic perspective by looking 
at complementary actions, processes and institutions that should work together to create 
a protective environment for children (Save the Children 2009; UNICEF 2010). By 
examining forces, interests, and incentives surrounding decisions on how much 
governments in selected countries spend on child protection, the study contributes to 
knowledge on systemic and structural issues that either enable or hinder effective child 
protection.  
Fifth, the study is strategic in the sense that it goes beyond the most discussed 
social sectors namely health, education, nutrition, sanitation, and hygiene when it comes 
to public spending on children. As rightfully pointed out by UNICEF (2020b:04), “child 
protection budget analyses and engagement … is far less developed than in other sectors 
like education, health or WASH”.  Besides tonnes of studies to measure spending on the 
above, excluding child protection, several investigations have also been undertaken to 
assess underlying challenges and bottlenecks, some of which through a political economy 
lens (Awly & Schech 2007; Bradstein 2003; Bursztyn 2015). Through this study, the 
importance of focusing on public spending on child protection, as a key aspect of human 
capital development is highlighted.  
Lastly, the study makes an original contribution to the body of knowledge on how 
child-focused organisations can navigate the messy public budgeting sphere to advance 
the child protection agenda. Most child protection focused organisations have been 
groping in the dark, without in-depth knowledge of what is behind budget decisions 




the study has the potential to illuminate the design of budget advocacy strategies by child 
rights advocates.   
1.8 Structure of the Study 
 
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Chapter Two explores classical and 
contemporary literature on the political economy of public spending in relation to child 
protection. Chapter Three presents the theoretical framework of the study, whilst Chapter 
Four is focused on the study design and methodology. Chapters Five discusses child 
protection policies, laws, strategies, and plans, which should ideally guide resource 
allocation. Chapter Six presents empirical data on the size and composition of budget 
allocations to child protection in each of the selected countries. Chapter Seven addresses 
the question of how prevailing constructions of childhood in the four countries have 
influenced the visibility of child protection in government plans and budgets. Chapter Eight 
examines how configurations and functioning of the state machinery affect budget 
allocations to child protection. Chapter Nine investigates how fiscal politics at various 
stages of the budget cycle impacts on the size and level of budget allocations to child 
protection throughout the budget. Lastly, Chapter 10 draws conclusions from the 
preceding discussion and proffers recommendations on how a political economy 
approach can be used to influence decisions on the size and composition of public 


















Political economy has, in recent years, become a buzzword especially amongst donors, 
international organisations, academics, and civil society organisations (Caporaso & 
Levine 2004; DFID 2009; Frey 2011). As Fisher & Marquette (2014) observed, its 
relevance to economic governance, particularly in how public resources are mobilised, 
allocated and utilised, is therefore difficult to ignore. The concept itself is not new, but its 
conceptual parameters and applications have widened significantly over the past two 
hundred years (Browning & Kilmister 2006; Harris & Booth 2013; Hudson & Leftwich 
2014). The focus of this chapter is to review literature on how political economy studies 
have penetrated the field of children’s rights, more specifically public spending on child 
protection. Given the dearth of specific information on the political economy of public 
spending on child protection in academic literature, the chapter is pieced together from 
analyses drawn from separate strands of literature on ‘political economy’ as a concept in 
general, ‘political economy of public spending’, ‘budgeting for children’ and ‘constructions 
of childhood’.  
The first section explores the topic ‘political economy’ as a development concept, 
with the aim of drawing conceptual contours within which the following discussion is 
situated. To do justice to the topic, historical and contemporary lenses are applied in order 
to trace the changing meanings and practical applications of political economy studies to 
public spending on child protection. The rest of the chapter discusses selected political 
economy variables which have influenced the nature and level of public spending on child 
protection in Africa. These include the international child rights normative framework, 
politics of budgeting, state fragility and humanitarian emergencies, fiscal decentralisation 
and global forces. It is from this chapter that the journey to formulate a narrative that 




2.1 Evolution of Political Economy as a Development Concept  
 
Political economy is a concept which has evolved over centuries (Bharadwaj 1994; Bruno 
1994; Mcloughlin 2014). Bruno’s (1994:24-49) analysis of the genesis of ‘political 
economy’ suggests that the concept emerged from the work of philosophers-cum-
economists between the 17th and the 19th centuries in their quest to understand the 
processes of economic production, accumulation, wealth creation, and their distribution 
by those in power. One can therefore argue that original conceptions of political economy 
leaned more towards economics than political science.   
Smith (1776), Mill (1844), Wayland (1870) and Jevons (1879) are amongst the 
earliest writers to use the term political economy. Although some differences in emphasis 
could be deciphered in their writings, a common theme is that political economy was 
originally studied from the perspective of wealth creation and economic growth. To Smith 
(1776), widely seen as the founding father of modern economics, the most important 
question that a political economy study of that time sought to answer was how to make 
production, and subsequently, distribution, more efficient in order to create wealth for 
nations, leading to economic prosperity. To achieve the efficiency objective, Smith 
advocated for a free-market economy, regulated by the ‘invisible hand’ – which he called 
laws of demand and supply4 (Smith 1776; Jevons 1879). Though issues of child protection 
were not explicitly mentioned in Smith’s writings he however, makes a strong case for 
governments to provide public goods required by citizens. Smith (1776) saw government 
as a key player in providing public services such as roads. He also believed that the rich, 
through the payment of taxes, should contribute to government revenue to deliver public 
services. Although Smith (1776) did not touch on specific issues to do with children, his 
voluminous works are relevant to this study, for stating that the government has a role to 
play in protecting citizens from harm, and in delivering essential services.  
Mill (1844:07) understood political economy as a ‘science’ consisting of two grand 
inquiries: ‘production’ (of which human labour is the main instrument) and ‘consumption’ 
by individuals and government. In between the two, he found an intermediate inquiry, 
 
4Demand refers to the extent to which a product or service is needed, measured by how much people are willing to 




which he termed ‘distribution’. As was the case with Smith (1776), child welfare was not 
specifically mentioned in Mill (1844)’s writings as a public good. Wayland (1870: 12-15) 
defined political economy in almost the same way as Smith (1776) and Mill (1844) but 
brought a governance dimension to the discourse by emphasising the importance of 
constitutions and laws to guide relations and interactions between people in complex 
processes of wealth creation. National constitutions and laws have now become the main 
anchors of child protection interventions in many countries across the word.  
Jevons (1879) preferred to look at the subject through ‘utility’, ‘wealth’, ‘value’, 
‘commodities’, ‘labour’, ‘land’ and ‘capital’ lenses which he called “elements of political 
economy” (Jevons 1879:1-10). Jevons argued that political economy is not ‘mere’ 
science, but a mathematical one. Accordingly, he used mathematical models to explain 
how the elements work and the relations between them. Jevons was probably naïve for 
limiting political economy to metrics, effectively ignoring qualitative elements which relate 
to human interactions. It is this technocratic view of political economy and the blinkered 
focus on economic factors which triggered criticisms from other classical philosophers 
especially Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1771-1831) and Karl Marx (1790-1884). 
According to Browning & Kilmister (2006: 16), Hegel and Marx found the emphasis 
on economic output and wealth creation to be inherently faulty. Their main argument was 
that previous writers had turned a blind eye to the human relations and social interactions 
that underpin wealth creation (Marx 1859). Marx and Hegel’s contribution to the study of 
political economy is in that they brought a social dimension to earlier definitions of political 
economy. The two philosophers argued that a political economy study would be 
inconclusive if it failed to delve into the dynamics of human interactions in their complexity, 
beyond issues of commodities, prices, and consumption. Hegel identified three factors 
that interact with each other in the political economy sphere, namely, family, civil society 
and the state (Caporaso & Levine 2004: 7-9). Additionally, he argued for “wider social 
and political values and commitments to limit the autonomy of the market and the impact 
of economic individualism” (Browning & Kilmister 2006:14). Although not explicitly 
referring to children, the idea of making the family part of the political economy jigsaw 




to embrace social dynamics, including how human beings relate and interact with each 
other in the process of wealth creation and distribution.  
Karl Marx’s ideas were more radical than those of Hegel in that they brought in 
deeply political issues of class interests and power relations (Bharadwaj 1994). Karl Marx 
vehemently argued that the systems of production were not only complex, but also full of 
contradictions, as different economic classes form, advance their interests and ultimately 
struggle over resources and ways through which wealth is created (Marx 1859; Wayland 
1870). Issues of class interests and struggles over scarce resources are a global 
phenomenon, observable in Africa as well. It is not surprising that Bates (1983:145) has 
argued that several governments in Africa advance the interests of the ‘emerging’ 
indigenous bourgeoisie, hence their portrayal as “agencies of class interests”. Ekeh 
(1975: 91-94), who shies away from the term indigenous bourgeoisie preferring ‘civic 
public’, argues that ideological and policy orientations of this ruling class borrow heavily 
from colonial systems.   
According to Marx’s (1859) worldview, conflict between the social forces of 
production leading to class struggle was an intrinsic and permanent feature of the political 
economy of wealth creation. In contemporary political economy, issues raised by Hegel 
and Marx, regarding class interests and conflictual relationships between those who own 
means of production and those who do not, are often ignored. But there is another type 
of conflict, which is relevant to this study, between traditional and contemporary societies, 
which Ekeh (1975:92) calls ‘primordial’ and ‘civic’ publics. The primordial publics 
(communities in their natural - often rural settings) do not always see things in the same 
way as the civic public (composed of educated and urbanised people running 
governments and businesses). This issue will be revisited in the section below on socio-
cultural constructions of childhood.  
Child protection, as a distinct child rights issue, was not visible in both Hegel and 
Marx’s writings. The closest reference to child protection made by Marx (1959) was within 
the context of exploitation of workers (which also included children). Marx believed that 
the poorest families, including children, were perpetually exploited by the rich and needed 
government protection (O’Hara 2012: 33-39). Marx did not treat children as a distinct 




Concepts such as class interests and power expounded by Hegel and Marx were 
later revisited by several writers in the 19th and 20th centuries. One such writer is Antonio 
Gramsci (1891-1937) who is well known for his theory of hegemony. Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony is built around four concepts: ‘interests’, ‘power relations’, ‘hegemony’ and 
‘counter-hegemony’ (Gramsci 1971). Gramsci’s ideas lean more towards political science 
than economics. He believed that when one ideology, worldview or political institution 
dominates, it presents its interests as common to all, with the aim of systematically 
suppressing other ideas and ideologies and consequently constructing its hegemony 
(Gramsci 1971; Simon 1991). The resultant ‘hegemony’ is re-adjusted and renegotiated 
regularly, by coercion, consent, or both, through the “war of manoeuvre”, which is outright 
conflict and of “position”, being a long-term effort to affect change through ideological 
transformation and political reform (Moore 2003:12). When one group becomes 
‘hegemonic’, others have the option of challenging it, including by formulating alternatives, 
which may or may not be conditioned or ripe for change (Gramsci 1971:67). Gramsci’s 
theory of hegemony is especially relevant to this study considering how the minority world 
(mainly America, Australia, Canada, and Europe) has globally constructed children’s 
rights and shaped views on child protection. The role played by the minority world will be 
addressed later in this chapter.  
Recently, many other writers such as Bruno (1994), Mill (2004), DFID (2009) and 
McLoughlin (2014) have explored the concept of ‘political economy’. In his attempt to 
describe the distinctive nature of contemporary political economy, Bruno (1994:26-46) 
locates the study of political economy at the intersection of politics and economics. More 
specifically, he describes political economy as the study of how politics influences 
economics and vice versa, but also how both factors influence decision-making by those 
with power. Acemoglu & Robinson (2001: 13-15) have described contemporary political 
economy as the study of how various institutions are governed and function. This involves 
power relations within and between institutions and their interaction with the general 
population in a given polity. The main theme in Acemoglu & Robinson (2001)’s writing is 
good economic and political governance, which come as a direct result of effective and 
transformational leadership, strong institutional arrangements, as well as laws, systems, 




Robinson’s (2001) views is that they place too much emphasis on formal systems without 
paying attention to the often more powerful informal relations, connections and power 
sources, including issues such as patrimonialism or neopatrimonialism in Africa (Pitcher 
et al. 2009). 
Browning & Kilmister (2006) argue that both formal and informal institutions and 
processes matter. Formal institutions refer to the state apparatus, rules of the game, as 
well as official decision-making structures (DFID 2009; Fritz et al. 2009). Informal 
institutions, on the other hand, denote unwritten rules and decision-making practices that 
are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels often 
through personal, social, political, and ethnic ties (Helmke & Levitsky 2004: 726). To 
illustrate the power of informal institutions and incentives, Bates (1983: 56-59) observed 
that policies, laws and set procedures of resource sharing and management are often 
overridden by politicians operating under an entirely different set of informal incentives, 
sanctions and enforcement mechanisms. 
The Department for International Development of the United Kingdom (DFID) has 
provided a fairly comprehensive and most contemporary definition of political economy, 
which many writers have adopted: 
Political economy is the interaction of political and economic processes in a 
society; the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and 
individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these 
relationships over time (DFID 2009:13).  
In this study, DFID’s (2009:13) definition has been expanded to include socio-cultural 
dimensions such as prevailing social norms and constructions of childhood. The study 
also accepts the elaboration of the word ‘processes’ by Frey (2011) to encompass a full 
range of actions, relationships, behaviours as well as interests, incentives and systems 
through which decisions are made. In the making of these decisions, Fisher and 
Marquette (2014:2-10) highlight the centrality of ‘power’ and ‘agency’ in the way people 
and institutions interact. According to these two authors, agency refers to the capacity to 




To conclude this section, it is important to highlight some key elements, or 
characterisations of contemporary political economy woven from the historicised 
overview above. Firstly, a political economy study requires one to investigate personal 
and institutional interests and incentives available to those in power to make certain 
decisions and to pursue certain courses of action (Harris & Booth 2013; Wayland 2006). 
Secondly, political economy studies delve into issues of power relations between and 
amongst different development players, as they jostle for finite resources and seek to 
construct and perpetuate their ideological, political, and economic domination (Gramsci 
1971; Harris 2013; Keefer 2004;). Thirdly, studies on political economy unpack underlying 
systemic issues that produce and perpetuate child poverty, abuse, and exploitation, such 
as constructions of childhood, structure of society, social norms, and gender 
constructions (Boyden 2014; Keefer 2002; White 2002). Fourthly, it involves 
understanding how economic and political institutions are structured and function, 
including an investigation of political regime characteristics, state structures and decision-
making processes on how public resources are distributed and shared (Acemoglu & 
Robinson 2001; Collier 2010; Evans 2010). Lastly, it is concerned with the interaction 
between and amongst states, including with global institutions (Bond 2007; Bruno 1994; 
Easterly 2001). While the study will examine how these five factors interact to influence 
decision making on government spending on child protection, greater focus will be on the 
first three, with limited attention to the remaining two.  
To sum it up, political economy is a multi-disciplinary concept located at the 
intersection of political science, economics, development studies, and law. The rest of the 
chapter examines literature on the above-mentioned elements of contemporary political 
economy, starting with global forces, which fall within the purview of the international 
political economy of children’s rights.  
2.2 International Political Economy of Children’s Rights  
 
Child protection policy and budget decisions are influenced by a range of forces within 
and outside the state, some of which fall within the realm of the international political 
economy (DFID 2007; Hart 2008; UNCRC 2003, 2016). The term ‘forces’ is used loosely 




budget decisions by governments. Within the broad banner of children’s rights, these 
forces include children’s rights commitments such as the UNCRC (1989) (and its optional 
protocols) and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), 
global development blue prints such as Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, and 
cross-country lobby and funding initiatives. International child rights commitments belong 
to the normative branch of political economy, which serves as the frame of reference on 
how children’s rights should be respected, protected, and fulfilled.  
All four case study countries ratified the CRC (1989) and the ACRWC (1990). 
Botswana ratified the CRC in 1995, Kenya in 1990, South Sudan in 2016 and Zimbabwe 
in 1990. The adoption of the CRC in 1989 was a defining moment in the global history of 
child protection (Boyden 2014: Peleg 2012). At the normative level, the CRC closed the 
debate on who is a child, how a child should be treated and what rights a child is entitled 
to (Mitchell 2006; Boyden 2014). The model global child has an age limit of 18 years and 
should be protected by the state and where necessary by the international community 
(Brochlehurst 2006; Linde 2014; Van Bueren 2011). The CRC views childhood as a 
matter of “public and not merely private concern” (Sloth-Nielson 2012:126).  
Article 4 of the CRC (1989) places an obligation on state parties to undertake 
legislative, policy and administrative measures ‘to the maximum extent of their available 
resources’ and, where necessary, ‘to seek international cooperation’ to ensure 
implementation of children’s rights. The measures were later popularised as ‘General 
measures of implementation’ by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC) through a ‘General comment (GC)’5 on Article 4 (UNCRC 2003). GC No. 5 
(2003) on ‘General measures of implementation of the CRC’, calls upon state parties to 
“make children visible in government budgets” (UNCRC 2003:12). In section 51, the GC 
further made it a requirement for state parties to develop mechanisms for the identification 
of “the proportion of national and other budgets allocated to the social sector and, within 
 
5 A General Comment (GC) refers to official interpretation by treaty bodies such as the UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child of the provisions of its respective human rights treaty. A general comment covers a wide range of subjects, 
from the comprehensive interpretation of substantive provisions, such as the right to life or the right to adequate food, 
to general guidance on the information that should be submitted in state reports relating to specific articles of the 
treaties. General comments also deal with wider, cross-cutting issues, such as institutional, legislative, administrative 




that, to children, both directly and indirectly”.  The why, what and how state parties should 
commit resources to implement children’s rights was further explained in GC No. 19 
(2016) on ‘Public budgeting for the realization of children’s rights’ (UNCRC 2016).   
Through the ACRWC (1990) African leaders wanted to show the world that an 
“African conception of children’s rights did exist” (Sloth-Nielson 2012:124). The ACRWC 
(1990) has nuanced clauses that speak to Africa-specific child protection issues such as 
child soldiers, children of imprisoned mothers, culturally specific understandings of the 
extended family, harmful practices, refugee, and displaced children (Okoli 2009). Unlike 
the CRC (1989), the ACRWC (1990), in Article 31, spells out the responsibilities of the 
child to his/her family and communities including respect of adults in all circumstances. 
Sloth-Nielson (2012:127) argues that the ACRWC (1990) should not be wrongly 
interpreted as an African rush to echo the CRC (1989), but a contextually specific 
“substantiation of an abiding concern for children and protection of their rights”.   
In 2018, the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACERWC), also issued a GC on ‘State party obligations under the African Charter on 
the rights and welfare of the child (Article 1) and systems strengthening for child 
protection’. To a large extent, this is similar to GC No.5 of the UNCRC (2003) in that it 
outlines general measures of implementation of the ACRWC (ACERWC 2018).  The GC 
demands that sufficient resources be “mobilised, allocated and spent in an accountable, 
effective, equitable, transparent, and sustainable manner” to implement children’s rights 
(ACERWC 2018: 38).  This GC also makes a clarion call for the strengthening of national 
child protection systems. Before this GC, the ACERWC also issued several others which 
relate to child protection, most notably on children and armed conflict, children of 
incarcerated and imprisoned parents and primary caregivers, name and nationality, and 
on ending child marriage.  
At a policy level, the UNCRC and the ACERWC have done their best to call upon 
state parties to invest sufficiently, equitably and effectively on child protection. But, it’s 
one thing to have commitments on paper, it is another to implement them. As highlighted 
above, the responsibility of states to equitably and sustainably invest in children through 




Realize Children’s Rights (2016)’ of the UNCRC (2016) and GC No. 5 of the ACERWC 
(2018). Using a budget cycle approach, GC No. 19 of the CRC provides guidance to 
states on measures that they should undertake to ensure sufficient, equitable, and 
effective public spending on child focused sectors and programmes, including child 
protection. Moreover, GC No. 19 advocates for a budget classification system which 
allows for the identification of child-focused budget lines, including child protection 
(UNCRC 2016). Section 84 of GC No 19 states that:  
Clear budget classification systems provide a basis for States and other entities to monitor 
how budget allocations and actual expenditures affecting children are managed in relation 
to the budget principles. This calls for budget lines and codes which, at a minimum, 
disaggregate all planned, enacted, revised and actual expenditures that directly affect 
children, by:  
(a) Age, recognising that the definition of age cohorts will differ from state to state; 
 (b) Gender;  
(c) Geographical area, for example, by subnational unit; 
 (d) Current, and possible future, categories of children in vulnerable situations, taking into 
consideration article 2 of the Convention;  
(e) Source of revenue, be it national, subnational, regional or international; 
 (f) Responsible units, such as departments, ministries or agencies at the national and 
subnational levels (GC No. 19, 2016)  
There are several other GCs that talk about investing in child protection, a key one being 
GC No. 13 of the UNCRC (2011) on the ‘The right of the child to freedom from all forms 
of violence’. The GC No. 8 of the UNCRC (2006) on ‘The right of the child to protection 
from corporal punishment and other cruel or degrading forms of punishment’ is also 
relevant. GC No. 13 is more specific when it comes to issues of public spending on child 
protection. It specifically calls upon governments at national and local levels to ensure:  
adequate investment in human, financial and technical resources dedicated to the 
implementation of a child rights-based and integrated child protection and support system 




The above international commitments and guidance documents, especially the GCs, are 
undoubtedly a step in the right direction. Their full implementation is, however, subject to 
many factors including political will by respective governments (Goldman 2012; Nolan 
2013). Nolan’s (2013) assessment of how child rights commitment and guidance 
documents such as GCs are being used at the national level seems to suggest weak 
reference to these instruments in budgeting for children. Nolan (2013:34) concluded that 
there are “serious shortcomings” when it comes to issues of public budgeting for the 
implementation of children’s rights. She also observed that GCs are legalist in tone and 
terminology by their very nature, making them less relevant in public finance and 
anthropology fraternities. This criticism was however made well before GC. No 19 of the 
UNCRC (2016), and GC No. 5 of the ACERWC (2018).  
While the authors of GCs usually do their best to cover relevant contextual issues 
for a given topic, it is not always easy to comprehensively cover all sensitive political 
economy issues such as negative power-relations, interests, and incentives available to 
those in power which undermine the implementation of children’s rights. Regrettably, to 
a certain extent, it is these political economy variables which determine whether such 
global guidance on public spending on children will be followed at national level or not. It 
is therefore dangerous to assume that once a country ratifies an international child rights 
commitment it will fully implement it. This point is particularly relevant if considering that 
Treaty bodies such as the UNCRC do not have the political and resource power to compel 
governments to implement international commitments. In most cases, they rely on the 
good will of states, moral persuasion as well as pressure from civil society for 
governments to implement international child rights commitments (Alina-Loana 2010; 
Hart 2008). Also, the extent to which international commitments are implemented 
depends on whether a country’s legal system is monist or dualist. While a monist system 
sees international and domestic laws as part of the same national legal framework, a 
dualist views the two as separate. Kenya, for example, practice both monism and dualism 
(Mbugwa 2013). The pros and cons of monism and dualism are a subject for a separate 
study. Notwithstanding the above, it is important to note the international law 
implementation principle outlined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which 




them in good faith” (United Nations 1969: 11). This means that it is wrong for a state to 
sign and ratify a treaty only to ignore it.  
In addition to the CRC (1989), ACRWC (1990), their optional protocols and GCs, 
there are also other global commitments relevant to public spending on child protection. 
These include the Human Rights Council (HRC) resolution on investment in children 
[A/HRC/28/L.28]) entitled ‘Rights of the Child: Towards better investment in the rights of 
the child’, adopted in 2015. The resolution argues cogently for governments to prioritise 
public investments in children. Its preamble makes a light reference to political economy 
issues. In particular, it acknowledges that “economic policies are not neutral in their effect 
on children’s rights” and that “transparent, inclusive, participatory and accountable 
governance and fiscal processes play a critical role in combating corruption and ensuring 
efficient resource mobilisation, allocation and spending for the protection and realisation 
of children’s rights” (OHCR 2015: 03).The resolution places emphasis on the need for 
public budgeting to be guided by child rights principles and for governments to engender 
a “life-cycle approach” in public budgeting (OHCR 2015:04). This approach requires 
governments to consider age-specific deprivations, vulnerabilities, and needs when 
formulating policies, plans and budgets. The emphasis on the life cycle approach is 
consistent with contemporary child protection studies which posit childhood as a life-stage 
on the life course (Jenks 2005; Boyden 2014). It is important, however, to note that when 
it comes to implementation, resolutions of this nature have the same weaknesses as GCs. 
Nolan (2013: 34-6) revealed that there is often a gap between the making of international 
policies and their implementation at national level. 
Another global commitment relevant to this study is the 2030 Agenda on 
Sustainable Development, which replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
as well as associated financing modalities outlined in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda 
(AAAA) on Financing for Development (UN 2015). The 2030 Agenda on Sustainable 
Development is made up of 17 goals and 169 targets. Sustainable Development Goal 16 
has the specific target of ending all forms of violence, including violence against children 
(SDG16.2). Article 7 of the AAAA on Financing for Development underscores the need 




We recognize that investing in children and youth is critical to achieving inclusive, 
equitable and sustainable development for present and future generations, and we 
recognize the need to support countries that face particular challenges to make 
the requisite investments in this area. We reaffirm the vital importance of promoting 
and protecting the rights of all children and ensuring that no child is left behind 
(Article 7 of the AAAA, 2015). 
For the first time, children’s issues are explicitly mentioned in a global agreement on 
financing for development. The 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development gave birth to 
the idea of a Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children.6 One of the priority 
action points of the Partnership is to mobilise resources to invest in child protection and 
address political and cultural barriers that make child protection hard to tackle. The 
Partnership was formed after governments and other child rights campaigners realised 
that efforts to prevent and respond to violence against children are chronically under-
funded in most countries (CPWG 2012; Save the Children 2009). The Partnership aims 
to explore the potential for innovative and results-based funding to deliver measurable 
reductions in levels of violence against children through setting up of The Global Fund to 
End Violence Against Children.  
There are other global initiatives which relate to child protection such as the Global 
Child Protection Working Group and the Global Partnership to End Child Marriage. These 
initiatives serve as outreach, lobby, advocacy, and resource mobilisation platforms for 
specific child protection actions. All four case study countries are actively involved in 
many of these initiatives. To them, they constitute an opportunity to mobilise additional 
resources to invest in child protection.  
In conclusion, regardless of the yawning gap between commitment and reality, 
child rights conventions, charters, GCs and resolutions have helped raise the political 
profile of child protection at both national and global levels. As Chapter Five will 
 
6The Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children is global mechanisms for mobilising resources and 
coordinating efforts of those seeking to prevent violence, protect childhood, and help make societies safe for children. 
The partnership offers the opportunity for everyone who believes in ending violence against children to come together, 
combine their efforts and maximise their impact. Governments, international organisations, NGOs and civil society, 





demonstrate, international child rights commitments have also shaped the content of child 
protection laws and strategies in each of the four case study countries. The impact of 
international and national laws may not be visible now and in the same way in different 
countries, but they are useful tools in the arms of civil society and governments as they 
advocate for improved spending on child protection.  
2.3  Child Protection and Politics of Public Budgeting at National 
Level 
 
From the international political economy of children’s rights, the discussion moves to the 
politics of public budgeting at national level. Politics and power relations are central 
themes in political economy studies. Politics in budgeting manifest in the way public 
spending priorities are identified and in how public resources are allocated, utilised and 
accounted for (Norton & Elson 2002; Wildavisky 1984). To explain how politics in 
budgeting affects public spending on child protection, this sub-section focuses on two 
streams of literature: a) political business cycles and b) fiscal politics throughout the 
budget cycle.  
 
2.3.1 Political Business Cycles  
Election cycles have an influence on fiscal policies and decisions on budget allocations 
(Hibbs 1981; Nordhaus 1975; Rubin 2013). The political business cycle (PBC) is one of 
the most common theories to explain the relationship between election cycles and public 
spending (Hibbs 1981; Nordhaus 1975). The central idea of the theory is that politicians 
seek to influence or manipulate economic policies, including fiscal policies, in order to 
create favourable macro-economic conditions, which allow them to gain the acceptance, 
support, and loyalty of voters. The underlying assumption of PBCs is that voters tend to 
care about the economy while politicians care about power (Nordhaus 1975:12). In 
practice, PBCs reflect the fusion of ideology and political opportunism (Kitschelt & 
Wilkinson 2009; Schultz 1995). To win the hearts of voters, governments would have to 




economic interests and the subjective preferences of their core political constituencies” 
(Hibbs 1981:07). 
To effectively use PBCs, the incumbent government should have the incentive, 
capacity, and opportunity to manipulate national policies before an election (Keefer & 
Khemani 2003). Opportunities that incumbent politicians may exploit include having a 
majority in parliament - popularly known as the “tyranny of numbers” in Kenya (Mueller 
2008: 24), information asymmetries, lack of agency amongst citizens, and weak 
opposition political parties (Schultz 1995: 80-84). Most of these conditions hold true in 
several African countries, including those selected for this study. The ability of incumbents 
to manipulate fiscal and other macro-economic policies also depends on the autonomy, 
capacity, and integrity of the institutions in question as well as the incumbent’s security 
when going into an election (Nordhaus 1975:173). If the incumbent is certain to win an 
election regardless of the policy measures they put in place, they may have no incentive 
to go out of their way to sacrifice extra resources to win additional votes (Krause 2005:81). 
In support of the PBC theory, Black et al.’s (2013) studies in Africa showed that 
during election time, it is common for incumbent governments to prioritise ‘visible’ 
initiatives such as construction of bridges and schools, education bursaries, food and 
agricultural subsidies instead of intangibles like child protection in order to win the hearts 
of the electorate. Braidwood (2015:1) calls such visible expenditures “desirable pork”. 
Neumann & Ssozi’s (2016) analysis of the relationship between fiscal policy and electoral 
cycles in Sub-Saharan Africa also found that infrastructure expenditures increase in the 
run-up to a presidential election, especially if there is a strong contender to the incumbent. 
Building on ideas put forward by Nordhaus (1975), Hibbs (1977) introduced the 
element of ‘vote maximisation’ when making decisions during the election period. The 
idea behind voter maximisation is that politicians usually seek to find the appropriate level 
of policy change and transformation that will satisfy supporters and voters. However, the 
thought that politicians in Africa would sit down to calculate the ‘voter maximising’ point 
with regards to public spending seems to be rather academic, if not utopian. Widespread 
poverty in Africa, which, for the most part, has a rural face, makes ‘dishing handouts’ to 




of African states also observed that budgeting is usually “highly politicised”, with 
government officials having the tendency to “purchase political support and repay favours 
via expenditure programmes that target important groups” towards an election. Using 
Kenya as an example, Mueller (2008) and Lumumba’s (2008) independent analyses 
corroborate Black et al.’s (2013) views that public budgeting is often manipulated by 
incumbent governments to achieve political goals.  
PBCs have also been observed at sub-national level. In his study of fiscal 
decentralisation in South Africa, Kroth (2014) found that provinces where the ruling 
African National Congress (ANC) had a higher vote margin generally received a higher 
equitable share, especially in the run-up to elections. This was despite the existence of 
an intergovernmental transfer formula for sharing public resources amongst local 
authorities (Kroth 2014:25). He also discovered election-related increases in net claims 
on the government in the run-up to an election. Kroth’s (2014) findings brought to the fore 
the importance of data in public finance management, which can be manipulated by 
incumbents to advance their interests. Alt and Lassen (2006) argue that data is a key 
mediating political economy variable. They arrived at this conclusion after observing that 
in countries where data is available and accessible to the public, and with clear fiscal 
transparency mechanisms, governments tend to budget effectively for their citizens.  
Before closing the discussion on PBCs, one question remains unanswered: is child 
protection likely to be prioritized or sacrificed during an election period?  The truth is that 
there isn’t sufficient evidence to draw meaningful conclusions on this matter. What is 
possible, at this stage, is to discuss some of the key features of PBCs which can 
potentially impact public spending on child protection. 
From a policy perspective, PBCs typically give primacy to economic development 
objectives when governments make expenditure decisions.  From Hibbs’ (1977, 1981) 
and Nordhaus’ (1975) models of a PBC, governments will concentrate on macro-
economic fundamentals such as employment creation, lowering the cost of living, and 
promoting ‘favorable’ taxation, and interest rates, instead of focusing on social 
development goals such as child protection (Hibbs 1977, 1981; Krause 2005; Nordhaus 




seen in Zimbabwe between 2005-2008 and in many other countries is fertile ground for 
voter frustration leading to change in voter preferences. Stabilizing, and better still, 
growing an economy, should be a natural priority of any government that seeks to be re-
elected. One should not be surprised when governments prioritise investments in sectors 
such as energy, agriculture, and education perceived to have “high multiplier effects” on 
the economy, and with a political appeal to voters, ahead of an election (Bradstein 2003: 
17). Notwithstanding the above, there is a growing body of literature which shows how 
violence against children and other forms of child maltreatment have knock-on effects on 
the economy (Fang et al. 2012, 2015; Pereznieto et al. 2014; Wodon et al. 2018)  
The other point is that child protection is not recognised or mentioned in any 
literature on PBCs as a key determinant of voter preferences and priorities. Whether this 
is deliberate or not – or even ignorance – the key deduction from available literature is 
that that delivering child protection services is not a key motivation for politicians to win 
an election, nor is it something that voters use as a yardstick to measure the performance 
of a politician. It follows from this view, that public spending on child protection is not likely 
to be the focus of politicians during an election.  
But while the PBC theory is plausible, its relevance is not universal. It is not always 
the case that politicians focus on improving the economy to win an election. Instead, as 
shown in Zimbabwe, some politicians resort to other methods of winning elections such 
as intimidation, violence, and even outright rigging (Moore 2014b; Sachikonye 2012). 
Others simply resort to vote-bribing, blatant lying, and playing of tribal/ ethnic cards to 
secure votes (Lumumba 2008; Mueller 2011). 
Despite the above limitations, PBCs cannot be thrown away in a study on the 
political economy of public spending. Accordingly, one of the issues investigated during 
primary data collection is the extent to which election cycles influenced decisions on 
budget allocation to child protection. But, besides PBCs, politics also plays itself in various 
ways throughout the budgeting cycle (Gasper et al. 2018; Norton & Elson 2002; 







2.3.2 Fiscal Politics Throughout the Budget Cycle  
 
Wildavisky (1984) as well as Norton and Elson’s (2002) seminal writings on the politics of 
budgeting shed further light on the relationship between politics and budget decisions. 
They highlight how interests of the leadership, incentive systems, power-relationships, 
and interactions – whether formal or informal – impact on decisions on budget allocations.  
Political leaders’ interests are either personal or institutional (DFID 2009: 26). The 
interests are personal if the aim is private gain, politically or economically. They are 
institutional if the intention is to advance organisational goals such as increased 
acceptance for a political party as well as other private interests of supporters and 
partners (Cayeros & Magalon 2003; DFID 2009). Several studies across the world have 
shown that the interests of the political leadership, and incentives available to them shape 
public spending priorities (Diaz-Cayeros & Magalon 2003; DFID 2009; Gasper et al. 2018; 
Lewis & Hildreth 2010). In Malawi, for example, studies by Rakner et al. (2004) revealed 
that the development interests of the presidency between 2000 and 2004 resulted in more 
spending on agriculture, including through fertilizer subsidies, at the expense of other 
sectors such as education and social welfare. When unchecked, the undue influence of 
political leaders on public budgeting can lead to skewed budget allocations as few 
programmes benefit more than others (Norton & Elson 2002; Lohmann 1998; DFID 2007).  
Personal and institutional interests of those in positions of power sometimes result 
in clientelist public spending (Keefer 2005b; Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2009). Clientelism 
refers to informal relationships between public officials with the responsibility to allocate 
public resources and a certain group of people, based on unwritten rules and processes 
that are asymmetrical but reciprocal (Ekeh 1975; Keefer 2005). Clientelism is a key 
feature of patrimonialism whereby “political relationships are mediated through, and 
maintained by, leaders and subjects, or patrons and clients” (Pitcher et al. 2009: 129). In 
this relationship, the patron delivers certain benefits such as allocation of resources to 
identified ‘clients’ or constituencies in exchange for services and loyalty, including votes 
(Diaz-Cayeros & Magalon 2003: 15). Clientelism creates unequal access to certain 
services as well as vulnerability and dependency of some communities on the patron. 




health, roads, education, subsidies, and cash transfers to a certain group of people, for 
his or her political benefit (Bates 1983; Chang & Grabel 2014).  
Clientelist public spending has been found to be common in programmes such as 
agriculture, transport, social protection, health, and education in the form of ‘pork-barrel’ 
projects (Keefer 2005; Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2009:78; Lumumba 2008). As highlighted 
earlier, pork-barrel projects refer to politically motivated projects aimed at serving ‘local 
interests’ to secure support and acceptance from a group of people (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 
2009:78). Typically, projects such as dam and road construction can be easily 
manipulated to become pork-barrel projects (Frey 2011).  
The relationship between war veterans and the ruling ZANU PF political party in 
Zimbabwe is a classic example of a clientelist relationship, especially between 2000 and 
2009. In this relationship, the Robert Mugabe-led government delivered a range of social 
assistance programmes and benefits such as hefty gratuities and free agricultural inputs 
to war-veterans in return for political loyalty (Moore 2003; Sachikonye 2012). The irony of 
clientelism is that it is usually perceived as ‘normal’ by those voters and politicians who 
benefit from it. It is therefore an acceptable practice in highly ethnicised communities 
where there are clear voting patterns (Diaz-Cayeros & Magalon 2003:04). According to 
Ekeh (1975:105) clientelism emerges when there is conflict between segments of what 
he calls the bourgeoisie (although Marxists would not call a class without ownership of 
the means of production by that name) regarding the proportionate distribution of national 
resources. In contemporary Africa, clientelist relationships often go hand in glove with 
corruption (Moore 2003; Ekeh 1975).  
Apart from interests and incentives available to those in positions of authority, 
power-relationships within government also shape fiscal politics as well as budget 
decisions in a country, as different ministries and departments jostle for finite resources. 
The exercise of power and agency by ministries sometimes turns political during spending 
prioritisation and negotiations for annual ceilings between line ministries and the treasury/ 
ministry of finance (Lindholm 1965). The jostling for limited resources by government 





Studies by Black et al. (2013) in several African countries have shown that 
ministries perceived by budget makers to be powerful and essential for the political 
survival of incumbents often negotiate from a point of advantage compared to their 
counterparts who are not. Pereznieto et al.’s (2011) analysis of trends in social sector 
spending in developing countries show that ‘powerful’ ministries such as local government 
and defense often receive larger allocations than child welfare ministries. This view is 
shared by several child-focused organisations such as Save the Children (2009) and 
UNICEF (2017). The low political profile of social and child welfare ministries means that 
child protection may not receive the attention it deserves in government budgets. A 
budget analysis done by Avati et al. (2018: 4-7) in Malawi revealed that the Ministry of 
Gender, Disability and Child Welfare, which is widely seen as relatively powerless, 
suffered the largest decline in allocations between 2014 and 2016, amounting to 35 
percent in real terms. Of course, the government attributed this decline to poor economic 
performance triggered by a severe drought as well as donor flight following a public 
finance management scandal uncovered in 2014, commonly known as ‘cash gate’. 
Underlying power struggles between ministries over the allocation of scarce public 
resources also manifest in turf wars and in some cases weak coordination and 
collaboration amongst government departments (Rakner et al. 2004).  
The politics of maneuver does not only happen between ministries; it is also 
common within the same ministry as different departments position themselves for more 
funding (Norton & Elson 2002). This type of politics is likely to be counter-productive, 
more so if there are weak systems of consultation and prioritisation within and across 
ministries. Keefer and Khemani’s (2003) research on public budgeting in developing 
countries, of which Africa is overrepresented, revealed that in some countries whilst 
ministries have established structures for stakeholder consultation, the reality is that 
budget decisions are usually made by technocrats in the Ministry of Finance/ Treasury 
without making reference to what stakeholders said during budget consultations. 
Sometimes budget makers have no option but to disregard wish lists from stakeholders 
due to limited fiscal space and pressure from donor partners (Killick 2004). This problem 
partly arises from the absence of a rigorous process to assess and prioritise issues raised 




led groups have often complained that children and young people are not consulted in 
public budgeting (Muchabaiwa 2015: 3-6).   
Fiscal politics in public budgeting does not only occur within the executive arm of 
government; it is also common between executive and legislative arms (Rubin 2013). 
Norton & Elson’s (2002) analysis of the politics of budgeting in several developing 
countries showed that the executive arm of government tends to have more power and 
influence on budget decisions than the legislature. In fact, some legislatures are ridiculed 
for being “rubber stamps” of decisions made by the executive, especially if the latter has 
the majority in parliament/ house of assembly (Posner & Park 2007:08). In such 
situations, if the executive arm of government pushes agendas that exclude child 
protection, legislatures are unlikely to offer counter arguments. It is important to note, 
however, that how budget politics play out within legislatures depends on several factors, 
notably political party composition, capacity of members of parliament (MPs), governance 
culture, and balance of power between legislatures and the presidency in a country 
(Posner & Park 2007). In cases where the ruling government has a majority in parliament, 
there is a high risk of collusion between the executive and the legislature in terms of what 
is to be prioritised in public spending (Posner & Park 2007; Rubin 2013).  
When it comes to decisions on how available resources should be allocated, the 
power-play between the executive and the legislative arm of government also extends to 
local authorities (Kroth 2014; Mudaki & Musaviru 2012b). In Kenya, for example, there 
are several instances whereby Members of County Assemblies (MCAs) went on a 
collision path with their governors over budget allocations. In Makueni County in 2014, 
for example, Governor Kivutha Kibwana fought with his MCAs over the budget for the 
purchase of computers for MCAs and County staff (Mulwa 2014). Several similar 
incidences happened in other counties (Makong 2020; Muriithi 2020). The Kenyan case 
is illustrative of how legislatures, even at local level, advance their own interests when 
making budget decisions. Local legislatures tend to also prefer pork-barrel projects like 
their counterparts at national level (Mulwa 2014; Muriithi 2020). Unfortunately, many of 




 In conclusion fiscal politics assumes different forms, depending on the interests, 
incentives, and power-relationships of people involved in public budgeting. The type of 
politics at play can either advance or undermine public spending on child protection.  
2.4  Childhood Constructions’ Influence on Child Protection Policies 
and Budgets 
 
Several anthropological and social work studies (Jenks 2005; Mason 2005; Mason & 
Steadman 1997; White 2002) have established a connection between childhood 
constructions and child protection policies and, by extension, public spending on child 
protection. The way different societies view children has a bearing on how they are treated 
within the family, in society, and in the law.  
The views held by communities about children are influenced by local and global 
developments (Boyden & Dercon 2002). At the local level, the influences include social 
norms, culture, and structure of relations within and between families (Jenks 2005; Okoli 
2009). Globally, views on childhood have been shaped by international child rights 
conventions such as the CRC (1989), donor funding and multi-country child rights 
initiatives, among other factors (Linde 2014; Mitchel 2006). In this section, the study 
examines recurrent themes on childhood constructions.  
To start, there is a wealth of literature on how local and global definitions and 
constructions of childhood are not always aligned. These include seminal works by 
Boyden (2014), James & Prout (1997), Linde (2014), and Tisdall & Punch (2012). Even 
within the same country, variations in how children are treated are sometimes observable 
across regions and socioeconomic classes (Qvortrup et al. 2002). Prevailing social 
norms, religious beliefs, human development stages, as well as structure and power of 
local institutions underlie these variations (Jenks 2005; Ndofirepi & Shumba 2014).  
The meanings of the concept ‘childhood’ are diverse and fast-approaching a 
“crossroads” because of too many “agendas and interests” (James 2010:485). So much 
is being written about childhood from different angles that led Mason and Steadman 




meaning. Piaget (1955) defines childhood as a biological stage in life shared by all 
children by virtue of their age, regardless of their social and economic backgrounds. 
Sociological constructivists such as Aries (1962), Boyden (1997) and Jenks (2005) 
understand childhood as a socio-cultural construction influenced by society’s structure, 
culture, relationships, social norms, and even ethnic configurations.  
For child rights-based theorists such as Caplain (1997) and Linde (2014), 
childhood is a phase in life which is normatively defined in the CRC (1989) whereby a 
person below the age of 18 is entitled to a set of rights and freedoms. To other writers, 
childhood is seen as a life stage that should be considered in relation to the stages that 
precede and follow it in terms of expectations and assumptions associated with each life 
stage (Huijsmans 2016; Jenks 2005). As a life stage on the life course, childhood can be 
divided into several phases: babyhood/infancy (early childhood) and middle childhood as 
well as early and late adolescence (late childhood) as put forward by Boakye-Boateng 
(2010:111). The boundaries between different phases are not fixed, nor are the key 
characteristics of each stage or the nature of relationships between them static 
(Huijsmans 2016). Camfield and Tafere (2011:249) further argued that childhood 
transitions into adulthood are never linear. In fact, they are multiple and full of 
contradictions. Each society sets parameters on how each generation should relate with 
another, as well as interdependences between and amongst generations (Tisdall & Punch 
2012; Huijsmans 2016). This life course perspective has resulted in childhood being 
understood as a ‘generations’ issue where children and adults negotiate boundaries, 
expectations, roles, and responsibilities associated with childhood (Huijsmans 2016; 
Qvortrup et al. 2002:23). 
The difficulty in apportioning a fixed meaning to the concept has led sociological 
constructivists such as Ndofirepi and Shumba (2014:233) to conclude that childhood is 
“historically, culturally, and socially variable” and subject to a “process of struggle and 
negotiation”. Whichever one’s angle, it is irrefutable that definitions of childhood are 
influenced by insights from several disciplines such as psychology, law, sociology, 
education, political science, health, and development studies (Tisdall & Punch 2012; 




constructions, social constructionists tend to gravitate towards context specific child 
protection interventions because they believe in the plurality of childhood (James 2010; 
Peleg 2018). Child rights theorists tend to lean on the universalised treatment of children, 
as guided by the CRC (1989), even though such assumptions are of late being questioned 
(Peleg 2018).  
Not surprisingly, the meanings attached to childhood continue to evolve. To begin, 
an ontological shift towards an emphasis on “rationality and connectedness” of children 
with adults and non-human forces is being witnessed (Spyrou 2019: 316). Another 
notable shift is from a dialectical characterisation of childhood as either Dionysian or 
Apollonian to an Athenian conception of childhood. Dionysian childhood assumes that a 
child is born with “initial evil”, “corruption” or “Adamic original sin” (Jenks 2005:62-63). 
This inherent sin causes them to misbehave and to commit various kinds of domestic and 
public offences, from which they need to be protected, guided against, or even punished 
for. The Dionysian conceptions may have led to the institutionalisation of violence 
amongst families in their quest to discipline and train children. An Apollonian child, on the 
other hand, is “angelic, innocent and untainted” (Jenks 2005:64-65). Later, the treatment 
of children as innocent souls was dismissed by Thomas Hobbes, (in Mitchel 2006: 43) as 
ontological naivety. Instead, Hobbes saw children with more sceptical eyes as “little 
devils” capable of committing crime and causing nuisance in society, including forming 
criminal gangs, getting involved in drug abuse, and indulging in sex related 
misdemeanours (Mitchel 2006:45). This latter view affirms the Dionysian view of 
childhood. The difference between the Apollonian and Athenian child is that the former is 
supposed to be seen and not heard, whilst the latter is fully interactive. 
The relatively modern conception - Athenian view of childhood - recognises the 
child’s right to self-govern but under adult guidance (Smith 2012:31). The Athenian image 
of childhood, which is essentially an improvement on the Apollonian image, resonates 
very well with rights-based conceptualisations of childhood, promoted by western 
countries, but exported to the rest of the world through non-governmental organisations, 
academics, international conferences and international organisations such as the United 
Nations.  In Athenian views of childhood, children are to be guided and raised not through 




interests and talents (Jenks 2005; Smith 2012). In the Dionysian view, a child is distrusted 
and subjected to strict control by adults, rigid codes and sometimes use of force to 
inculcate certain values in them (Smith 2012:25).  
Lastly, two broad and geographic boundaries have been drawn to describe 
childhood practices notably: ‘minority’ and ‘majority’ world childhoods (Boyden 1997; 
Peleg 2012). The term ‘majority world’ refers to what was traditionally called the Third 
World (Africa, Asia, and Latin America) where most people live. The minority world refers 
to few rich countries in Europe, as well as the United States of America, Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand (Tisdall & Punch 2012). Several studies (Boyden 1997; Jenks 
2005; Katz 2004; Qvortrup et al. 2002) have shown that the way childhood is constructed, 
and child protection understood in the minority world is sometimes different to the majority 
world. Boyden (1997:46) observed that majority world childhoods tend to be viewed as 
“deviant when examined within the globalised model of childhood”. In the minority world, 
childhood is perceived mainly as a time for play and school (Boyden 1997; Peleg 2012; 
Tisdall & Punch 2012). In the minority world, the dominant view of childhood is either 
Apollonian or Athenian, which argues that children’s innocence should be protected. It is 
this minority conception which largely informed the way that the CRC (1989) was written 
(Linde 2014). 
In the majority world, whilst child rights proponents and activists interpret the 
participation of children in income-generation, farming and household chores as child 
labour, concerned communities usually see this as a natural process of transitioning to 
adulthood and the normal way of securing livelihoods (Okoli 2009; Sloth-Nielson 2012). 
Okoli’s (2009) studies on children’s work in Nigeria concluded that children’s vending, 
although considered to be hazardous by child rights activists, is seen by communities as 
an “integral part of their childhood activity” and a “realistic preparation of their future lives 
and careers” (2009:244). Child labour is one area where local and global constructions of 
childhood clash. Even at a scientific level, the line between acceptable and hazardous 
work by children is thin and vexatious (Okoli 2009). The complexity of child labour also 
arises from the “interdependent realities of survival, socialization, and participation” that 
children in Africa find themselves in (Abebe & Bessell 2011: 765). Peleg (2018:326) 




a case study. The net effect of this is that communities are unlikely to support new 
legislation on child labour, let alone expect government to allocate scarce resources to 
an issue they do not consider important. In their review of policies on children and work, 
Bourdillon and Carothers (2019: 387) also argues that most of the policies on child labor 
fail to recognize the benefits that children get from working including new knowledge and 
skills. Accordingly, they argue that future policies on children and work should consider 
the perspectives of children, families, and communities. Available evidence seems to 
suggest that the burden of financing the fight against hazardous work, or government 
policy on the same, is dumped on the shoulders of NGOs and their donor counterparts 
(Okoli 2009).  
The minority vs. majority world dichotomy is illustrative of tensions between the 
two worlds in how children should be raised. It also reveals how the rich and powerful, 
even if few, have influenced global thinking on what constitutes acceptable childhood and 
child protection practice. In the first instance, it is the minority world which, through the 
CRC (1989), shaped hegemonic ideas about childhood and children’s rights (Peleg 
2012). The aid and civil society “industry”, as Bond (2007:25) calls it, has arguably 
become a key vehicle for the exportation of these global ideas on child protection in a 
typical Gramscian style.  
Scholarly works on African childhoods have also been dominated by writers from 
the minority world, who, for the most part, have portrayed African children as “unloved, 
endangered and robbed of their childhood” (Okoli 2009:47). Boakye-Boateng (2010) and 
Dan (1991) observed that in a wide range of western literature about African childhoods 
children are portrayed as the property of their fathers. This means that they could be 
beaten and flogged anytime as a way of instilling discipline and training them to be 
obedient and responsible adults. This also means that a parent has the right to do 
whatever he/she wants – good or bad - to his/her children including subjecting them to 
harmful practices such as giving them away as appeasement to avenging spirits, forced 
and arranged marriages, virginity testing, and female genital mutilation (Boakye-Boateng 
(2010. Patriarchy, cultural beliefs, and the hierarchical structures of African societies have 




Emerging pockets of literature by writers such as Adu-Gyamfi (2014), Ndofirepi & 
Shumba (2014), Nsamenang (2013), and Sloth-Nielson (2012) have, however, sought to 
present a more ‘balanced’ view of childhood in Africa through the presentation of positive 
elements in African culture, socialisations, and family systems. Whilst it is true that some 
children in Africa are exposed to various kinds of abuse and neglect, including being 
forced to work to support the family and being forced to marry before the legal majority 
age (18), it is not fair to say that all children are violated. In his analysis of childhood in 
Ghana, Adu-Gyamfi (2014: 3), for example, argues that Ghanaians “view life without a 
child as meaningless and would do anything to have a child”, meaning that they value 
children and are willing to protect them from harm. Sloth-Nielsen (2012) also observed 
that children in Africa are “cherished and valued” (2012:119), as evidenced by how 
families celebrate the birth of babies as well as institutions, they put in place to instil 
certain values amongst children. Ndofirepi & Shumba’s (2014:178) studies of the Shona 
people in Zimbabwe also revealed that child protection systems were embedded within 
the communitarian framework, hence common phrases such as “it takes a village to raise 
a child”. The model of child protection was community based, anchored in the family, and 
founded on the assumption that “left to their own devices, children would turn out badly” 
due to perceived negative influences and potential danger outside the family (Ndofirepi & 
Shumba 2014:179).   
The preceding discussion is relevant to this study because constructions of 
childhood (both local and international) influence the content of child protection policies, 
plans and budgets (Mason & Steadman 1997). Moreover, they bring out the tension that 
politicians may feel when faced with competing and often oppositional demands from 
local communities and international donors with regards to how certain children’s issues 
should be handled in government policies and budgets. As argued earlier, constructions 
of childhood also determine what should be considered as child maltreatment. They also 
inform the development of approaches and paradigms for addressing violence against 
children. A community that values children and is aware of children’s rights is likely to 
demand resources for their development and protection from its leadership, whilst the 
opposite can also be true (Wessells et al. 2012). If communities believe in social norms 




fight them. Hence the extent to which child maltreatment is embedded in local socio-
cultural beliefs and norms is also likely to influence the way that local politicians respond 
to it (Abebe & Bessell 2011). 
Mason and Steadman (1997) offer a good summary of how childhood 
constructions constitute the bedrock of child protection policy. Their main argument, and 
also an important contribution to the body of knowledge on the subject, is that child 
protection policy is one area that is most impacted by society’s understanding of what it 
means to be a child. Using evidence from several countries, including the four selected 
countries, their argument is as follows: constructions of childhood influence 
conceptualisations of child protection, which then influence the content of social policies, 
plans, and budgets (Mason & Steadman (1997:31) As constructions of childhood evolve, 
whether endogenically or through pressure from the outside, child protection policies and 
programmes are also bound to change (Mason 2005; Ridge 2015). Given diverse 
meanings and tensions, the policy implications of childhood constructions should be 
subject to several contextualisations and adaptations (Aries 1962; Boakye-Boateng 2010; 
James 2010).  
2.5 State Fragility and Humanitarian Emergencies  
 
State fragility, which is closely associated with humanitarian crises, affects public finance 
management as well as the effective functioning of child protection systems (Buckle 1999; 
Deléchat et al. 2015; IMF 2014). Fragility is defined by Deléchat et al. (2015: 03) as a 
situation where the capacity and legitimacy of a state to effectively and sustainably protect 
and provide public services to its citizens are compromised. There are many underlying 
drivers of fragility, including protracted armed conflict, endemic poverty, ethnic tensions, 
external interference, weak institutions, limited enforcement of laws and rights, 
continuous humanitarian disasters, and contested electoral politics (Deléchat et al. 
2015:1-9). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has singled out state fragility as a key 
mediating political economy variable that undermines the effective functioning of the 
state, public budgeting processes, and the delivery of public services, including child 




There are several ways through which fragility, especially in complex emergencies, 
negatively affects public spending on child protection, at the same time worsening the 
child protection situation in a country. There is literally an explosion of policy and 
academic work on how war retards development, derails progress, poses significant 
protection risks to children, and compromises fiscal policies and patterns of public 
spending (Burkle 1999; CECORE & CDPS 2015; Deléchat et al. 2015; IMF 2015; 
Lachman & Poblete 2002; UNICEF 2017c). To begin with, fragility increases children’s 
vulnerability to abuse and exploitation (Deléchat et al. 2015; Lachman & Poblete 2002; 
UNICEF 2017c). As discussed earlier in Chapter One, most of the protection risks in 
South Sudan are associated with war. It is for this reason that UNICEF (2017c:02) 
described the situation in South Sudan as childhood under attack in that an: 
entire generation of children is at stake as they face death, injury, hunger, disease, 
recruitment, forced displacement and loss of schooling. More than 2,300 children have 
been killed or maimed and about 19,000 have been recruited and associated with armed 
groups. 
Second, during complex emergencies a government’s capacity to finance investments in 
child protection is severely constrained due to decline in public revenue (Burkle 1999; 
Save the Children 2015b).  Faced with shortages of revenue, poor countries often turn to 
the international community for assistance. As observed by Save the Children (2009) and 
War Child Holland (2012), donors, working with their civil society counterparts, become 
the main funders and players in child protection in line with the responsibility of the 
international community to protect human rights when the state’s capacity is limited. In 
such circumstances the United Nations, through the Office of Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) usually develops Consolidated Appeal Processes (CAPs) 
to use as tools for fundraising. Child protection is a common sub-set of CAPs. However, 
reports produced by the Global Child Protection Cluster (2008; 2010) have shown that 
child protection is usually the least funded item in most CAPs. Shrinkages in domestic 
revenue sometimes force governments to borrow, domestically or internationally (Buckle 
1999; Landgren 2005). In some cases, debt burdens become heavy as certain countries 
default on their payments due to their low capacity in raising domestic revenue to keep 




Third, normal budget processes of consultations with stakeholders and 
subsequent prioritisation are disrupted, effects of which permeate to child protection as 
well (CECORE & CDPS 2015; IMF 2014; Penrose & Takaki 2006). Accountability for 
children’s rights is also compromised (CPWG 2012; Lachman & Poblete 2002). In fragile 
and emergency situations, politicians will be tempted to override technical staff and make 
decisions on who gets what and when. Patently, security expenditures will be prioritised 
because most situations of fragility threaten the survival of political regimes (Mueller 
2008).  
It is therefore common for public finance institutions to be circumvented or 
subverted to serve the interests of those in power (CECORE & CDPS 2015).  In addition, 
governments in fragile contexts can become closed to stakeholder views on several 
matters including how public resources should be distributed as security and political 
considerations take precedence over good public finance management (IMF 2017; 
Kameir 2011). They also become self-serving and paternalistic. Moreover, some 
governments become paranoid of civil society organisations and donors (Lumumba 2008: 
11; Kagoro 2005). Overall, state institutions become subject to political patronage and 
interference from higher authorities (Bates 1983; Mueller 2008).  
Fourth, composition of budgets and public spending patterns are frequently altered 
at all levels (IMF 2015: Landgren 2005; Wessells 2015). As fragility increases and 
emergencies become complex, available child protection resources are shifted from 
prevention to response, often in a piecemeal and inequitable fashion (WCH 2012; Save 
the children 2009). Prevention programmes such as campaigns against harmful practices 
and law reform which aim to proactively create a protective environment will be sacrificed 
(Save the Children 2009, 2010). This shift is also common amongst donors and NGOs, 
who also prioritise resources to response interventions such as family tracing and 
reunification, rescuing child soldiers and provision of psychosocial and medical support 
to children whose rights are violated. Moreover, as Lachman and Poblete (2002: 589-
591) argue, during emergencies there is minimal attention to cross-cutting issues such as 




turn out to be more issue and project specific instead of seeking to strengthen the entire 
child protection system.  
Fifth, armed conflict and other serious emergencies also pose fiscal challenges to 
neighbouring countries (Lachman and Poblete 2002). According to data in the Financial 
Tracking Service (2019), in 2015, the five neighbouring countries of South Sudan, notably 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, needed at least US$809 million to 
respond to the refugee crisis caused by the war in South Sudan. By the end of October 
2015, donors made only 19.7% of this amount available (OCHA, 2017). The crisis in 
Zimbabwe also overstretched child protection and other social services in neighbouring 
countries especially in Botswana and South Africa (MoLSS & UNICEF 2010). 
Sixth, fragility and emergencies compromise smooth flow of resources and child 
protection expenditures. Studies by the African Development Bank (2015) in South Sudan 
revealed several budget implementation problems due to conflict. These included delayed 
disbursements (often not linked to cash flow forecasts), shift of resources from one line 
to the other without due process, as well as delayed and unsatisfactory accountability for 
disbursed resources. Diversion of resources to areas of interest to politicians was found 
to be common in several countries affected by conflict, including South Sudan (Burkle 
1999). Additionally, corruption also increases (Lachman & Poblete 2002).  
Lastly, evidence from CAPs and the FTS shows that in fragile contexts, donor 
support to child protection increasingly goes off-budget (OCHA 2017; Save the Children 
2010). Whilst this may be expedient to donors for efficiency reasons, the result may be 
further weakening of public finance management systems. Worse still, donors and NGOs 
often target specific areas, based on their own criteria. Rarely do they reach all needy 
people across a given country (Lachman & Poblete 2002: 590). The selection of ‘priority’ 
areas is often based on their child rights situation and political economy analyses as well 
as resources available. The other challenge is that choices of donors are not always in 
harmony with priorities of host governments, resulting in conflictual relationships 




From the preceding paragraphs, available literature suggests that fragility and 
humanitarian emergencies alter the form and level of public spending on child protection 
and increases children’s vulnerability to abuse and exploitation. The degree to which 
financing and public expenditure systems are changed depends on the level of fragility in 
each country. If the above implications are taken to their logical conclusions, it is apparent 
that emergencies lead to diminished public revenue, which in turn curtails potential 
government spending on child protection.  
2.6 Fiscal Decentralisation and Public Spending on Child Protection 
 
This section examines literature on whether fiscal decentralisation leads to more and 
better spending on child protection at sub-national level. Sobhee (2009:23) argues that 
decentralisation theoretically, brings an “informational advantage” to policy and budget 
makers as they seek to respond to the needs of the populace. The logic of this argument 
is that when the government is decentralised, there is a high probability that local needs 
and issues of concern, including matters to do with child abuse, are likely to be reflected 
in government policies, strategies and budgets (Mudaki & Musaviru 2012b; Sobhee 
2009).  
Sobhee (2009) also observed that fiscal decentralisation has the potential to cut 
down red tape in planning and budgeting. At sub-national level, the issue is not about 
whether certain ethnic groups and regions will benefit more from budget allocations, but 
how to mitigate the negative impact of informal relationships between departments and 
different arms of government (Sobhee 2009). A subsequent worry is to ensure that the 
interests and incentives available to those in power in a local authority do not work against 
improved public spending on child protection. Budget analyses done by Save the Children 
(2015) in Kenya showed that if local leaders have the requisite awareness about child 
protection and incentives such as match funding,7 it is likely that child protection will be 
visible in their plans and budgets. To the credit of fiscal decentralisation, recent studies 
in Kenya have shown that with political will, fiscal decentralisation has the potential to 
positively transform the level of local government spending on child protection and 
 
7Match funding is a situation where a government is expected to also contribute a certain amount for every dollar 




minimise dangerous regionalism and ethnicism in resource allocation allegedly common 
at national level (Save the Children 2015; UNICEF 2014).  
Whilst the arguments for fiscal decentralisation are theoretically plausible, it is 
important to note that it does not automatically lead to increased public spending on child 
protection. As Sobhee (2009) admitted, the success of fiscal decentralisation is a function 
of a range of factors which include the nature of local politics, structure of the local 
economy, power of local pressure groups, capacity and independence of public finance 
institutions as well as incentives available to those with the power to allocate resources 
in a certain way. Altogether, these factors are likely to further influence the size, 
composition, and effectiveness of public spending on child protection.  
Political will to invest in child protection by local governments, referred to above, is 
only one side of the story. The other side is that local governments will only spend on 
issues they are mandated to (Kroth 2014). A review of the national constitutions of the 
four focus countries showed that the development of a national child protection system is 
the responsibility of the national government. Only a few issues such as rehabilitation of 
children living on and off the streets and primary child protection services such as case 
management are devolved. In all four countries, fully devolved functions include waste 
management, early childhood development, water supply, primary health care and 
development of local markets, especially for the sale of agriculture produce. Child 
protection is a shared responsibility between national and local governments, with the 
former carrying more responsibilities (GoK 2015; Maundeni 2010). However, questions 
of responsibility and gaps in the delivery of child protection services between national/ 
federal and local governments continue to be raised (KIPPRA 2020; Kroth 2014) 
 A key takeaway from the above section is that the structure of the state, in terms 
of the level of decentralisation, has potential bearing on public budgeting processes and 
outcomes. Evidence from Kenya suggests that devolution has the potential to increase 
and improve the quality of public spending on child protection (Save the Children 2015). 
Whether this can be generalised to all countries is an issue that will be discussed in the 
following Chapters.  The last segment of this chapter looks at the influences of donors 




2.7 Donor Interests, Carrots and Sticks  
 
Public spending on child protection cannot be understood without considering the 
influence of donors and CSOs. Development literature in Africa is awash with 
commentaries on how donors have influenced national policies and budgets using a 
range of tools and tactics (Bond 2007; Booth 2011; DFID 2009; Moyo 2009). Given power, 
resource and knowledge imbalances, poor African countries are susceptible to the 
influence of donors and other global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB) (Bond 2007). Donor influences, which can either be direct 
or indirect, assume various forms, with some being subtle whilst others border on outright 
pressure for governments to manage their public resources in a certain way (Duncan & 
Williams 2012: 23; Stiglitz 2002: 45-53). As a result, donors are often caught up in the 
politics of budgeting (Fritz et al. 2009).  
Direct donor influence on budgeting is usually exerted via participation in budget 
and sector working groups, technical assistance to government ministries (especially 
ministries of finance) and through ‘policy’ and other ‘programmatic’ advice offered to 
governments (Booth 2011; Easterly 2010). Advice by donors on public finance 
management issues is sometimes wide-reaching, going to the level of influencing sector 
financing and expenditure systems (for instance, health, education and social welfare). 
Through their grants, donors finance a myriad of child protection programmes in line with 
their priorities. Technical assistance and financial support are strategically used as 
incentives for governments to embrace and implement child protection services, as 
defined by the minority world.  
Donors also indirectly influence budget decisions through several tactics such 
conditional aid, training of professional workforce in government, and secondment of 
‘experts’ to support governments in the delivery of social services (Bond 2007; Keefer 
2004). In practice, this often implies offering grants to NGOs, think tanks and research 
organisations to undertake the above actions. In all four focus countries, there is a 
considerable presence of NGOs involved in evidence generation, capacity building, and 




200, 2010; World Vision International 2021). Besides a paraphernalia of local NGOs, 
international child rights organisations such as Save the Children, Plan International, 
World Vision, and Child Fund are at the forefront of making the case for all countries to 
recognise the importance of investing in child protection.  This is based on information on 
their respective websites, which shows that child protection is core to their mandate. Plan 
International, for example, has been rolling out continent wide campaigns against child 
marriage, female genital mutilation, and exploitation of the girl child.8 
Apart from influencing national governments via NGOs, donors also indirectly 
influence national policies and budgets through supra-national institutions such as the 
United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and treaty bodies such as the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child and the ACERWC. Along with many other institutions, the above have 
developed benchmarks and standards on how governments should protect children from 
all forms of abuse and violence including GCs and resolutions on strengthening national 
child protection systems (UNCRC 2003, 2007, 2016; ACERWC 2018). In addition, 
advocacy initiatives for the protection of children’s rights are being rolled out. For 
example, in 2014, the African Union, launched a campaign to end child marriage in Africa, 
which was financially supported by several donors. Accordingly, Nyaradzai 
Gumbonzvanda, a long-time women’s rights activist, was appointed as the Goodwill 
Ambassador for the campaign. The campaign was supported by the development of a 
Common position on how AU can member states can end child marriage. The Common 
position reiterated the importance of “… budgetary and technical support to enable 
Member States to plan, implement laws and policies, monitor and evaluate and ensure 
accountability with regards to measures taken to end child marriage” (African Union 2015: 
04). 
To mobilise international resources for child protection, donors, together with their 
civil society counterparts, have also been instrumental in the creation of multilateral 
resource mobilisation and funding mechanisms. A classic example is ‘The Global Fund 
to End Violence against Children’. This fund was established under the auspices of ‘The 
 





Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children’ whose main purpose is to mobilise 
donors, governments, CSOs and private sectors to end violence against children. Civil 
society coalitions such as Girls Not Brides (GNB) have also served as vehicles to mobilise 
resources towards addressing specific child protection risks, in this case, ending child 
marriage. Girls Not Brides is a global partnership of 1500 civil society organisations in 
100 countries committed to ending child marriage and enabling girls to fulfil their 
potential.9 The influence of civil society on child protection policy and budgeting is 
however dependent on their capacity as well as relationship with the state (Chiroro 2013), 
which in turn has a bearing on their embeddedness within it (Evans 2005; 2010). While 
the relationship between CSOs in Zimbabwe and the government between 2000 and 
2010 (and even beyond) was characterised by serious suspicion and mistrust (Chiroro 
2013), CSOs in Botswana involved in child protection enjoyed a relatively cordial 
relationship with their government (Bothlale 2015; GoB 2010). The relationship between 
civil society and the government in Kenya is at best a ‘love-hate’ one, with most CSOs 
seeking to keep a critical distance with the government (ANPPCAN 2015).  
Individually and collectively, donors, have over the years, shaped child protection 
agendas at national and global level. The United States of America (USA), for example, 
through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), launched in 2003, 
has over the past few years promoted orphan care support programmes in Botswana, 
Kenya, and Zimbabwe. To that extent, one would argue, USA funding contributed to the 
emphasis given to social assistance programmes in these three countries (ANPPCAN 
2014; MoLSS & UNICEF 2010). Furthermore, the above countries also developed 
national plans of action on orphans and other vulnerable children with prompting from the 
above and other donors. 
The influences of donors can either be positive or negative in terms of their impact 
on the level of public spending on child protection. For instance, during the time of 
economic structural adjustment programmes in Africa (c. 1990-2000), donor prescriptions 
to cut social sector spending turned out to be catastrophic on social welfare programmes 
 





(Bond 2007), including child protection, which suffered the largest cuts. There are also 
cases where continued emphasis by donors on one element of child protection, such as 
the Harmonized Cash Transfer Programme in Zimbabwe, resulted in skewed funding of 
child protection (NANGO 2006).  
In this study, donor influences are positive when they result in improved 
investments in child protection. For example, through the Global Partnership to End 
Violence against Children, donors have contributed to the mobilisation of international 
public resources towards prevention and response to various forms of violence affecting 
children. Donors have also supported studies on the social and economic costs of 
violence against children (Child Fund et al. 2017; Wodon et al. 2018; World Vision 
International 2021), which have brought the issue to international attention. In a positive 
turn of events, the IMF and the World Bank have recently conducted studies on the costs 
of violence against children and child marriage in order to add on to the available evidence 
base on why it is important to invest in child protection (Wodon et al. 2018). Such 
developments are welcome in that they help increase the political profile of child 
protection.  
Before concluding this section, it is important to note, as argued by Brown and 
Raddatz (2014), that the nature and level of donor influence on development policies and 
budgets varies from country to country depending on several, but interconnected, political 
economy factors. These include: the geo-political significance of a country (Brown & 
Raddatz 2014);  the strength of political, economic and security ties with the donor country 
(Mueller 2008); the capacity of a host government to negotiate, position and assert itself 
in international politics (Mueller 2008); the attractiveness of incentives availed to ruling 
elites and their counterparts in the private sector; the country’s fiscal position measured 
by the extent to which it can finance its own development; and the level of state fragility 
and humanitarian crises warranting international intervention (Brown 2012). Brown and 
Raddatz (2014) cite Ethiopia as a classic example of a country that has been able to 
“retain high levels of aid despite policies that diverge from donor prescriptions, because 
of the recipient government’s ability to play a series of ‘cards’ in its negotiations with 




2014:45). The ability of a country to play these cards is enhanced by ‘counter leverage’ 
such as fronting opportunities for donors to advance their commercial and other strategic 
interests such as security (Mueller 2011:190).  
In summary, this sub-section has demonstrated that donors and related institutions 
are a critical part of the political economy of public spending on child protection. Given 
state dependency on donors to finance child protection policies and programs in countries 
such as South Sudan and Zimbabwe, this element of the political economy of public 
spending deserves attention.  
2.8 Concluding Remarks  
 
From the above literature review, it is evident that public spending on child protection is 
influenced by a range of political economy variables internal and external to the state-
society complex. The variables and the above discussions are by no means exhaustive. 
The foregoing discussion, albeit not conclusive, proved that public budgeting is a murky 
and competitive process whereby government departments and ministries fight for scarce 
national resources. Amongst other factors, it emerged that the process of identifying 
priorities for spending, allocation and approval of budgets is influenced by the 
international child rights normative frameworks, power relations between and amongst 
organs of the state, interests and incentives available to those in power, and structural 
issues such as constructions of childhood, and by donors and CSOs. How these factors 
play out in reality is dependent on governance dynamics and socio-economic factors in 
each country. The separate strands of literature on the political economy of public 
spending reviewed above have laid a solid base for the development of the theoretical 









Theoretical Framework of the Study 
3.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the multi-disciplinary theoretical framework of the study developed 
from the literature review in the previous one. The main purpose of the theoretical 
framework is to guide the entire study, including development of research questions, 
analyses, discussions, and conclusions (Grant & Osanloo 2013; Green 2013). As 
postulated by Grant and Osanloo (2013:12), a theoretical framework serves as a blueprint 
on how to “philosophically, epistemologically, methodologically, and analytically 
approach” the entire study. Moreover, it “explains the path” of research (Dickson et al. 
2018: 438), whilst providing definitions of key constructs and variables to be investigated.  
This chapter is divided into two parts, with the first presenting the conceptual 
framework of the study. Without a solid conceptual framework, there is substantial risk of 
deviation from acceptable research theory and practice, which may ultimately 
compromise research outcomes (Dickson et al. 2018: Grant & Osanloo 2013). The 
second and final part discusses key constructs investigated in the study namely: political 
economy, public spending, and the systems approach to child protection.  
In developing the theoretical framework, the researcher was conscious of the fact 
that the three constructs being investigated come from traditionally disconnected 
disciplines - each with its own unique jargon and strands of literature. Epistemologically 
and methodologically, it is not easy to make these constructs sit alongside each other. 
For instance, public spending goals of fiscal discipline, sustainability and economic 
efficiency at times conflict with child rights goals anchored in the notion of “entitlement to 
resources and standards of service delivery” (Norton & Elson 2002:15). General 
Comment (GC) No 16 of the UNCRC (2016), however, elaborates on the relationships 
between public budgeting and children’s rights. Thus, reconciling these concepts and 




attempt to draw insights from numerous disciplines to explain trends in public spending 
on child protection makes this study unique. 
3.1 Conceptual Framework for the Study 
 
The conceptual framework of the study was weaved together from three carefully selected 
sets of theories on political economy. The first set is on interdisciplinary political economy 
theories related to the construction of childhood. This set was inspired by the writings of 
Aries (1962), James and Prout (2014), Jenks (2005), Linde (2014), Mason and Steadman 
(1997), and Ndofirepi and Shumba (2014), which fall within the realm of cultural political 
economy. The second is on statist and governance focused political economy theories 
anchored in the writings of Acemoglu & Robinson (2001), Evans (2005, 2010), Fritz et al. 
(2009) and Mkandawire (2001) which place the state at the centre of development efforts, 
including protection of children. The last set is about interests, hegemony, and power-
based theories of political economy drawn from the writings of Gramsci (1971), Hibbs 
(1977,1981), Nordhaus (1975), Norton and Elson (2002) and Wildavsky (1984). This 
categorisation was found necessary considering that political economy is a complex 
subject. Under each set of theories, relevant political economy variables were unpacked, 
specific research questions developed, and relationships between variables explored. 
The conceptual framework is diagrammatically presented in Figure 2. A composite 
research hypothesis can be deduced from the conceptual framework, which is that 
decisions on the size and composition of budget allocations to child protection are 
influenced by three main political economy variables. These are: a) prevailing 
sociocultural and legal constructions of childhood, b) structure, dynamics and broad 
functioning of the state, and c) interests, power-dynamics, and incentive systems 
available to those in positions of power to allocate national resources in a certain way. 
The three broad factors, which are susceptible to the influence of a litany of contextual 
and global forces, were thoroughly examined to see how they play out in development 
and emergency settings. The three broad variables are closely related and oftentimes 




Each of these three broad factors is aligned to a set of political economy theories 
as shown in Figure 2. Although guided by layers of administrative procedures and public 
finance management laws, budget decisions are subject to a wide range of influences 
from within and outside a given polity (Cangiano et al. 2013; Norton & Elson 2002; Rakner 
et al. 2004; Rubin 2013). The discussion and analysis of the main findings of the study 
(Chapters Seven to Nine) have therefore been structured to mirror each of the three sets 
of theories. The discussion and analysis in Chapter Seven is guided by theories related 
to constructions of childhood, whilst Chapter Eight is built around statist political economy 
theories. The discussion in Chapter Nine, which is focused on fiscal politics throughout 
the budget cycle, is anchored in interest, power-based, and hegemony theories of the 
political economy of public spending.  
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The wide range of political economy variables shown in Figure 2, is evidence of the 
complexity of public budgeting (Diaz-Cayeros & Magalon 2003; Keefer 2002; Nordhaus 
1975). Each of the three sets of theories are briefly discussed below.  
3.1.1 Interdisciplinary Theories Related to Constructions of Childhood 
Through this first set of theories, the study sought to establish the extent to which socio-
economic and legal constructions of childhood and children’s rights have influenced 
public spending on child protection in selected countries. Attention was paid to dominant 
views on how children are treated and raised as influenced by social norms, religion, 
culture, and human relationships. Social norms determine what is considered as child 
maltreatment or not in each locality. They also inform the content of child protection 
policies, plans and subsequently budget allocations (Mason & Steadman 1997; Tisdall & 
Punch 2012). In discussing implications of prevailing constructions on childhood, 
reference was made to writings of social constructivists such as Mason and Steadman 
(1997), Ndofirepi and Shumba (2014), Okoli (2009), Sloth-Nielsen (2008, 2012, 2014), 
and Wessells et al. (2014) as well child rights proponents including Linde (2014), who 
have attempted to describe and explain the nature of childhood in Africa from different 
angles. The minority and majority world conceptualisations of childhood were also used 
as conceptual frames to understand childhood experiences in selected countries and 
what governments might be expected to do in the area of child protection.  
3.1.2 Statist Political Economy Theories 
Under ‘statist political economy theories’, the study examined how the structure and broad 
functioning of the state apparatus influenced decisions about public spending on child 
protection. This aspect of the conceptual framework borrowed heavily from ideas put 
forward by Acemoglu & Robinson (2001), Evans (2005, 2010), and Fritz et al. (2009). A 
common theme in their writings is that an elected government has the space, at least 
constitutionally, and the mandate to drive development through its leadership, institutions, 
and policy choices. Accordingly, the study examined the laws, policies, and plans 
developed by all four case study countries and further examined how configurations and 
broad functioning of budget institutions in the four focus countries influenced spending on 




and the relationships between them. Drawing inspiration from Sobhee (2009), and Mudaki 
and Musaviru (2012b), the study investigated the extent to which fiscal decentralisation 
in selected countries enabled or hindered improvements in public spending on child 
protection. Additionally, matters to do with the autonomy and capacity of budget 
institutions to deliver on their mandate partly influenced by available human resources, 
the level of fragility, nature of relationships between politicians and technocrats as well as 
governance culture were also explored.  
Drawing inspiration from Evans’ (2010:25) theory of ‘embeddedness’ of the state, 
the influence of civil society organisations (CSOs) and donors on budget decisions was 
also investigated under statist theories of political economy. The notion of 
‘embeddedness’, if viewed from a public finance management perspective, implies that 
public budgeting should, to some extent, be informed, by the views, needs, experiences 
and expectations of various groups of people including CSOs, the private sector, workers, 
and children themselves (Evans 2005, 2010). In contemporary public finance 
management, this is achieved through public hearings as is the case in Botswana 
(Bothlale 2015), budget sector working groups, parliamentary consultations, and other 
interactions between budget makers and various members of the society (IBP 2018).  
The underlying logic of the embedding theory is that a government does not exist 
in isolation. Its policies and programmes should be anchored in and influenced by the 
affected people. However, there must be a limit to the influence of various interest groups 
and stakeholders. Whilst remaining consultative, the state should be strong enough to be 
able to steer development agendas without being swayed by powerful forces within 
society (Evans 2010). If not strong, the state is bound to be captured by interest groups 
and class forces, some of them may even be crooks. State capture may result in the state 
advancing the interests of a few individuals or a particular economic class (Ake 1976; 
Humphreys & Bates 2005).  
3.1.3  Interests, Hegemony and Power-Based Theories 
The last leg of the conceptual framework was guided mainly by Norton and Elson’s 
(2002:02) seminal writings on “what is behind the budget”. Through their writings, Norton 




ideas complement earlier writings about political business cycles by Nordhaus (1975) and 
Hibbs (1977, 1981) by showing how political developments influence budget decisions. 
These ideas guided the investigation on how interests, power relationships, interactions, 
and constructions of hegemony by political elites have a bearing on budget decisions. In 
this study, the multiple interactions between different players involved in budgeting as 
they exercise their power, advance their interests and seek to respond to different 
incentives available to them, are loosely branded ‘fiscal politics’.  
The underlying assumption informing this component of the conceptual framework 
is that public budgeting is a deeply political process, involving trade-offs, behind-the-
scenes negotiations and power-play between various entities as they position themselves 
and jostle for finite resources (Black et al. 2013; Gasper et al. 2018; Keefer & Khemani 
2003; Norton & Elson 2002; Wildavisky 1984). The study examined how fiscal politics 
played out at each stage of the budget cycle in all four countries. This started with an 
examination of interests and spending priorities of the country’s top leadership followed 
by a discussion on the impacts of politics during determination of spending priorities, 
formulation and approval of government budgets. Budget makers do not just crunch 
numbers, they also must understand the priorities of those in positions of power as well 
as the macro-economic and political implications of the decisions they make (Lewis & 
Hildreth 2010; Norton & Elson 2002; Rubin 2013).  
In terms of budget players, the study examined interests and incentives available 
to the executive and legislative arms of government mainly at national level. Dynamics at 
sub-national level were examined only to a limited extent, mainly in the case of Kenya, 
due to paucity of data. The study also unravelled the interests and motivations of political 
parties when it comes to fiscal policy and annual budget decisions. Any group of people 
contesting power, including economic and political classes, can construct and perpetuate 
its hegemony over the political, social and economic life to advance its interests through 
“multiple communicative actions” (Cox 1983:123). This hegemony, if constructed by ruling 
political parties, often finds expression in government policies, programmes, budgets and 
in how specific groups of people, including children, are treated, as well as how issues 




re-adjusted and renegotiated regularly, by coercion, consent, or both, through the “war of 
manoeuvre and of position” (Moore 2003:34). Matters of the balance of power within and 
amongst government departments as well as necessary and contingent relationships 
within and outside the legislative and executive arms of governments constitute the 
fulcrum of studies on political economy of public spending (Caporaso & Levine 2004; 
DFID 2009). Ultimately, all this has a bearing on how budget prioritisation is done, budget 
negotiations play out and extent of trade-offs when making budget decisions (Gasper et 
al. 2018; Keefer & Khemani 2003; Norton & Elson 2002) 
3.2 Key Constructs and Variables Investigated 
 
In this section, the meanings of the three main constructs investigated in this study 
namely: political economy, public spending, and child protection (from a systems 
perspective) are summarised. While the summary description of political economy is 
developed from Chapter Two, the discussion on the systems approach to child protection 
is an extension of the working definition of child protection provided in Chapter One.  
3.2.1 Political Economy 
From the literature review in Chapter Two, a working definition of political economy is 
possible. In this study political economy refers to formal and informal, political and 
economic, social and cultural, formal and informal, individual and institutional, influences 
and dynamics of decision-making on how public resources are managed and distributed. 
This definition borrows heavily from DFID (2009) but expanded to include socio-cultural 
dimensions. The influences referred to in the above definition are mediated by socio-
cultural context, macro-economic environment, governance structures, and social 
arrangements in each country as well as the degree of fragility (Acemoglu & Robinson 
2001; Fritz et al. 2009). From the working definition, key elements of political economy 
are identified, which are summarised below, given that the previous chapter detailed their 
discussion. 
The first element is interests and incentives available to those in positions of power 




Wayland 2006). Often, people make decisions which advance their ideologies and/or 
personal or institutional interests. In certain cases, personal interests may be aligned to 
the common good, leading to decisions which benefit the public, but this is not always the 
case (Bruno 1994; DFID 2009). The second is power relations between and amongst 
different government ministries and departments with a stake in public budgeting as they 
seek to position their constituencies, sectors, and programmes for increased funding 
(Harris 2013; Keefer 2004; Wildavsky 1984;). The perceived power, importance and 
position of a ministry or agency is a key factor in public budgeting, especially during 
budget negotiations. The third element is socio-cultural, and legal constructions of 
childhood and children’s rights, falling in the realm of cultural political economy (Mason & 
Steadman 1997; Shumba & Ndofirepi 2014; White 2002). The fourth element is 
interactions between and amongst states, including with global institutions (Bruno 1994; 
Bond 2007; Easterly 2013). The fifth element is governance dynamics. Under this 
element, issues such as political regime characteristics, state structures and how they 
interact with each other are considered (Ake 1976, Collier 2010; Frey 2011). Institutional 
dynamics is the last element, concerned with formal and informal decision-making 
cultures and processes within specific departments and ministries (DFID 2009; Fritz et al. 
2009; Rakner et al. 2004). The understanding of the above elements of political economy 
shaped the discussion and analysis in Chapters Seven to Nine. However, it should be 
noted that the main focus was on the first four elements, with only peripheral attention 
given to the last two because of the objectives of the research.  
3.2.2 Public Spending 
In this study, public spending denotes all expenditures by governments, through budgets 
or other mechanisms linked to the state to achieve desired development objectives. 
Resources from external donors which are spent in a country through government 
channels are also counted as public spending (Cangiano et al. 2013). Inhibited by the 
paucity of actual expenditure data, budget allocations are used as proxy indicators of 
public spending unless otherwise stated.  
It is crucial to note, however, that expenditures (also referred to as spending) and 




allocations refer to financial commitments, that is, what is set aside in government 
budgets, to be spent during the year (Black et al. 2013). As defined by Cangiano et al. 
(2013), a government budget is a financial plan of action which outlines planned revenues 
and expenditures in a given fiscal year. In most countries, there is a variance between 
planned (allocations) and used (expenditures) budget, due to a range of factors including 
fiscal capacity to raise revenues, systemic and economic shocks, and absorption capacity 
(Lewis & Hildreth 2010; Rubin 2013). Although variances between allocations and 
expenditures are observable in all four case study countries, the use of the former as a 
proxy indicator does not materially affect the design, process and outcomes of the study. 
In any case, budget allocation is the main window through which the primary commitment 
of government to child protection is assessed (CPWG 2012; Pereznieto et al. 2011; World 
Vision International 2021)). The term ‘public spending’ is therefore loosely used to refer 
also to budget allocations.   
3.2.3 Child Protection System 
To complement the definition of child protection provided in Chapter One, this section 
extends the discussion to include a systems perspective given the linkages with political 
economy. A child protection system refers to institutions, processes, resources and actors 
which should work together to create a protective environment for children (Save the 
Children 2009; UNICEF 2008, 2010). A systems approach requires government, civil 
society organisations and other development players to be holistic when designing and 
implementing solutions to prevent and respond to child maltreatment (NCCS 2014; Save 
the Children 2008; UNICEF 2008). The approach underscores the need for both formal 
(through state structures) and informal (individuals, families and communities) child 
protection structures to coordinate their actions (UNICEF 2008; UNCRC 2003). 
A systems approach is based on the view that child protection risks are complex, 
multi-faceted and ever changing (Kostelny et al. 2014; Lachman & Poblete 2002; 
Landgren 2005). A key feature of a child protection system is that it is inherently multi-
disciplinary and inter-sectoral, seeking to engender cooperation between governments, 
communities and children in order to strengthen the protective environment around each 




prevent and respond to child maltreatment are understood to be the responsibility of 
several institutions working towards a common objective within the continuum of care 
(CPWG 2012; Lachman & Poblete 2002; UNICEF 2008).  
The continuum of care is a concept based on the UNCRC (1989), which refers to 
a range of services that should be in place to ensure protection of children. These include 
preventative services such as awareness-raising campaigns against harmful cultural 
practices, child sexual abuse, and other forms of child maltreatment; early intervention 
services including case management; statutory child protection services; child justice, 
rehabilitation, recovery, reintegration, and after-care services (Barnett & Wedge 2009; 
CPWG 2012; Davis et al. 2014. Within each category, national global standards on the 
quality of services have been developed including through GCs of the ACRWC (1990) 
and the UNCRC (1989) (ANPPCAN 2012; CPWG 2012).  
The continuum of care should be considered in relation to children’s rights to family 
care, parental care or appropriate alternative care; to protection from violence, abuse, 
exploitation, neglect and maltreatment; and to social services that support the child’s 
protection, survival and development, including recovery and reintegration as needed 
(Davis et al. 2014, Terling-Watt 2000). From a budgeting point of view, this means that 
several ministries and government departments from various sectors including social 
welfare, education, gender, judiciary, health and internal security should budget for child 
protection. In recent years, various child rights organisations developed consensus on 
key elements of a child protection system (CPWG 2015; Davis et al. 2014, Save the 
Children 2009; UNICEF 2008) as shown in Table 1. In line with provisions of the General 
Comment No 5 of the UNCRC (2003), mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that 















Directorate of children’s services. 
Child protection committees. 
National commission/ council for children. 





Prohibition of female genital mutilation Act 
National children’s policy.  
National Plan National child protection strategy 
National plan for children for Orphans and other vulnerable children. 
National strategy to end child marriage.  
Government 
Budget 
Dedicated budget line items at local and national level for various 




Child rights awareness raising campaigns. 
Early childhood care and development. 
Child sensitive social protection that is age and gender specific. 
Safe migration programmes for children and their families. 




Family tracing and re-integration. 
Placement of children in places of safety and residential care. 
Counselling services. 
Family support clinics. 
One stop centres. 
Child friendly spaces during emergencies. 
Professional 
work force 
Training of social workers and related professional staff such as police, 





Toll free hotlines. 
One stop centres. 
Child protection centres. 
Police Service Victim Support Units. 







Accreditation and licensing of social workers. 
Development of standards and operating procedures on specific child 
protection topics. 






National child protection information management systems. 
Violence against children surveys. 
Multiple indicator cluster surveys (MICS). 
Child rights observatories.  
Database of sex offenders. 





The responsibility to budget for programmes and interventions under each element of a 
child protection system is spread across several ministries and departments. Using child 
sexual abuse as an example, while ministries responsible for children’s affairs budget for 
case management; the judiciary, which is responsible for the administration of justice, 
requires resources to adjudicate on cases. At the same time, ministries of health plan and 
budget for interventions to respond to the medical and psychological needs of survivors 
of abuse, with ministries of education budgeting for long term reintegration of affected 
girls including provision of schooling and vocational training services. If all these ministries 
are to be efficient and effective in planning and budgeting for programmes to prevent and 
respond to child sexual abuse, they need to coordinate their interventions (Davis et al. 
2014, Hyslop 2008; Save the Children 2009; UNICEF 2008).  
Before the advent of systems thinking, most governments focused on single issues 
such as child trafficking, street children, child labour, emergencies, charitable institutions, 
and HIV and AIDS, without linking them together (Hyslop 2008; Save the Children 2009; 
UNICEF 2008). The result was a patchwork of responses that did not reinforce each other. 
The underlying philosophy of a systems approach is therefore to avoid piecemeal, 
vertical, and isolated interventions (CPWG 2012; Davis et al. 2014).  
Several child-focused organisations have embraced a systems approach to child 
protection. In 2008, UNICEF launched its global strategy on child protection, based on 
systems thinking.10 Through this strategy, UNICEF probably influenced several child 
focused organisations such as Plan International, World Vision International, and Save 
the Children to be holistic when designing child protection programmes. The UNICEF 
Strategy also identified cross-cutting areas in child protection such as the development 
and implementation of common guidance, private sector collaboration, partnerships, and 
advocacy (UNICEF 2008).  
The systems approach is relevant to this study because it emphasises the role of 
different actors, processes and forces in the creation of a protective environment for all 
 
10 The key pillars of the strategy were drawn from the Protective Environment Framework (PEF) that UNICEF articulated 
in its Operational Guidance Note produced in 2002 and in a journal article written by Landgren (2005), who was then 





children. It is these forces which a study of this nature seeks to investigate through a 
political economy lens. A systems approach appreciates the complexity of child 
protection. However, as Chapter Six will show, it is not always easy to plan and budget 
for child protection using a systems approach. 
3.3 Concluding Remarks  
 
This chapter has presented the multi-disciplinary conceptual framework for the study. The 
framework was built from three sets of political economy theories which are: a) cultural 
political economy theories related to constructions of childhood, b) statist theories and, c) 
interest, power and hegemony theories. The above three broad factors are interrelated 
and influence each other. To illustrate this point, interests and incentives available to 
those in power are influenced by dominant social norms, religion, and practices at a given 
time. These interests have a bearing on rules and processes to govern the functioning of 
the government.  
The takeaway from the conceptual framework is that decisions on budget 
allocations to child protection are influenced by several political economy related factors. 
Although seemingly complicated, the strength of the conceptual framework is in its use of 
insights from various branches of political economy to investigate factors behind the 













Research Design and Methodology 
4.0 Introduction 
 
The study utilised a qualitative research design, although quantitative information was 
used in the analyses of the size and composition of public spending on child protection. 
Using inductive theory, the views, influences, and motivations of public officials to allocate 
resources to child protection in a certain way were qualitatively investigated as they occur 
in their natural world. A wide array of interpretive techniques was used to describe, 
decode, translate, and give meaning to policymakers and stakeholders’ opinions, 
perspectives and motivations for the budget decisions they made.  The rest of the chapter 
discusses the research design, sampling method, data analysis methods, reliability, 
trustworthiness, reflexivity, ethical issues, and limitations of the study.  
4.1 Qualitative Research Design of the Study 
 
The nature of the research topic, which is essentially about ever-changing human 
interactions, relationships, and perspectives, makes a qualitative research design most 
appropriate. Qualitative research assumes that the social world is not static. It changes 
from time-to-time in response to evolving socio-economic and political dynamics 
(Creswell 2013). The reality and knowledge investigated, which was in the form of 
opinions and ideas could only be approached qualitatively. In each country, the research 
topic was explored by capturing the perspectives of research participants on political 
economy variables that influenced the level and composition of public spending on child 
protection. The qualitative research design was operationalised through a case study 
approach, described below.  
A case study approach was found to be the most relevant because of its 
particularistic, descriptive, heuristic and inductive nature, which allowed for the analysis 
of several complex budgeting processes within each country (Merriam 1998; Ritchie & 




characterised events, processes, and other developments within the public budgeting 
sphere, without having to rely on a readily available data set (Merriam 1998; Starman 
2013).  
Each of the four countries (Botswana, Kenya, South Sudan and Zimbabwe) was a 
specific case through which to study how political economy variables affect public 
spending on child protection. The four countries were purposively selected to mirror the 
fragility continuum covering development and emergency settings. The different social, 
political, and economic circumstances have implications for child protection (Barnett & 
Wedge 2009; Davis et al. 2014) and the practice of public budgeting (DFID 2007; IMF 
2017; Rubin 2013). To illustrate this point, as observed by the CPWG (2012), Save the 
Children (2009), and UNICEF (2016c), the protection risks faced by children in a conflict 
situation are not identical to those faced by children living in peaceful environments such 
as Botswana, although common themes can be identified. Accordingly, child protection 
interventions are likely to be different in form and in how they are delivered and financed 
(Lachman & Poblete 2002; UNICEF 2017). It is due to this desire to determine if child 
protection policy planning and budgeting differ with context, that the study has chosen to 
look at the topic through the two settings: ‘humanitarian/ emergency’ and ‘development’ 
contexts. In between, there are ‘transitional contexts’ as countries move from being an 
emergency to a development setting.  
Drawing these contextual parameters is important to appropriately situate the case 
studies (Taylor 2018). Issues of childhood, child protection, and public budgeting are 
significantly affected by context. Each country was found to have unique budgeting and 
decision-making cultures, which required careful examination to extract commonalities in 
meanings amongst research participants. Political economy dynamics of public spending 
in each case study were compared with the situation in other countries to identify unique 
as well as common variables that impact decisions on how much governments spend on 
child protection (Welman et al. 2011).  
For each case study, data was collected from several sources, as discussed in the 
sections which follow. One of the main benefits of a case study approach is that it allows 




2013; Welman et al. 2011). The diversity of data collected added to the richness of the 
analysis leading to more robust conclusions.  
4.2  Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions of the Study 
 
Critical realism, as put forward by Bhaskar (1997), has been selected as the most 
appropriate ontological and epistemological framework for this study. Critical realism 
assumes that there is a “real world out there” (Easton 2010: 119). It is located between 
positivism (objectivism) and social interpretivism (subjectivism)11. It seeks to understand 
reality as it exists in the “actual and real domains” (Clark 2008:03). Critical research 
assumes that the world or reality can change, hence it should be carefully examined to 
establish its impact on relations, phenomena, and processes (Bhasker 1997; Easton 
2010). In critical research, the reality is produced by people and at times historically 
constituted. In many instances, people’s abilities to produce and reproduce certain 
realities is constrained by several socio-economic and political factors, many of which fall 
within the realm of political economy (Creswell 2013; Denzin & Lincoln 2005).   
The ontology in critical realism argues for an “objective reality formed of both 
events and underlying causes” looked at through explorative processes, going beyond 
the surface (Clark 2008: 02). Further, critical realism assumes the existence of social 
forces and institutions, independent of the individuals, which influence processes and 
decisions (Bhasker 1997; Easton 2010; Taylor 2018). To discover that reality, numerous 
conceptualisations, analyses, and convincing explanations are required (Easton 2010: 
119-21). The knowledge being sought is both socially constructed and empirical. Critical 
realists acknowledge the existence of both the external and socially constructed worlds 
(Taylor 2018: 218).  
By looking at the empirical trends in budgeting for child protection, which is 
positivist in frame, and capturing the lived experiences of budget actors, which is 
 
11 A research paradigm is interpretative if it assumes that the subject being investigated has no singular or objective 
outcome. In that case, the social reality, which is shaped by human experiences as well as the socio-economic context, 
is subject to multiple interpretations (Easton 2010; Creswell 2013). In an interpretive paradigm, there is no right or 
wrong value or belief system as everything depends on the context (Chilisa & Kawulich 2002; Denzin & Lincoln 2005). 
With a positivist paradigm, the concern is the empirical nature of the world wherein the researcher concentrates on 





interpretivist, the study benefitted from insights from both constructivist and positivist 
research paradigms (Jupp 2006). Insights generated from the use of the two paradigms 
provide explanations on how and why certain events occur, in this case, why child 
protection is under-funded in government budgets. To this extent, and as argued by 
Taylor (2018: 218-19), critical realism allows for use of both quantitative and qualitative 
information and the development of a composite theoretical framework (Creswell 
2013:114). Bhasker (1997: 24-28) argues that the complexity common in critical research 
should not be shied away from but embraced and explored using multiple methods. 
Considering that child protection is a multi-sectoral and complex issue with many different 
elements, it can only be studied effectively through the lens of a critical realist.  
Building on Bhasker’s (1997) ideas, Clark (2008:03) argued that critical realism 
views human behavior as influenced by “agency and structural factors” such as culture, 
laws, and governance systems. Many of these structural factors fall within the purview of 
the political economy. This makes critical realism most relevant to this study. Although 
human beings can cause certain events to happen, through channels such as collective 
action, lobbying and advocacy, their choices and actions are often limited by surrounding 
social, economic and political factors (Clark 2008; Creswell 2014; Denzin & Lincoln 2005). 
Guided by this logic, the study also examined socio-economic and legal constructions of 
childhood that influence the child protection practice.  
To conclude, critical realism favors a structuralist approach to research, seeking 
to explore entities, social forces, and mechanisms that cause events and processes to 
happen (Clark 2008; Taylor 2018). Public budgeting is one such process involving several 
entities and processes (Cangiano et al. 2013). In some countries, the process is fraught 
with challenges that can only be unearthed through the eyes of a critical realist such as 
abuse of public resources through patronage networks, corruption, and clientelist public 
spending (Clark 2008; Keefer 2002; Taylor 2018). The complexity of the subject being 
investigated, the sensitivity of issues, and the multiplicity of actors involved further confirm 






4.3 Research Population and Sampling Strategy 
 
The population of the study encompassed all individuals within and outside the 
government that are involved in, seek to influence, or keenly follow decisions on public 
budgeting on child protection. From the population, research subjects were selected using 
stratified purposive sampling. By employing a purposive sampling strategy, the 
researcher was only interested in reaching out to those respondents with the most 
relevant information about the research topic as described in the paragraphs below 
(Creswell 2013; Denzin & Lincoln 1998).  
The sampling procedures involved several steps. The first step was to stratify the 
study population into homogenous groups according to the roles they play in budgeting 
and the delivery of child protection services. Stratification is a key requirement for 
targeting research subjects that have diverse backgrounds, interests and characteristics 
(Jupp 2006; Welman et al. 2011). Eight strata/ groups were selected: a) parliamentarians 
who approve government budgets; b) ministries, departments and agencies responsible 
for planning and budgeting for child protection; c) ministries of finance/ treasuries with the 
responsibility to compile national budgets; d) national and international child-focused civil 
society organisations involved in child protection and also in budget analysis; e) 
researchers/ consultants/ opinion leaders with knowledge on budgeting and child 
protection; f) donors/ international organisations supporting child protection programmes 
and or public finance management systems; g) media personnel who report on issues 
relevant to the study topic and h) local authorities responsible for budgeting and the 
delivery of child protection services at the sub-national level.  
The second step entailed the purposive selection of research participants in each 
category guided by predefined criteria relevant to the research objectives (Creswell 2013; 
Elo et al. 2014). Four main factors were considered: a) involvement in public budgeting 
at either national or local level during the study period; b) active following of, or seeking 
to, influence decisions on public budgeting and or child protection policies including 
through research; c) involvement in child rights evidence building, capacity building, 




economic dynamics in the country. To illustrate the purposive aspect, under the category 
of child-focused organisations, the researcher selected organisations that have been 
involved in budget advocacy such as the Child Protection Society in Zimbabwe and Save 
the Children in Kenya and South Sudan. Parliamentarians from budget and social affairs 
related committees with knowledge on budgeting for child protection were deliberately 
targeted. In all relevant institutions, only professional staff with working knowledge of the 
issues at stake were selected. An initial list of 130 potential research participants was 
compiled for all four countries, which was informed by the researcher’s contacts, 
information from networks, and a database of NGOs accessed from their umbrella 
organisations in each country. The specific number of research participants under each 
category varied with each country depending on the size of the research population. An 
optimal size was reached when primary data collection reached saturation point, with no 
new information coming from research participants (Elo et al. 2014; Merriam 1998).  
The third step, which took place during the primary data collection phase, involved 
the identification of additional participants through snowballing within the strata listed 
above. This technique entailed asking selected research participants and any other key 
informants known to the researcher to identify people they thought would contribute to 
the study because they possessed characteristics required in research participants 
(Biernackl & Waldorf 1981; Gill & Treasure 2008). Snowballing is especially relevant when 
researching sensitive topics where research participants may not feel comfortable being 
publicly identified with the study (Biernackl & Waldorf 1981: 142). The technique proved 
to be very useful in Botswana and South Sudan where the researcher had little prior 
knowledge of the research population. All suggested research participants were verified 
for eligibility in line with the four factors described above and cover letter shared with 
them. The rest of the data collection procedures were the same. In the final analysis, the 
purposive-sampling technique, augmented by snowballing resulted in the most relevant 
people participating in the study.  
In total, 165 people, all of them being professionals in their areas of specialisation, 
participated in the study between 2016 and 2020 (Table 2). Out of all research 




(51) identified through snowballing. Out of the 51, 17 were from Botswana,15 from South 
Sudan, 10 from Kenya, and 9 from Zimbabwe. To reach out to respondents, written 
communication via email was used accompanied by an official cover letter from the 
University of Johannesburg, as well as ethical clearance certificate and the research 
permit from the host governments, in the case of Botswana and Kenya.12. A few people 
were reached by telephone. English was used as the medium of communication 
throughout the research since it is the official language in all four countries.  
Table 2: Number of Research Participants Per Country 
 
Sampled Strata 
Case Study Country  
Botswana Kenya South 
Sudan 
Zimbabwe Total  
1. Parliamentarians and staff  2 4 2 4 12 
2. Child protection-related 
ministries/departments 
(Social Welfare, Local 
Government, Education, 
Health and Home Affairs/ 
Interior) 
4 7 4 6 21 
3. Ministry of finance 3 2 2 3 10 
4. Child-focused civil society 
organisations  
11 19 8 14 52 
5. Researchers/ consultants/ 
opinion leaders 
5 8 5 4 22 
6. Donors/ international 
organisations  
3 8 3 7 21 
7. Other (media, students, 
other CSOs etc) 
5 3 4 1 13 
8. Local Authorities 3 6 1 4 14 
                   Total  36 57 29 43 165 
 
It is important to note that a total of 192 potential research participants were invited to 
participate in the study, amounting to a response rate of 86%. Out of the 27 people who 
did not participate in the study, after communication was sent to them, 15 did not respond 
even after following up.  These were mostly government officials and parliamentarians.  
The other 12 gave assorted reasons such as “sorry, something cropped up”, “lets 
 
12 In Botswana and Kenya, the researcher was requested by the respective governments to apply for a permit to collect 





postpone”, “I will come back to you”, “send the questionnaire to me, I will respond 
online.”13  
The highest number of research participants (57) were from Kenya, followed by 
Zimbabwe at 43, with 36 and 29 respondents drawn from Botswana and South Sudan 
respectively. The researcher’s presence in Kenya, whilst working for an international child 
rights organisation between 2012 and 2016, enabled access to a considerably higher 
number of research participants. As for Zimbabwe, the selection and contacting of 
research participants were easier because, being his country of origin, the researcher 
had relatively good contacts and cooperation from research participants. South Sudan 
had the least number of research participants largely because of the challenge of conflict, 
described below. The relatively large number of respondents in Kenya did not in any way 
affect the outcome of the study. In fact, it enriched the study because of the large 
population compared to the other three countries.   
Despite minor variations – which were expected – in the number of research 
participants per country, the sample is broadly representative of the research population. 
The selection of research participants, including further snowballing, stopped when data 
collection reached a saturation point.   
4.4 Data Collection Methods  
 
Secondary and primary data collection methods, as recommended by Merriam (1998) 
and Yin (2009) were used in the study. Each of these methods is described in the 
following paragraphs. 
4.4.1 Collection of Secondary Data  
As part of the literature review, the study began with a review of classical and 
contemporary literature including journal articles, academic books, and online papers 
relevant to the research topic. Google Scholar was the main search engine used, as well 
as the UJLink library, an online portal for the University of Johannesburg, for journal 
 





articles. A few hard copies were obtained from the University of Johannesburg library. 
The literature review was broad, focusing on the three constructs that were investigated 
namely: political economy, public spending on children and child protection policy.  The 
search focused on publications after the adoption of the CRC in 1989, with a bias on the 
latest.  
 The researcher also reviewed a wide range of government, civil society and UN 
reports on child protection to understand the magnitude and incidences of child 
maltreatment as well as governments’ programmatic and budgetary responses. Under 
this strand, violence against children (VAC) survey reports, child rights situation analyses 
in all four countries, humanitarian situation analysis reports (especially for South Sudan), 
and multiple indicator cluster surveys (MICS) (all except South Sudan) were natural 
starting points. VAC surveys have become the main tool for collecting information on 
several topics related to child maltreatment such as bullying, sexual abuse, corporal 
punishment, and harmful practices. Zimbabwe conducted a VAC survey in 2013, Kenya 
in 2014 and Botswana in 2017 (the report was only released in 2019). South Sudan had 
not, as of December 2020, undertaken a VAC survey. Multi-country reports on child 
protection related topics from organisations such as ANPPCAN, Save the Children, Child 
Fund, UNICEF, Plan International, War Child Holland (WCH), World Vision International, 
and the Africa Child Policy Forum were also reviewed. 
Third, the researcher extensively reviewed policies, laws, and strategy documents 
related to child protection in selected countries. The legal and policy analysis started with 
constitutional reviews to see the extent to which child protection was covered. What 
followed was an examination of national laws, strategies, and child protection institutions 
in place. To reinforce the findings, the researcher also reviewed commentaries on the 
child rights legal framework in each country. The discussion on child protection policy and 
legal frameworks, covered in the next Chapter, was instrumental in showing that the 
problem is not the lack of frameworks, but resources to deliver quality child protection 
services.   
 Fourth, the researcher quantitatively analysed budget information between fiscal 




documents. The aim of this review was twofold: 1) to assess the extent to which key child 
protection issues and programmes were reflected in fiscal policies as well as in national 
and sub-national budget documents and 2) to measure the size and composition of 
budget allocations to child protection for each country. The following key national budget 
documents were collected and analysed: medium-term expenditure frameworks, pre-
budget statements, approved budget estimates, and national audit reports. In Kenya and 
South Sudan, many of these documents are published online on the Ministry of Finance 
website. In Botswana and Zimbabwe hardcopies were collected from the Ministries of 
finance and Parliament, with some bought in bookshops. It was not possible to access 
annual financial reports with actual expenditures on child protection programmes for all 
four countries. Furthermore, it was very difficult to obtain budget documents at the sub-
national level as they were not publicly available. It was only that the researcher managed 
to access budget documents from the following counties: Bungoma, Kakamega, 
Mombasa, Nairobi, Taita Taveta, and Wajir. In Zimbabwe, budget data was only found 
for Harare and Gweru City Councils, but was in aggregated fashion, making it difficult to 
analyse allocations to child protection.  
In addition to government budget documents, the researcher also collected 
information about donor expenditures on child protection from the Financial Tracking 
Service (FTS) coordinated by the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) and from the Development Assistance Cooperation (DAC) website by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Financial information 
from web portals such as the FTS was crucial to estimate donor spending on child 
protection during emergencies. This information was augmented by data from 
consolidated appeal processes (CAPs) managed by OCHA as well as child protection 
resource mapping reports collected in soft and hard copies from UNICEF offices in 
Zimbabwe and Kenya. After the review of budget documents, a rigorous process, to be 
discussed in the next Chapter, was followed to estimate how much each of the four 
countries allocated to child protection between 2011 and 2018. This process helped the 
researcher to confirm earlier studies which found that most governments spend little on 




 Fifth, the researcher reviewed political party manifestos of the main political 
parties, which were found online: Botswana Democratic Party and Botswana Movement 
for Democracy; Jubilee Party and CORD (Kenya); Movement for Democratic Change – 
T, MDC-Alliance and Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (Zimbabwe). No 
manifestos were found for political parties in South Sudan. To complement what is in the 
manifestos, the researcher also reviewed the state of the nation addresses by incumbent 
presidents, which were published in newspapers during the study period, or, where 
available, online. Hansard reports14, capturing parliamentary debates during the budget 
approval stage of the budget cycle, were also reviewed. Hansard reports were found for 
Kenya and Zimbabwe for 2015 and 2016 budget sessions and the 2016 session in the 
case of Botswana. The reports were obtained from the respective parliament offices. No 
reports were found for South Sudan. However, a report by the South Sudan Parliamentary 
Lobby Group on Children dated July 2013 was found. These documents provided useful 
insights on the political profile of child protection and its conceptualisations by decision-
makers in each case study country. 
 Sixth, the researcher reviewed archival information such as the minutes and 
reports of pre-and post-budget meetings by parliamentarians especially by the 
Parliamentary Lobby Group on Children in South Sudan and the Southern African 
Parliamentary Trust based in Harare, Zimbabwe, and civil society organisations. Other 
archival documents reviewed include budget circulars in Kenya and Zimbabwe sent to 
ministries outlining ceilings and other guidance on resource allocation.  
 Lastly, reports produced by relevant international institutions such as the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child and African Committee of Experts on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child were also reviewed. These include General Comments as well 
as Concluding Observations following state party reporting to treaty bodies. Concluding 
observations for Kenya, for instance, served as evidence of the underfunding of child 
protection institutions and programmes. Alternate reports from United Nations agencies 
such as UNICEF and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) to treaty bodies were 
also reviewed.  
 





4.4.2  Collection of Primary Data 
 
The primary data collection techniques utilised in this study are in-depth interviews, 
participant observation and a review of archival documents. Primary data was gathered 
from research participants to determine how political economy variables affected 
decisions on public spending on child protection. Due to sensitivities associated with the 
topic, data collection methods such as focus group discussions were not used. As Gill & 
Treasure (2008: 292-4) noted, focus groups are not appropriate when there is a risk that 
some participants may not be forthcoming with information in a group setting considering 
the sensitivity of a topic. The three primary data collection methods are discussed below.  
Primary data collection, including interviews with research participants, was 
conducted in several instalments from 2016 to 2020. Most of the data collection in South 
Sudan was undertaken in 2018 with the help of a research assistant, who was domiciled 
in Juba at the time of the study. The research assistant was trained on the research 
objectives, tools and data collection procedures. A few respondents were interviewed via 
telephone and Skype call during the same period (2016-2020). 
4.4.2.1 In-depth Interviews 
 
In-depth interviews were used as the main method to gather primary data from the 
research sample. Out of 165 people who participated in the study, 122 were interviewed 
face-to face by the researcher and 20 (from South Sudan) by the research assistant. The 
remaining 18 were interviewed via Skype/ Zoom/ telephone by the researcher, with the 
other five interviewed face-to-face in Nairobi. The interviews provided a deep 
understanding of social phenomena, especially in cases where detailed insights are 
required, and can be appropriate where individual and sensitive data is required (Denzin 
& Lincoln 2005). The key elements of political economy such as interests, power relations, 
and incentive systems underlying decision-making fit into the above characterisation, 
hence the suitability of this method. Also, interviews are suitable for exploring the “views, 
beliefs, and motivations” of research participants on a study topic (Gill & Treasure 2008: 
292). This study sought to gather research participants’ views about why government 




4.4.2.2 Data Collection Instrument 
An interview guide containing a wide range of mainly open-ended questions, developed 
from the conceptual framework presented earlier, was used as the main data collection 
instrument. The tool enabled the collection of detailed information about the research 
topic whilst leaving room for additional insights from research participants (Denzin & 
Lincoln 2005; Gill & Treasure 2008). The interview guide was developed in a way that 
captured participants’ perspectives about the elements of the political economy of public 
spending, presented in the previous chapter. These include a) personal and institutional 
interests and incentives available to those in power to make decisions about public 
spending; b) power relations between and amongst different budget players; c) 
constructions of childhood and children’s rights; d) institutional dynamics, including formal 
and informal decision-making cultures and processes; and e) interactions between and 
amongst states, and influences of key stakeholders, within and outside each country. The 
questions were framed in a non-leading way to avoid bias as recommended by Gill & 
Treasure (2008: 293) and were written in English.  
The interview guide was pilot tested in Kenya with eight research participants from 
civil society. From these eight, feedback about the length of the questionnaire and the 
need to include questions that relate to the financing of child protection programmes 
targeting certain groups of children, such as those living with disabilities was provided. 
As the study evolved, some questions were revised, in response to insights from other 
research participants. For example, in Kenya, the need to capture dynamics at the sub-
national level was emphasised. In response to this, a few questions were added, which 
were tested during a field mission to Kisumu County where five research participants (two 
local legislators, one government official and two officials from civil society) were 
interviewed. 
4.4.2.3 Data Collection Procedure 
To begin with, formal communication was sent to potential respondents requesting an 
appointment by email or phone. Once confirmed, the questionnaire (interview guide) was 
shared with participants in advance to enable them to prepare for the interview. The 




In South Sudan, some of the Interviews were conducted by a research assistant after 
going through the necessary induction and training.  The research assistant interviewed 
20 people face-to-face in Juba. All interviews were conducted in English and translation 
was not required.  
In line with professional and ethical procedures of research, research participants 
were informed about the study objectives and were assured of the researcher’s 
commitment to ethical principles such as anonymity and confidentiality in the presentation 
of results as recommended by Babbie & Mouton (2011) and Gill & Treasure (2008). 
Participants were asked to sign a research consent form, which clarified objectives, 
participants’ roles, level of risk involved and anonymity of respondents. Informed consent 
is a key ethical procedure in research (Gill & Treasure 2008; Welman et al. 2011) and is 
part of the University of Johannesburg’s research protocol to be discussed later in this 
Chapter. The researcher also received an ethics clearance certificate from the Higher 
Degrees Committee of the University.  
Before each interview, permission was sought to use a digital voice recorder. 
Some of the research participants declined to be audio-recorded. In such instances, their 
responses were captured through handwritten notes. Both tape-recorded interviews and 
handwritten notes were transcribed afterwards in the form of computer typed notes. 
Verbatim transcriptions helped the researcher to have a pool of information from which to 
quote during data analysis and presentation (Bogdan & Biklen 2003). Hand-written notes 
were kept in a safe and secure place as back up at the researcher’s place of residence. 
The typed notes were saved in a protected file on an external hard drive, also kept at the 
researcher’s residence.  
 In conducting interviews, the researcher was sure to project professionalism and 
a non-threatening image. This was essential to convince research participants, especially 
government officials, of the importance of the study and to allay their fears about the risks 
of participation. The interviews demanded strong interpersonal and communication skills, 
including the ability to listen carefully, read the non-verbal language, and ask probing 
questions in a manner that kept respondents comfortable. As Denzin & Lincoln (2005) 




that a researcher has strong questioning, listening, and synthesizing skills to extract 
meanings and recurring themes from words and other images. Throughout the interview 
process, the researcher was on the watch out for defensive or superficial responses, as 
well as sideshows. In situations where philosophical and or superficial responses were 
given, the researcher followed this with probing questions about the what, why, and how 
of budgeting events and processes as they relate to the study topics. The use of a 
recorder also enabled the researcher to pay attention to what was being said and to probe 
more, without being distracted by note-taking. Overall, the interviews were conducted in 
a respectful, and professional way, enabling the researcher to find out answers to 
research questions.  
4.4.2.4 Observation 
In addition to interviews, observation was also used to collect primary data, especially in 
Kenya and Zimbabwe. Babbie & Mouton (2011) define participant observation as a 
process of witnessing events unfold in their natural settings through the lenses of the 
research topic. Participant observation also entailed involvement in some budgeting 
events and processes under study (Welman et al. 2011). Throughout the study, the 
researcher actively sought opportunities to participate in relevant conferences including 
pre and post-budget meetings and seminars organised by governments and NGOs.15 The 
researcher also followed through budget presentations and debates in the parliaments of 
Botswana (2017 & 18), Kenya (2015 & 2016) and Zimbabwe (2016, 2017 & 2018).  
In addition to listening to the debates through the media and reviewing Hansard 
reports by Parliaments, the researcher followed several commentaries in both print and 
electronic media about the budget, especially those which focused on children’s issues. 
The commentaries were the tip of the iceberg on the key issues that concern most opinion 
leaders and other interest groups including child-focused organisations. Lastly, the 
 
15 In Kenya, for example, the researcher participated in 13 pre and post child budget consultative workshops organised 
by the Kenya Institute of Public Finance and Institute of the Economic Affairs of Kenya, Save the Children, Children’s 
and the Kenya Alliance for the Advancement of Child Rights (KAACR) between 2015 and 2017. In 2019, the researcher 
also participated in a global conference on budgeting to end child marriage organised by Girls and Not Brides 
organisation, wherein he presented a paper on lessons learnt in tracking child protection budgets based on his 





researcher was also involved in child protection budget analyses in Kenya and Malawi, 
as part of his professional job, and also in the development of the UNICEF guidance on 
how to produce a child protection budget brief in 2019. These experiences allowed him 
to apply theory to practice, leading to a better understanding of the intricacies and 
challenges of measuring public spending on child protection. Throughout primary data 
collection, issues of reflexivity were considered and will be discussed in detail later in the 
Chapter.  
4.5 Data Analysis  
 
4.5.1 Analysis of Quantitative Budget Data and Information 
 
Until recently, authoritative guidance on how to measure the level of public spending on 
child protection has been glaringly absent from the burgeoning literature on child 
protection (Lachman & Poblete 2002; Landgren 2005; NCCS 2012). Folscher & Allan 
(2014) were probably the first to propose a comprehensive methodology to measure the 
size of public spending on child protection in each country. Before that, there were 
piecemeal initiatives by child-focused organisations such as Save the Children, World 
Vision International and Plan International, which concentrated on tracking budgets for 
specific child protection programmes such as residential care for children without 
appropriate parental care and humanitarian assistance to children affected by conflict and 
other disasters (NANGO 2006; Pereznieto et al. 2011; Save the children 2010). In 2010, 
for example, the Global Child Protection Working Group, composed mainly of child-
focused organisations, including Save the Children, analysed publicly available 
information in proposals and commitments recorded in the Financial Tracking Service to 
measure how much donors were spending on child protection during emergencies (Save 
the Children 2010). Several NGOs also attempted child-focused budget analysis to 
establish how much governments were spending on child-focused programmes (NANGO 
2006; ACPF 2011; Save the Children 2015).  
The interest of NGOs in child-focused budget analysis has grown in recent years, 




researcher came across several budget analyses done by NGOs such as Botswana 
Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (BOCONGO), Kenya Alliance for 
Advancement of Children (KAACR), and the National Association of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NANGO) in Zimbabwe. Many of the organisations only did a superficial 
analysis of allocations to child welfare ministries, without tracking specific allocations to 
child protection programmes. As a result, their analyses did not give a very precise picture 
of how much governments are spending on child protection. To improve the quality of the 
analysis, organisations such as Save the Children, UNICEF and World Vision decided to 
develop guidance for their members and partners on how to measure and track child 
protection budgets. For example, in 2015, Save the Children developed a technical note 
(which was however not published) for its country offices to guide them on how to do child 
protection budget analysis (Muchabaiwa 2015). Since then, more than 15 countries in 
Africa have undertaken child protection budget analyses with support from Save the 
Children (Kenya Interviewee 2, CSO, 2018). The research only managed to see work 
done in four selected countries. 
UNICEF headquarters produced a similar tool in the same year with assistance 
from Mokoro Ltd intending to develop a financial benchmark for child protection. The tool 
metamorphosized into a manual which was launched in 2020 (UNICEF 2020). UNICEF 
Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO) also developed a guideline on how 
to produce a child protection budget brief in 2019. Using this guide, by end of 2019, four 
UNICEF country offices in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) namely Burundi, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, and Malawi had undertaken child protection budget analysis with support from 
UNICEF (Kenya Interviewee 50, donor organisation, 2019).  
This thesis’s methodology to measure the level of budget allocations to child 
protection benefitted immensely from early efforts by Save the Children (2015) and 
UNICEF (Folscher & Allan 2014), including experiences from other countries such as 
Bangladesh. The methodology and findings were corroborated with recent child 
protection budget analyses done in Malawi (Avati et al. 2018), Rwanda (Save the Children 
2015) and Bangladesh (UNICEF 2018) as well as well as the guidance developed by 




behalf of UNICEF, were particularly useful in that they drew conceptual parameters 
around what should be counted as expenditure on child protection, arguing that a budget 
is befitting the label ‘child protection’ if it is “deliberately and specifically meant to prevent 
and respond to child protection concerns…demarcated by the types of harm identified” 
(Folscher & Allan 2014:04). Moreover, they provided methodological clarity in terms of 
the measurement of budget allocations to child protection, considering the cross-sectoral 
and complex nature of child protection, which makes tracking of relevant budget lines 
cumbersome and potentially expensive. 
Building on the above efforts, several steps were followed to measure the size of 
budget allocations to child protection in each of the four countries. The first step entailed 
analysing pertinent child protection risks in each country. This information served as input 
in the listing of preventive and response services and interventions that should be planned 
and budgeted for by the government, which follows. The key sources of information 
included the child rights situation analysis (CRSA) reports, VAC survey reports, national 
plans of action for children as well as UNICEF’s child rights statistics (UNICEF 2015, 
2017). A list of categories of children at risk was also drawn based on analysis of the 
socio-economic contexts, child rights situation analysis, and other common risks and 
vulnerabilities of children in each country. Altogether, the list included children living and 
working on the streets, children involved in armed conflict, displaced children, child 
migrants, children in conflict with the law, orphans and other vulnerable children, 
abandoned children, children involved with drugs, trafficked children, children with 
disabilities, girls, survivors of child sexual abuse, and children involved in harmful cultural 
practices. While most of the above are relevant to many countries, some, such as children 
affected by armed conflict were relevant to specific countries, and in this particular case 
to South Sudan. Unfortunately, as discussed in Chapter Six, both online and physical 
searches of budget books revealed glaring gaps in the articulation of child protection. The 
most commonly cited group of children in many budget books were orphans and other 
vulnerable children.  
In the second step, child protection interventions were listed for which government 




campaigns against child maltreatment, training of the child protection workforce, social 
assistance to children without appropriate parental care, psychosocial and medical 
support to victims of abuse, monitoring of child rights violations, case management, family 
tracing and reunification, birth registration, as well as protection and rehabilitation of 
children involved in a conflict, rehabilitation of children engaged in substance abuse and 
living on the streets. Guided by a systems approach, the study also listed other elements 
of a child protection system requiring funding from the government, such as the creation 
of a robust and accurate system to collect child protection data and statistics, monitoring 
and regulation of child protection services, and strengthening of child protection 
institutions such as child protection committees. 
The third step entailed mapping the government ministries and departments 
responsible for addressing the identified harms and for implementing the interventions 
listed above. In all four countries, a wide range of ministries was found to be responsible 
for child protection notably: Social Welfare, Local Government, Home Affairs/ Interior, 
Education, Justice and Health.  
In the fourth step, a line by line review of approved budget estimates for all 
identified ministries to identify budget lines relevant to specific interventions or elements 
of a national child protection system was undertaken. For those countries where soft 
copies of budget documents were found (Kenya and South Sudan), a word search by 
intervention/programme harms to children, and category of children at risk was used as 
a technique to identify all relevant budget lines as suggested by Folscher & Allan (2014). 
The online word search of key child protection terms and programmes to identify relevant 
budget lines was also done by Pereznieto et al. (2011) when they carried out a global 
study on investment in children on behalf of Save the Children. During the review of 
budget documents, the study found that a considerable number of child protection 
interventions were lumped together with other programmes, making it difficult to identify 
the component that could be attributed to child protection. This challenge was also 
observed by Avati et al. (2018) in the case of Malawi. The review of documents was 
complemented by an analysis of relevant sector plans as recommended by Muchabaiwa 




detail. The reason for doing this was that before an issue finds expression in a 
government budget, it must first be planned for, at least theoretically, as discussed in the 
previous Chapter.  
It is important to highlight at this stage that the lack of disaggregation of budgets 
was a major challenge in the identification of child protection budget lines. This problem 
was more pronounced in South Sudan than in the other three countries due to the budget 
classification system whereby allocations for many activities are lumped into one cost 
centre. In the fiscal year 2017/18, for example, budget allocations to the Ministry of 
Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MoGCSW) in South Sudan were only categorised into 
five headline cost centres in the form of directorates in the ministry, namely: 
administration, planning, gender, child welfare and social welfare. This administrative 
budget classification system made it difficult for the researcher to discern how much of 
the ministry’s budget was specifically for child protection services. Officials from the 
above-mentioned ministry argued that this type of budgeting was the most pragmatic 
given the small size of the budget ceiling for the ministry. One official commented on this 
matter: “Tell me how do you break down such meagre resources? The funds we are 
getting are just too little. It makes budgeting meaningless” (South Sudan Interviewee 17, 
Government official, 2018). 
The argument put forward by the quoted official is that if resources are limited, 
sharing them amongst many competing priorities is a difficult undertaking. This thinking 
resonates with Redmond’s (2014) view that poor countries struggle to budget effectively 
because the resources are too limited. However, whilst the above view is a convenient 
way of dealing with scarcity, the risks to child protection budgeting are too many and 
sometimes costly (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2009). Such practices often give unfettered 
powers to a few individuals to decide where and how resources should be spent. This 
has the potential to fuel clientelism and favouritism in resource allocation (Diaz-Cayeros 
& Magalon 2003; Keefer & Khemani 2003); more so is the case when resource allocation 
is done in an opaque fashion (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2009).  
Although South Sudan had the least comprehensive government budgets, the 




Open Budget Survey (IBP 2017), which includes indicators of the comprehensiveness of 
government budgets.16  Results of the 2017 survey show that whilst South Sudan got 5 
out of 100 points, Botswana got 15/100, Kenya 46/100, and Zimbabwe 23/100 (IBP 2017). 
All four case study countries performed below 50 out of 100.17 Consistent with IBP (2017) 
observations, Kenya was found to have the most comprehensive budgets compared to 
the other three countries. The study found that the more disaggregated a budget is, the 
more likely it is to find direct child protection budget lines. This finding is consistent with 
the recommendation of the UNCRC (2016) and the ACERWC (2020).   
In the fifth step, all identified budget lines were tagged, and data entered into an 
excel sheet. A seven-year period (2011-2017) of budget analysis study was found to be 
long enough to show meaningful patterns of public spending on child protection in each 
country. In South Sudan and Kenya where the budgeting approach is programme-based, 
information about child protection related programme goals, targets and indicators were 
also captured.  
The sixth step involved screening and organising the data, which was in excel 
sheets, according to the institution responsible, programme, function, purpose and 
economic classifications, borrowing from UNICEF’s approach to the child protection 
budget analysis undertaken in Bangladesh (UNICEF 2018e) and Malawi (Avati et al. 
2018). Learning from Folscher & Allan (2014), the researcher also categorised the budget 
data into ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ budget lines. The idea was to differentiate programmes 
whose primary objective is to prevent and respond to abuse, neglect, exploitation and 
violence against children and those which only contribute to the creation of a protective 
environment and other purposes.  
Direct budget lines were defined as those whose main aim is to prevent or respond 
to specific harms against children (Folscher & Allan 2014). Examples include: ‘Street 
Children Fund’, ‘Victim Friendly Units’, ‘Reformatory centres for children’ and ‘Alternative 
 
16 The Open Budget Survey is the world’s most authoritative survey on budget transparency conducted by the 
International Budget Partnership. An Open Budget Index is produced afterwards. The index looks at public access to 
key budget information as well as comprehensiveness of government budgets. 
 
17 In this score, 0 is poor performance whereby governments do not provide the public with budget information, with 




care arrangements for children without appropriate parental care’. Indirect budgets were 
defined as those programmes or budget lines that contribute to, but are not entirely meant 
for, child protection. The degree of contribution varies with each programme. For 
example, a programme on ‘Resettlement and Reintegration’ in South Sudan inevitably 
benefits children and adults. Such a budget line cannot, therefore, be wholly taken as 
child protection spending. The same could be said of ‘campaigns against gender-based 
violence’ which benefit girls and women in the first instance, but also boys and men. Other 
examples of indirect budgets, as defined by Avati et al. (2018), include police services, 
social protection programmes, early childhood care and development and economic 
empowerment programmes for women.  
In the seventh step, the researcher attempted to apportion indirect budget lines to 
child protection. The reason behind this was that by simply adding all direct and indirect 
budgets the study ran the risk of exaggerating the level of government spending on child 
protection, hence the need to apportion parts of indirect budgets. To apportion 
components of indirect budgets to child protection, Folscher & Allan (2014: 8-21) 
suggested a weighting approach, which this study also adopted.  
At the basic level, weighting entails making decisions on a reasonable proportion 
of the indirect budget to be assigned to child protection, based on analysis of several 
variables. The variables considered include the number of child protection related cases 
brought forward/handled in relation to the total number of cases; the number of staff in a 
department working on child protection issues to total staff complement; percentage of 
children at risk who utilised certain services in relation to the total number of users; the 
proportion of communication and other materials with messages on child protection to all 
materials produced, and the number of sub-programmes on child protection to total within 
a bigger indirect programme area. The total budget for child protection in each country 





CPbgt = (Dirji+ Direc jii...) + (Apki+Apkii...) 
Where: 
CPbgt = Total child protection budget 
(Dirji = Direct child protection budgets in programme j (I, ii, iii…) 
Apki = Indirect/ Apportioned budget in programmes k (i, ii, iii…) 
Due to the paucity of data, it was not possible to obtain data to use in the apportionment 
of several indirect budget lines for Botswana and South Sudan. As a result, the idea of 
apportioning all indirect budgets was abandoned. The analysis presented in Chapter Six 
is based on the calculation of visible or direct child protection budget lines. The decision 
to drop the apportionment exercise did not materially affect the underlying narrative about 
the under-funding of child protection. Focusing on identifiable/ visible budget lines was 
also appropriate for this study in that the visibility of child protection programmes in 
government budgets is a strong indicator of intentionality to address child maltreatment 
(CPWG 2012; Landgren 2005; UNICEF 2012). One can argue that the more visible child 
protection budget lines there are, the more likely it is that a government is aware of the 
problem of child maltreatment and is doing something about it (UNICEF 2012). Further, 
it is also fair to say that issues that matter to politicians often find space in political party 
manifestos, national plans, and national budgets (DFID 2009; Hibbs 1981; Norton & Elson 
2002).  
Finally, data collected was adjusted for inflation using 2011 as the base year. whilst 
Descriptive statistical methods were used to describe the level of government spending 
on child protection in each country. Among other measures, the researcher analysed the 
total child protection budget in each country as a share of the total government budget, 
of gross domestic product (GDP), and selected ministries. Trends over time were also 
established and per capita allocations calculated. Also, an analysis of the composition of 
total child protection budgets was done to get a picture of which elements of a national 
child protection system are prioritised in government budgets. Finally, cross-country 
comparisons were made, using parameters such as range and variances. The researcher 




settings. Findings from the budget analysis were presented in the form of graphs and 
tables to better show trends and patterns. This information is presented in Chapter Six.   
4.5.2 Analysis of Qualitative Data 
 
Content and discourse analysis where the two main qualitative data analysis techniques 
used. Content analysis entailed a review of documents, text, and speeches to see what 
themes emerge, including assessing the visibility of child protection in government plans 
and budgets, political party manifestos, and such other documents (Bogdan & Biklen 
2003; Denzin & Lincoln 1998). According to Elo et al. (2014:1-2) a prerequisite for 
successful content analysis is that data collected should be organisable into concepts 
that describe a research phenomenon. The content analysis helped the researcher to 
decipher underlying messages from research participants, within the realm of political 
economy, which influenced decisions about budget allocations to child protection.  
Content analysis entailed editing, organising, coding and synthesising notes and 
other transcribed information to search for specific themes and patterns (Babbie& Mouton 
2011; Bogdan & Biklen 2003). The first step in the analysis was to screen and edit data 
to keep relevant and correctly captured information. This included listening to audio 
recordings and reading handwritten and computer typed notes. Key thematic markers 
were first identified and coded, guided by the conceptual framework, namely: political 
profile of child protection (Pp); conceptualisation of child protection (CCp); constructions 
of childhood (CCh); interests and incentives available to decision-makers (Intr.); 
hegemonic idea (Heg.); power-relations (Pr); development and spending ideology (Ideo.); 
politics of budgeting (PolBu.); state and governance structures (SStr.); fragility (Frag.); 
and global and civil society influences (Gl.). As typed notes were reviewed, identified 
themes were tagged. The coding and categorisation of data later helped the researcher 
to make comparisons of themes and patterns identified in the four case studies, as 
suggested by Ritchie & Lewis (2003: 56-64). All identified themes based on the above 
listed thematic markers were analysed to establish recurring political economy variables 
which influenced decisions on public spending. Microsoft Word and Excel were used to 




Discourse analysis was used to complement content analysis in that it contributed 
to an improved understanding of hegemonic ideas on the constructions of childhood and 
conceptualisations of child protection, and consequently the political profile of child 
protection in each country. The discourse analysis was done mainly to parliamentary 
debates, political party speeches during key events, state of the nation addresses and 
civil society organisation workshops. As part of the analysis, the researcher paid attention 
to the language used by target groups, common messages (and even contradictory ones) 
to capture dominant views on childhood and child protection, which in turn influenced the 
content and scope of programmes and budgets on child protection. Discourse analysis 
assisted the researcher to identify narratives that mirror hegemonic ideas on public 
spending on child protection (Irene 2014; Merriam 1998).  
The results of content and discourse analysis in each country were compared with 
the others to identify common political economy themes. To correctly interpret the 
analyses, the socio-economic and political context was considered. The critical realism 
paradigm employed in this study requires contextualisation in data analysis and 
interpretation (Bhaskar 1997: 18-20).  
During data collection and analysis, the researcher came across contradictory 
views, with some of them being philosophical such as whether a child should be studied 
as an individual or as part of the household. In such cases, efforts were made to navigate 
philosophical debates and to find supporting evidence for emerging views from archival 
documents such as Hansard reports, child protection programme evaluations, and budget 
documents to ascertain the truth. Some of the areas of contradiction were ironed out 
during interviews with the next set of research participants, including independent 
consultants. Throughout the study, due diligence was made to confirm recurring themes 
with supporting evidence from either secondary or primary data, as recommended by Elo 
et al. (2014) and Irene (2014). 
To sum it up, through iterative content and discourse analysis as well as rigorous 




impacting decisions on budget allocation to child protection were identified. These 
variables will be discussed in Chapter Seven to Nine.  
4.6 Reflexivity 
 
Considering that qualitative research is often criticised for being “impressionistic, 
anecdotal and influenced by the researcher’s bias” (Patnaik 2013:99), the study had to 
give due attention to reliability, validity, and reflexivity issues, which are intricately related. 
The researcher constantly engaged himself in a process of self-critique to check for any 
possible impacts of his experience, employment status, and prior knowledge on the 
research process and outcomes. Using a reflexive journal, the researcher continuously 
challenged himself to respect research ethics, detect and deal with bias whilst ensuring 
that his employment with an international child rights organisation did not undermine 
rigorous and objective research. 
Moreover, the researcher reflected on the implications of his employment with an 
international child-focused organisation during the research period where he was 
responsible for evidence-building, advocacy, and capacity strengthening of government 
and civil society actors on matters to do with public investments in children. The aim was 
to assess the potential impact of his professional experience on the research process and 
outcomes. Through this process, the researcher noticed that there was a likely risk that 
his prior knowledge about public budgeting would affect the interview process and 
outcomes, if not checked.  
To minimise the risk, the researcher continuously challenged himself to put away 
all preconceived ideas about public spending on child protection gained as part of his 
professional life. Additionally, as highlighted earlier, he utilised a reflexive journal wherein 
he noted crucial observations, new insights, thoughts and interpretations before 
comprehensive data analysis. The researcher cultivated the discipline of undertaking the 
reflections immediately after conducting in-depth interviews and participating in relevant 
meetings and conferences. Furthermore, a deliberate effort was also made to ensure that 
interview questions were not leading or prejudicial because of the researcher’s prior 




Overall, the researcher’s employment status was not seen as a limitation, but as 
an opportunity to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Furthermore, the 
employment status put him in a powerful reflexive position to gain deeper insights into the 
political economy of public spending. Access to research participants as well as 
budgetary documents and other crucial documents were also made relatively easy. In line 
with research ethics, the researcher disclosed information about his doctoral studies to 
his employer and stressed that the study was independent of professional responsibilities, 
although the two fed into each other. It is important to stress, however, that, to a large 
extent, the primary data collected as well as the secondary data reviewed were not 
enabled by the researcher’s employers. The research findings and outputs are wholly 
owned by the researcher.  
However, the researcher’s employment status posed ethical dilemmas at times.  
For example, there were times he attended meetings in his professional capacity but then 
made certain observations and took notes that were used for this study. In such 
circumstances, he informed conveners that he was also involved in a doctoral study and 
asked for permission to use some of the information collected from the workshop. In 
situations where the researcher had to interview workshop attendees, he would follow the 
normal research procedure discussed in the previous section.  
4.7 Trustworthiness and Reliability of Findings 
 
Trustworthiness and reliability aspects of the research were addressed through data 
triangulation, member checks, peer reviews and saturation as suggested by Merriam 
(1998). The trustworthiness of qualitative data depends on the “availability of rich, 
appropriate and well-saturated data” (Elo et al. 2014:6). In this study, data triangulation 
assumed various forms. Firstly, the same question was asked to several respondents in 
the same case study to capture all perspectives. Second, emerging views about entities, 
processes, and political economy variables were also cross-checked with parties 
concerned, including informant outliers who held divergent views from most research 
participants. Lastly, triangulation was done by comparing what was said verbally with 




Although the strength of qualitative studies is not necessarily in the size of the 
sample (Green 2013: 34), the higher the number of research participants, the more likely 
that the dataset is rich and reliable. As indicated earlier during the section on sampling, 
165 research participants constitute a large sample size from which meaningful 
conclusions can be drawn. Moreover, several common themes, especially with regards 
to the political profile of child protection, its conceptualisations and the politics of 
budgeting, kept recurring until no new information was forthcoming. This renders the 
findings credible.  
 Member checks entailed cross-checking tentative interpretations and findings with 
regards to specific research questions. Member checks were done with three 
independent consultants and two CSOs in Kenya which focused on the power and agency 
of the NCCS. Two were done in Zimbabwe to further inquire about the nature of budget 
negotiations between social sector ministries and the Ministry of Finance. Two additional 
member checks were conducted in Botswana with an official in the Department of Social 
Protection about child protection within government structures and with a professor at the 
University of Botswana. In practice, this entailed inquiring about preliminary 
interpretations of perspectives shared by research participants. In almost all the cases 
where feedback was sought, research participants validated the researcher’s preliminary 
interpretations. According to Richards & Schwartz (2002:138), member checks minimise 
the risk of participants’ views being misrepresented or misinterpreted during data analysis 
and presentation.  
To complement member checks the researcher shared draft chapters with experts 
in the field of child protection and public budgeting. Chapter Six on trends in budget 
allocations to child protection was reviewed by two economists. It was necessary to 
request economists to review this chapter because of the technical nature of the subject 
matter. All the above reviews were in addition to the day to day guidance received from 




4.8 Ethical Issues 
The main ethical issues that this study considered relate to informed consent, 
confidentiality, right to withdraw and protection of respondents from harm (Ritchie & Lewis 
2003; Richards & Schwartz 2002).  Some of these issues have been alluded to already. 
Although their studies focused on the health sector, Richards & Schwartz (2002), 
highlighted additional ethical issues such as anxiety and distress, exploitation, 
misrepresentation, inconvenience, and opportunity cost relevant to this study. A research 
ethics protocol requires that the above risks be mitigated through regulation of the 
interaction between the researcher and the people involved in the study and in the choice 
of tools, instruments, and methods used (Watt 2007; Merriam 1998; Richards & Schwartz 
2002). The main ethical issues faced are elaborated in the paragraphs below.  
4.8.1 Obtaining Informed Consent 
As discussed earlier, with regards to informed consent, the researcher was guided by 
Welman et al. (2011:201), who argue that respondents should give written or verbal 
consent to participate in the study after being sufficiently informed of the purpose of the 
research, assured of confidentiality and that they will not be harmed as a result of their 
participation in the research. All research participants were therefore requested to sign a 
research consent form in English, the adopted language for the study. Participants only 
signed the consent form after a thorough overview of the research and assurances that 
comments will not be attributed to an individual. This was necessary to avoid any 
repercussions and potential threats to job security if their employers were to become 
aware of what they said during the interview. Even after this assurance, a few 
respondents flatly refused to sign the consent form, be audiotaped, and for their names 
to be mentioned in the study. The refusal by research participants to do the above did 
not, however, materially affect the quality of the interviews or the findings.  
4.8.2 Anonymity, Confidentiality and Privacy 
The fear of one’s personal views being known is common in qualitative studies because 




(Sanjari et al. 2014; Welman et al. 2011). Considering this risk, the researcher proactively 
decided to ensure the anonymity of participants in the presentation of results and 
referencing by not stating their official position. Additionally, transcribed data was saved 
in a folder with a password so as to ensure that information about who said what is not 
known by anyone else except the researcher. In the spirit of observing confidentiality, the 
common citation method in the study is the use of the official status of a research 
participant such as ‘Zimbabwe Interviewee 1, Government Official, 2018’ without 
revealing the specific title or position. 
 To ensure privacy during interviews, research participants were requested to 
suggest a suitable place for a meeting. In most cases, researchers opted for interviews 
in their offices. A few suggested places such as coffee shops where they would not be 
heard by their work colleagues. Additionally, some people who used Skype or the 
telephone preferred the interviews to be scheduled after working hours when they were 
at home. Although the researcher was flexible, a conscious decision was made to avoid 
meeting in private places as it had the potential to compromise the integrity of the 
research process.  
4.8.3 Researcher-Participant Relationship 
Considering that the study involved certain research participants with whom the 
researcher had a professional relationship, either as partners, network members or sub-
grantees, honesty about research objectives and methodology was respected. The 
researcher was particularly sensitive and open when engaging with respondents, who 
were working for sub-grantees of the organisation that employed him during the study 
period. The objective was to avoid a situation where they would feel compelled to 
participate for fear of risking funding. Professional and research boundaries were 
maintained to avoid potential conflict of interest, duress as well as likely exploitation of 






4.8.4 The Right of Participants to Withdraw 
The right of research participants to withdraw from the research was highlighted in the 
research consent form. This was also clearly explained before the start of each interview. 
Participants were informed that they were free to opt-out of the study without giving 
reasons. However, examples of factors that may push a research participant to withdraw 
such as the likelihood of harm, the sensitivity of issues and risks of breaching ethical 
protocols were highlighted to all participants, with mitigation measures explained. No 
research participant withdrew from the study after having agreed to an interview and or 
after having participated in an interview. Although the risk was low, the researcher kept 
the interview time between 60 and 90 minutes to avoid unnecessary fatigue, which often 
creeps in when interviews take too long or touch on sensitive topics (Richards & Schwartz 
2002: 138). 
4.8.5 Minimising the Risk of Harm 
Due to the armed conflict in South Sudan, travel was risky during the study period. To 
minimise the risk of harm, the researcher decided to utilise the services of a research 
assistant based in Juba. However, a few interviews were conducted by the researcher 
via Skype, with six face-to-face interviews done outside the borders of South Sudan. The 
researcher realised that travelling to South Sudan to undertake face-to-face interviews in 
a conflict situation may endanger himself and the research participants. Given the 
volatility of the environment, there was a risk that if local people were spotted in meetings 
with a ‘stranger’, they would be targeted. As discussed above, in other countries, the 
principle of anonymity helped reduce the risk of harm against research participants.  
4.8.6 Avoiding deceptive practices 
In all circumstances, the researcher avoided deceptive practices such as collecting data 
without seeking consent, as discussed earlier in this section. Integrity in the research 
process was upheld throughout the research process. As highlighted earlier, this was 
extended to the disclosure of research interests to the employer, partners, and sub-




Johannesburg and official research permit issued by governments of selected countries 
were openly shared with research participants (Annex 2). Participants were informed that 
participation was voluntary, therefore no compensation for time spent or ideas shared 
was provided. It is also important to note that the research proposal which included a 
section on ethics was reviewed and accepted by the Humanities Higher Degrees 
Committee at the University of Johannesburg leading to the issuance of the Ethical 
Clearance certificate highlighted above. Also, the researcher sought permission to use 
certain documents and data sets accessed during employment such as child protection 
budget briefs in Kenya. Suffice to say that, the bulk of the data used for the study was 
collected independently of the organisations for which he worked.  
4.9 Study Limitations  
 
The study faced certain limitations, which should be highlighted. Firstly, because of the 
absence of actual spending data in all case study countries, the study relied on budget 
estimates (allocations) as a proxy indicator of public spending. The researcher is, 
however, aware that budget allocations are sometimes different from actual expenditures 
especially in fragile countries (Cangiano et al. 2013; Pereznieto et al. 2011).  
Second, the study did not examine issues of equity, efficiency, and effectiveness 
of public spending on child protection in detail. The focus of the quantitative budget 
analysis was to measure the size and composition of budget allocations to child 
protection. The researcher is aware that equity, efficiency, and effectiveness are key 
public financial management goals that should be realised in the context of public 
spending on child protection (ACERWC 2018; Cangiano et al. 2013; UNCRC 2016). Also, 
equity is a key development principle embedded in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development to ensure that all children are reached with services, including child 
protection. It is the right of every child, regardless of geographic location, social and 
economic status as well as the religious and political affiliation of their parents, to be 
protected from all forms of violence. Ensuring value for money in public spending is key 
because, as Cangiano et al. (2013) observe, budget execution challenges persist in 




reallocation of resources, delayed transfers, and wastages. Ultimately resources 
allocated for child protection may not be used for intended purposes (Avati et al. 2018; 
World Vision International 2021).  
Third, there were challenges in coming up with comparable figures about donor 
spending on child protection in all four countries. This was mainly due to the paucity of 
data in some countries, especially Botswana. Data in the Financial Tracking Service only 
cover countries in emergencies such as South Sudan and not Botswana. As a result, it 
was impossible to find comparable data on donor funding to child protection sector in all 
four countries. A similar problem was also observed at the sub-national level. Except for 
Kenya, budgets for local authorities were not publicly available, even upon request. It was 
therefore not possible to compare the size and level of public spending on child protection 
at the sub-national level. Despite this challenge, it is important to note that 14 respondents 
were drawn from local authorities. Their insights greatly illuminated this study.  
Fourth, although the ultimate beneficiaries of the study are children, no children 
were directly involved. There were two main reasons for this decision. The first one is that 
the focus of the research was to examine the underlying reasons and motivations of 
budget makers and other people involved in budgeting when they decide how much 
should be allocated to child protection. This meant policymakers and their adult 
influencers were the primary research participants and not children. The other reason is 
that given sensitivity associated with political economy discussions, it was not prudent for 
the researcher to involve children in issues of power-relations, and incentive systems 
underpinning decision-making, which occurs behind closed doors not accessible to 
children. The researcher, however, deliberately targeted child-focused organisations in 
all the four countries involved in public budgeting from a children’s rights perspective. The 
researcher is aware that under Article 12 of the CRC (1989), children’s voices should be 
given due consideration particularly in matters that affect them, depending on their 
evolving capacity.  
Lastly, the proportion of government officials interviewed is less than other sample 
groups. The majority of the 27 people who did not participate in the study, yet were invited 




were from ministries of justice (in Botswana and South Sudan), health (Botswana, South 
Sudan, and Kenya), and home affairs/ interior (responsible for the police) for Botswana 
and Kenya. Encouragingly, the researcher interviewed officials from ministries 
responsible for the coordination of child protection services in all four countries as well as 
representatives of ministries of finance. While the researcher managed to involve officials 
from national children’s commissions, he was not successful in securing appointments 
with representatives of Human Rights Commissions in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Botswana 
does not have a Human Rights Commission. As highlighted in GC No 2 of the UNCRC 
(2002), Independent National Human Rights Institutions (INHRI) play an important role in 
the promotion and protection of the rights of the child. Luckily, in Kenya, the researcher 
managed to interview an official from the National Gender Equality Commission, rolling 
out several campaigns against maltreatment of girls including involvement in harmful 
practices such as female genital mutilation (FGM).  
Notwithstanding the above gaps in sampling and selection of respondents, a total 
of 57 officials from the government (parliamentarians, ministries, local authorities, and 
children’s commissions) were involved in the study. This is a good sample size from which 
insights into the political economy dynamics of public spending on child protection were 
drawn.  
4.10 Concluding Remarks  
 
In this chapter the research design, approach, and methods were presented. Critical 
realism was selected as the epistemological framework to guide this inter-disciplinary 
qualitative study. Primary data were collected in all four case study countries mainly 
through face-to-face interviews with research participants and participant observation, to 
some degree, to complement available secondary data. The researcher was careful to 
consider issues of trustworthiness, ethics and study limitations, reflexively. The next 
chapter will highlight the policy and strategic frameworks, which ideally, should guide 







Child Protection Policy and Institutional Frameworks 
5.0 Introduction 
 
The primary objective of this chapter is to establish what child protection policies, 
strategies, and plans exist in each of the four case study countries and to assess whether 
they are linked to government budgeting or not. Often, national and sectoral plans are 
disconnected from decision-making on spending priorities (Killick 2004; Rubin 2013). The 
chapter is motivated by the understanding that governments should plan first what they 
want to do before making decisions on budget allocations (UNCRC 2016). Under optimal 
circumstances, decisions on budget allocations to child protection should be guided by 
relevant policies, strategies, and plans (Cangiano et al. 2013; OHCHR 2015; Rubin 2013; 
UNCRC 2003, 2016). However, in reality, the extent to which budget makers refer to 
existing policies, strategies, and plans when making budget decisions is dependent on 
several factors and varies from one country to another (DFID 2007; Lewis & Hildreth 
2010). Whether practiced by many or a few governments, the logic of planning before 
budgeting is widely recognised in public finance management (Cangiano et al. 2013; 
Rubin 2013; Wildavsky 1984).  
 The chapter is divided into three sections, with the first focusing on the child 
protection policy and legal framework in each country. The second maps out a host of 
national and thematic strategies and plans related to child protection. Whilst policies and 
laws serve as overarching frameworks to guide the national response to prevailing child 
maltreatment, it is usually national and thematic plans which provide a better picture of 
the human, technical, and financial requirements to deliver child protection services. The 
last section examines the role of various child protection institutions in decision making 





5.1 Child Protection Policy Environment  
 
Each of the four selected countries has relatively robust national child protection policies 
and laws (ACPF 2018; ANPPCAN 2014; NCCS 2011). The ratification of international 
commitments such as the CRC (1989) and the ACRWC (1990) carries with it an obligation 
for signatory countries to domesticate provisions thereof into national policies and laws 
(Linde 2014; Nolan 2013).  
Child protection policies and laws in all four selected countries can be categorised 
into four: a) national constitutions, b) overarching children’s laws and policies, c) laws to 
address specific child protection risks and, lastly d) thematic policies which contribute to 
child protection. Each of the above is discussed in the paragraphs which follow, starting 
with national constitutions.  
 
5.1.1 National Constitutions 
 
National constitutions for each of the selected countries have provisions for child 
protection (GoB 2002; GoK 2010; GoSS 2011; GoZ 2013). The relevant provisions give 
a hint of the main protection risks in a country and government’s appreciation of its role 
in child protection. Partly as a reflection of the time the constitutions were developed as 
well as the socio-economic and political context, there are variations in the level of detail 
and child protection areas covered.  
Comparatively, Botswana’s national Constitution has the lowest level of detail on 
child protection, followed by Zimbabwe and Kenya. Non-discrimination and protection 
from slavery, forced labour and inhuman treatment are the only child protection issues 
explicitly stated in Section 11 of the Constitution of Botswana (2002). The level of child 
protection detail in the Constitution of Botswana is probably linked to the time it was 
developed (in 1966) and then amended in 2002. The constitutions of the other three 
countries are relatively recent incorporating latest thinking in child protection. The 
Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) makes a commitment to protect children “from economic 
and sexual exploitation, from child labour and from maltreatment, neglect and any form 




children have the right to “protection from abuse, neglect, harmful cultural practices, all 
forms of violence, inhumane treatment and punishment, and hazardous or exploitative 
labour.” (GoK 2010: 23). Kenya’s Constitution uses the contemporary term ‘violence’ to 
refer to child maltreatment. This characterisation possibly reflects the government’s 
appreciation of changing and globalised conceptualisations of child protection. Most of 
the research participants, especially in Botswana and Zimbabwe did not use the term 
‘violence against children’ during interviews.   
The Constitution of South Sudan (2011) is remarkably comprehensive when it 
comes to child protection, in that it outlines several areas to which the government should 
pay attention. It is the only one among the four countries that explicitly bans corporal 
punishment, condemns harmful cultural practices, and the involvement of children in 
armed conflict: Section 17 states that:  
Every child has the right: 
a) to life, survival and development;  
b) to a name and nationality;  
c) to know and be cared for by his or her parents or legal guardian;  
d) not to be subjected to exploitative practices or abuse, nor to be required to serve in 
the army nor permitted to perform work which may be hazardous or harmful to his or 
her education, health or well-being;  
e) to be free from any form of discrimination; 
f) to be free from corporal punishment and cruel and inhuman treatment by any person 
including parents, school administrations and other institutions;  
g) not to be subjected to negative and harmful cultural practices which affect his or her 
health, welfare or dignity; and  
h) to be protected from abduction and trafficking (GoSS 2011:17). 
While the Constitution is very comprehensive, the dominant socio-cultural views on how 
children should be raised and treated in the country is in stark contrast to the legal 
provisions. The country is grappling with a wide range of harmful practices including child 
marriage, female genital mutilation, and girl-child compensation (MoGCSW & UNFPA 
2018; UNICEF 2017c). Many children are not registered, and access to basic social 




high levels of fragility characterised by recurring armed conflict and high levels of food 
insecurity (De Waal 2014; IMF 2014, 2017).  
Despite variations in level of detail, each of the four countries should be credited 
for recognising the importance of child protection in their national constitutions. This is 
significant because as the supreme law in every country, national constitutions set the 
tone for child protection laws and policies, and subsequently decisions on resource 
allocation. Contents of a constitution also demonstrate the level of political commitment 
to creating a protective environment for all children.  The justiciability of constitutional 
provisions when it comes to allocation of resources for their implementation, however, 
remains a challenge for many countries (Bothlale 2015; Nolan 2013).  
 
5.1.2 National Child Protection Policies and Laws 
 
Drawing inspiration from national constitutions, each of the four countries has developed 
overarching children’s laws, which cover child protection topics extensively. These are 
the Children’s Act (2009) of Botswana, Children Act (2001) of Kenya, Child Act (2008) of 
South Sudan, and the Children’s Act (2003) of Zimbabwe. Most child protection concerns 
such as sexual abuse, abandonment, neglect, child labour, and trafficking are covered in 
the above statutes. To a large extent, the above laws are aligned to the CRC (1989), 
ACRWC (1990), and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979.  
In General Comment (GC) No 5 of the CRC (1989) on ‘General measures for the 
implementation of children’s rights’, the Committee on the Rights of the Child encourages 
states to develop a “consolidated children’s rights statute (UNCRC 2003:03).” Similarly, 
GC No 5 on ‘State party obligations under the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child (article 1) and systems strengthening for child protection’ also underscores 
the foundational nature of supportive national policies and laws in the development of a 
strong national child protection system (ACERWC 2018). The laws listed above, at least 
on paper, are a sign of commitment to create a protective environment as required under 
the CRC (1989) and the ACRWC (1990). Most notably, all the laws are aligned on the 




same as socially constructed understandings of where childhood ends (Linde 2014). On 
this matter, one research participant said that: 
Yes, our laws say that when a person turns 18 years of age, he/she ceases to be a child, 
but communities have their own definitions. To them, maturity is measured by biological 
markers such as development of a beard, breasts and growth in height and ability to carry 
out certain family responsibilities (Botswana Interviewee 23, CSO, 2018).  
The above quote exposes tensions between legal and social constructions of childhood. 
Until today, some families marry off their children not because they deliberately want to 
go against the law, but because they see them as ready for marriage as measured by 
locally defined biological markers. Some children too, use these markers, as justification 
for entering sexual relationships, and subsequently marriage before attaining the legal 
age of marriage.  What children and their families consider mostly is physical 
development of a body not what is written on a piece of paper called a birth certificate. In 
any case, a sizeable number of children in the four selected countries do not have birth 
certificates (UNICEF 2017).   
 The four overarching children’s laws recognise the multi-sectoral nature of child 
protection, which underpins a systems approach (ACERWC 2018; Landgren 2005; Save 
the Children 2009; UNICEF 2008). The complementary role of various ministries, 
departments, and agencies in delivering child protection services is acknowledged in all 
the laws. To encourage collaboration amongst various actors, national and local 
coordination mechanisms are proposed. Two such mechanisms are the national 
children’s councils or commissions and child protection committees (ANPPCAN 2014; 
NCCS 2011). In Kenya, for example, the National Council for Children’s Services is 
tasked with the responsibility to coordinate children’s programmes nationally and to 
support resource mobilisation efforts to implement children’s laws, whilst Area Advisory 
Committees coordinate child protection efforts at sub-national level (NCCS 2013, 2015). 
Similarly, South Sudan’s Children Act (2008) provides for the establishment of the 
National Children’s Commission. The issue of child protection institutions will be revisited 
in detail later in this chapter.  
 Although the above national children’s laws cover numerous child protection 




harmonisation. A few examples will help illustrate this point. Whilst Section 25 (1) of the 
Child Act (2008) in South Sudan legislates against child labour in certain situations, 
Section 25 (3) provides for paid employment for children’s ‘light work’, which is not clearly 
defined. Although Article 27(3)(h) of the Children’s Act (2009) in Botswana requires 
parents not to discipline children in a way that violates their dignity, Article 27 (5) claws 
this back by saying that this “should not be construed as prohibiting the corporal 
punishment of a child”. Article 61 of the same law allows for corporal punishment in the 
home and in schools. Article 29 of the Education Act (1967), Prisons Act (1980) and the 
Penal Code (1964) of Botswana also allow corporal punishment.  
Gaps in child protection legislation in all four countries were also found. Most 
notably, existing laws do not cover information technology related violations such as 
cyber-bullying and online pornography, bullying in schools, protection of children affected 
by emergencies, rights of minority groups such as gay and lesbian children, and 
protection of children from politically motivated violence. The latter issue has become a 
matter of public concern in Kenya and Zimbabwe as most elections are marred with 
violence (Mueller 2008; Moore 2014). Other issues not adequately covered include 
children on the move, especially refugee children. Of the four national children’s laws, it 
is only the Kenya’s Children Act (2001) that specifically highlights the need to protect 
refugee children. As the study will show in the next Chapters, the issues which are not 
covered in national children’s laws, also do not have a corresponding budget line item.  
In addition to overarching children’s statutes, selected governments have also 
enacted laws that aim at responding to specific child protection risks such as sexual 
abuse, child labour, harmful practices, and trafficking. Examples include the Prohibition 
of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) Act (2011) in Kenya which outlaws FGM and the 
Sexual Offences Act (2001) in Zimbabwe which seeks to protect all people, especially 
children, from sexual abuse. Other specific child protection risks are covered in sectoral 
policies and laws with other broad objectives. Examples include child labour regulated 
through employment laws, right to birth registration provided for in national registration 
laws such as the Births and Deaths Registration Act (2005) of Zimbabwe, child trafficking 
prohibited in the Counter Trafficking in Persons Act (2010) in Kenya, for example, and 




because it is usually not possible to include every detail about a child protection procedure 
in an overarching children’s law. The researcher’s legal review showed that of the four 
case study countries, Botswana and South Sudan have the lowest number of issue 
specific child protection laws. Table 3 provides an overview of key child protection related 
laws and policies in each of the selected countries.  
Table 3: Child protection Policies and Laws in Selected Countries 




Children’s Act (2009) 
 
National Orphan Care Policy 
(1999) 
Policy on Destitute Persons 
(2002) 
Gender Equality Policy (1996) 
Overall legal framework on child rights.  
 
Provides guidelines on orphan care support. 
 
Framework to guide responses to destitute children. 
 








Children Act (2001) 
 
Counter Trafficking in Persons 
Act (2010) 
Prohibition of Female Genital 
Mutilation Act (2011). 
 
National Children’s Policy 
(2015) 
 
Sexual Offences Act (2001) 
 
National Gender Policy (2000) 
Overarching law about children’s rights.  
 
Outlines measures to fight trafficking, including of children. 
 
Outlaws genital mutilation/ cutting of girls. 
 
 
Overall policy framework to implement children’s rights. 
 
Provides protection to victims of sexual abuse, including 
minors. 







Children’s Act (2008). 
 
National Gender Policy (2013) 
 
Civil Registry Act (2018) 
 
Policy on Children without 
Appropriate Parental Care 
(2018) 
 
The Penal Code Act (2008) 
Overarching law for the protection of children. 
 
Empowerment, and protection of the rights of women and 
girls. 
Law on birth and death registration. 
 
Provides guidance on how to support children without 
appropriate parental care. 
 
Regulates criminal offences against the state 










Children’s Act (2003) 
 
Sexual Offenses Act (2006) 
 
Zimbabwe National Orphan 
Care Policy (1999) 
Trafficking in Persons Act 
(2014). 
 
Labour Act (2001). 
Overall legal framework on child rights.  
 
Provides protection to victims of sexual abuse, including 
minors. 
Policy to ensure development and protection of orphans. 
 
Provides for the prohibition of trafficking of all persons. 
 






National Gender Policy (1999)  
 
National HIV and AIDS Policy 
(2001) 
Guardianship of Minors Act 
(2005) 
 
Maintenance Act (2009) 
 
Child Abduction Act (2005) 
Empowerment, and protection of the rights of women and 
girls 
 
Protection of children affected by HIV and AIDS 
 
Protection of children under guardianship 
 
Support to children whose parents have separated. 
 




5.1.3 Thematic Policies  
 
Child protection is also covered in a wide range of sectoral/ thematic policies which 
contribute to child protection, most notably on gender, HIV and AIDS, social protection 
and orphan care. These policies seek to achieve other objectives beyond child protection. 
Kenya developed its first National Orphan Care Policy in 1998, followed by Zimbabwe in 
1999 (MoLSS & UNICEF 2010; NCCS 2013, 2015). Three years later, in 2002, Botswana 
developed a National Policy on Destitute Persons (GoB 2010). The HIV and AIDS 
pandemic which wreaked havoc in the 1990s forced governments to devise national 
response policies, some of which had components on orphan care (Maundeni 2010). Both 
HIV and Orphan Care policies have strong components on child protection considering 
that many affected children became vulnerable to abuse and exploitation following the 
loss of their parents to HIV and AIDS (Mwanda 2016; NCCS 2015). Financial assistance 
offered by donors such as USAID and DFID served as carrots for governments to develop 
such policies (Muridzo & Malianga 2015). One positive outcome, from a public spending 
point of view, is that some of the policies were accompanied by measures to mobilise 
domestic and international resources towards their implementation. In Zimbabwe, for 
example, the Government introduced the Aids Levy in 1999 to raise funds to implement 
the National HIV and AIDS policy with a strong child protection component (MoLSS & 
UNICEF 2010). The National Aids Council was established to coordinate resource 
mobilisation to implement the National HIV and AIDS policy (Muridzo & Malianga 2015).  
Gender policies are another example of thematic policies contributing to child 




protection of girls from all forms of abuse and exploitation, especially sexual violence. 
Most of the gender policies were developed after the United Nations Fourth World 
Conference on Women held in Beijing in China in September 1995.  The Beijing 
Declaration (1995), which severally referred to the CRC (1989), observed that girls are:  
often subjected to various forms of sexual and economic exploitation, paedophilia, forced 
prostitution and possibly the sale of their organs and tissues, violence and harmful 
practices such as female infanticide and prenatal sex selection, incest, female genital 
mutilation and early marriage, including child marriage. 
In Kenya and Zimbabwe, the development of gender policies was followed by 
establishment of relevant institutions such as the Gender and Equality Commission of 
Kenya and the National Gender Commission in Zimbabwe, both under an act of 
parliament. In line with the Beijing Declaration (1995), the respective governments 
committed resources to these institutions and also introduced budget lines on ‘gender 
mainstreaming’ and ‘empowerment of women’ in their national budgets (UNFPA 
&UNICEF 2018b; UNFPA 2012).  Whether the resources were adequate or not is an issue 
that requires a separate discussion.  
To conclude this section, it is fair to say that all four case study countries have 
robust child protection legal and policy frameworks (ANPCANN 2012; 2014). To a 
noticeable extent, the contents of child protection laws are aligned to the CRC (1989) and 
ACRWC (1990). The laws also reflect the socioeconomic context, this is why child 
protection laws in South Sudan have provisions on children in armed conflict, but 
Botswana does not. The challenge, moving forward, is to ensure that the above laws and 
policies are implemented, starting with the commitment of human, financial and technical 
resources. This conclusion is summarised by the words of one civil society representative 
in Kenya: 
The problem in this country, and I am sure in many other African countries is not lack of 
laws and policies. We have a lot of child protection policies in this country which are nicely 
formulated. The problem is implementation. One wonders whether it is the government 
that came up with these laws in the first place or they hired consultants to do so for them… 
maybe at the insistence of donors or pressure from powerful groups (Kenya Interviewee 




The development of laws and policies is only one side of the equation. The other side is 
to put in place concrete and time bound strategic frameworks and or plans to implement 
them. The next section will therefore zoom in on child protection plans in case study 
countries. A key question to which the following section seeks a response is whether each 
of the four countries has comprehensive and costed plans to guide decision-making on 
the allocation of resources to child protection. A subsequent question is whether the 
costed plans are ever used in budgeting, and if so, to what extent?  
5.2 Child Protection Strategies and Plans 
 
The child protection landscape in case study countries is littered with assorted plans, the 
typology of which mirror those of policies and laws discussed above. Theoretically, the 
different types of child protection plans should be guided by national constitutions and 
development plans such as Vision 2030 for Kenya. Unfortunately, the researcher’s review 
of national development plans, revealed that child protection is largely invisible. At best, 
national development plans only refer to improved child well-being and superficially 
mention a few factors which increases the vulnerability of children to maltreatment such 
as poverty, orphanhood, and limited access to basic services such as education. Given 
the foregoing, this section will focus on child-focused plans, starting with national plans 
of action on children. After this, a discussion of plans focusing on specific child protection 
risks in a given country such as orphanhood, sexual abuse, harmful cultural practices, 
and violence against children follows. Lastly, the section reviews sector plans such as 
health, education, and social protection, which have clear components on child protection. 
This latter discussion is important considering the cross-sectoral nature of child 
protection.  
 The development of a national strategy or plan of action on children is one of the 
general measures of implementation of children’s rights (UNCRC 2003; ACERWC 2018). 
In GC No 5, the UNCRC (2003:07) calls upon governments to develop “a comprehensive 
national strategy or national plan of action for children, built on the framework of the 
Convention”. Such a plan is expected to cover the full spectrum of rights, including to 




national plans on children following their ratification of the CRC. As a newly established 
country, also bedeviled by conflict, South Sudan still has to catch up with its neighboring 
countries in developing a national strategy for children.  
Although Zimbabwe’s National Programme of Action on Children (NPAC) contains 
elements on child protection, it is outdated, considering that it was launched in 1992 and 
much has changed since, including the evolvement of child protection risks. In 2006, 
Botswana launched its National Plan of Action for Children (2006-2016), which covers 
many child protection issues such as sexual and economic exploitation, children without 
appropriate parental care, and child labour. The Plan of Action has orphans and 
vulnerable children as its focus. Sadly, the plan has expired, and it has not yet been 
replaced. Kenya has the most recent and comprehensive National Plan of Action for 
Children (2015-2022). In addition to common child protection issues such as sexual 
exploitation, street children, child labour, trafficking, and neglect, the plan includes 
contemporary child protection issues such as children and disasters and climate change. 
The above plans are usually financed through budget allocations via ministries in various 
sectors such as education, health, social welfare, local government, and child justice. 
According to feedback from some respondents, donor organisations such as UNICEF 
also played a role by providing financial and technical assistance (Kenya Interviewee 19, 
CSO, 2016; Zimbabwe Interviewee 35, government official, 2019).  
The three countries with National Plans/Programmes of Action on Children 
(NPACs) also developed National Action Plans on Orphans and other Vulnerable 
Children (NAPs for OVCs).  According to feedback from numerous research participants 
the formulation of these plans was driven by donors – notably USAID, DFID and UNICEF 
– to a large extent, in a bid to support the national response to HIV and AIDS (Botswana 
Interviewee 10, CSO, 2010). It is fair to conclude, therefore, that the high prevalence rate 
of HIV and AIDS was the underlying driver in the formulation of NAPs for OVCs (GoB 
2010: Maundeni 2010). For Botswana and Zimbabwe, the NAP for OVCs replaced the 
NPACs in terms of the attention they received from governments and donors (Zimbabwe 
Interviewee 27, donor organisation, 2018; Botswana Interviewee 10, CSO, 2010). In 
Zimbabwe, for example, the NAP for OVC has been updated every five years since it was 




running from 2010 until 2015.  The plan was costed and heavily funded by donors, 
especially USAID, SIDA, and DFID (Zimbabwe Interviewee 27, donor organisation, 2018). 
Donors funded nearly 70% of the resources required for programme implementation in 
the first five years, with the government committing to contribute the remaining 30% as 
well as core staff costs (MoLSS & UNICEF 2010; (Zimbabwe Interviewee 27, donor 
organisation, 2018).  
NAPs for OVCs were directly linked to national budgets and were often 
accompanied by development of financing strategies to guide resource mobilisation from 
domestic and international sources (MoLSS & UNICEF 2010; Zimbabwe interviewee 33, 
government official, 2018). Between 2011 and 2018, governments of Botswana, Kenya 
and Zimbabwe set aside resources to finance their NAPs for OVCs, including cash 
transfers to poorest children and their families. By the end of 2018, the national orphan 
care programme in Botswana was wholly funded by the government (Botswana 
interviewee 29, government official, 2019; Zimbabwe interviewee 33, government official, 
2018). To supplement its own domestic resources allocated from the national budget, 
Kenya mobilised additional resources from the World Bank in the form of a concessional 
loan for the cash transfer programme (World Bank 2017). Several reasons account for 
the strong connection between NAPs for OVCs and budgeting, aptly captured by one 
respondent in Zimbabwe:  
First, governments were under pressure from communities because millions of people 
were dying of HIV and AIDS, with many children left without parents. It was morally and 
politically wrong for governments to do nothing about the pandemic. Second, donors 
offered a lot of irresistible carrots to governments ranging from grants for programmes to 
technical assistance in the development of polices and plans. Third, the interventions 
offered were tangible – school fees support, food and cash – appealing to both politicians 
and communities. All these things make politicians look good in the eyes of communities. 
Lastly, until to date, communities flock to offices of members of parliament to request for 
orphan care support. The demand is high. Politicians have no option but to ensure they 
respond favourably (Zimbabwe Interviewee 34, Independent researcher, 2019).  
Unfortunately, as the next chapter will show, funding to social assistance programmes 




programmes. Some officials from Botswana and Zimbabwe who participated in the study 
defended this position, arguing that “the most foundational child protection intervention is 
to alleviate poverty and suffering which make children vulnerable to abuse and 
exploitation” (Botswana Interviewee 14, Government official, 2018), hence the focus. 
They further argued that the NAPs for OVCs are primarily meant to achieve child 
protection objectives. Whilst the above assertion has elements of truth, its main limitation 
is that NAPs for OVCs do not cover the full scope of child protection services. For 
example, issues such as cyberbullying and harmful practices such as child marriage are 
not covered in Zimbabwe’s NAP for OVC for the period 2010-2015 (MoLSS & UNICEF 
2010). Additionally, the primary focus of these plans is orphans, as the name suggests. 
UNICEF (2008) and Save the Children (2009) have argued that a good child protection 
system should be sufficiently comprehensive to cover pertinent risks and vulnerabilities 
of children in a given country. It should also target all children instead of a specific group.  
Apart from the NAP for OVC, Kenya has developed a comprehensive national 
strategic framework on child protection. None of the other three countries has the same. 
Kenya launched The Framework for the National Child Protection System in 2011, 
followed by the development of Child Protection System Guidelines for County 
Governments (2013). The Framework recognises child protection as a multi-sectoral and 
multidisciplinary issue which should involve institutions from various sectors including 
health, education, justice, social welfare, gender, and security (GoK 2014; NCCS 2015). 
The Framework seeks to promote linkages between different actors and to foster 
coordination between formal and community led child protection (GoK 2014).  The 
National Council for Children’s Services (NCCS) was given the mandate to lead resource 
mobilisation for the implementation of the Framework (Ibid). However, as Chapter Eight 
will show, the NCCS has not been very effective in performing this role.  
Beyond NPACs and NAPs for OVCs, Kenya, South Sudan and Zimbabwe 
developed issue focused child protection plans. A few examples will help illustrate the 
point.  Recently, between 2017 and 2018, Kenya, South Sudan and Zimbabwe developed 
National strategies to end child marriage with support from Girls Not Brides, UNICEF and 
UNFPA, according to information in the respective acknowledgement sections. In 2012, 




Response Plan to Violence Against Children (2013-2018), the National Plan of Action for 
Combating Human Trafficking (2013-2017) and the National Plan of Action Against 
Sexual Exploitation of Children (2013-2017). Before that, the country had formulated the 
National Plan of Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (2009-
2013). From the names, the purposes of these plans are self-explanatory. In 2014, 
Zimbabwe launched the Action Plan to End Rape and Sexual Violence (2014-2019).  
The respective governments also developed operational procedures to implement 
certain policies and plans. In 2010, the Government of Zimbabwe developed the National 
Residential Child Care Standards (NRCCS) in collaboration with the Zimbabwe National 
Council for the Welfare of Children (ZNCWC). In 2014, Kenya also developed guidelines 
for the alternative family care of children in Kenya to respond to the situation of children 
without appropriate parental care as well as national standards for charitable children’s 
institutions in Kenya (2013).  
Apart from the National Strategy to End Child Marriage, the Government of South 
Sudan had not formulated any other child protection specific plan as of December 2020. 
Botswana does not have issue specific plans, apart from the NAP for OVCs and child 
protection regulations promulgated in 2015. The aim of the regulations is to guide the 
country on how to protect children. Unfortunately, the very short document, about two 
pages, only touching on a few risks such as lack of family care, child labour and sexual 
abuse. 
Of the four case study countries, Kenya has the highest number of issue specific 
child protection plans, followed by Zimbabwe (ANPPCAN 2015; GoK 2014; NCCS 2015). 
This partly reflects the socioeconomic contexts.  The high prevalence rates of FGM in 
Kenya, which is not an issue in Botswana, necessitated the development of the National 
Action Plan for Accelerating the Abandonment of FGM (2008-2012). It has been 
submitted that owing to armed conflict and weak state capacity, it has been difficult for 
the Government of South Sudan to concentrate on the development and protection of 
children (IMF 2014; UNICEF 2016c; UNICEF 2017c). The volume and 
comprehensiveness of plans are also indicative of state capacity, existence of political 




(ANPPCAN 2014). Moreover, in Kenya especially, cultural practices are very diverse, 
making it necessary for the government to come up with plans to address specific 
protection risks such as FGM, which is not an issue in Botswana. If one compares Kenya 
and Botswana, which is relatively peaceful and homogenous in terms of its demographics, 
the role of context in influencing the breadth and depth of child protection plans can easily 
be deciphered.  
Before concluding this sub-section, it is important to make a few political economy 
observations regarding origins, ownership, contents and financing of child protection 
strategic frameworks and plans discussed above. Firstly, according to many research 
participants, as highlighted earlier, most child protection plans were developed with 
prompting, as well as technical and financial support from donors and NGOs (Zimbabwe 
Interviewee 27, donor organisation, 2018; Botswana Interviewee 6, CSO, 2018).  A typical 
example being NAPs for OVCs in all countries. The push towards the formulation of 
national strategies for ending child marriage came mainly from donors (Kenya interviewee 
52, CSO, 2019). In Kenya, for example, as noted in the acknowledgements page, the 
strategy was developed with funding and technical support from the UNFPA, UNICEF, 
the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom and the 
Government of Canada.  UNFPA and UNICEF were behind the national strategy to end 
child marriage in South Sudan. The Multi-sectoral protocol on the management of sexual 
abuse and violence against children in Zimbabwe (2014) was produced with initiation as 
well as technical and financial support from Save the Children and UNICEF (Zimbabwe 
Interviewee 27, donor organisation, 2018).  The above are merely a few examples. There 
are many cases of donors encouraging governments to develop certain child protection 
policies and plans shared by research participants during primary data collection. 
Unfortunately, donor driven plans generally lack ownership from the government, with 
implications for the financing of their implementation. When donors incentivise formulation 
of child protection plans, the “default expectation of government is that they will fund the 
implementation” (Kenya Interviewee 52, CSO, 2019). One research participant from 
Zimbabwe commented that: 
the government has not committed meaningful resources to implement the Multi-Sectoral 




in-year out, governments come to us to request for financial assistance to implement these 
plans (Zimbabwe Interviewee 14, Donor organisation, 2016). 
Donor dependency on financing of crucial child protection plans not only raises questions 
on the ownership of these documents it also poses sustainability challenges. Thus, it is 
common to find “many good child protection policies and plans, which governments never 
refer to nor fund from their budgets” (Zimbabwe Interviewee 9, Academic, 2016). 
The second observation was that the link between most issue specific child 
protection plans, and budgets were found to be weak in all countries, except for NAPs for 
OVCs. This is because governments of selected countries did not “introduce new budget 
lines, change programme structures, or increase the current size of spending to 
implement child protection related plans they had developed” (Zimbabwe interviewee 24, 
Independent researcher, 2018). Connecting child protection plans to budgets was made 
difficult partly because many of them were not costed at the time of study (Zimbabwe 
Interviewee 27, donor organisation, 2018). Without cost estimates, it is difficult to know 
how much exactly is required and for what child protection programme. Not surprisingly, 
the researcher’s budget analysis revealed that the plans were not reflected in medium 
term expenditure frameworks of their respective governments. The other problem is that 
the plans were not accompanied by the development of financing strategies as was the 
case with NAPs for OVCs (Zimbabwe interviewee 22, CSO, 2018.  
The third observation is that most of the plans, especially on ending child marriage, 
child labour and FGM, focussed more on prevention than response. This programmatic 
bias manifested itself in more government funding of prevention programmes than 
response, as the next Chapter will show, especially for social assistance programmes as 
was also shown by Avati et al. (2018). Between 2015 and 2019, governments of the four 
countries spent considerably more on programmes such as cash transfers (preventive 
child protection) than in assisting girls who have been rescued from child marriage, for 
example, which fall in the category of response services. Among the few response 
programmes that attracted funding from governments were investigation and justice for 
victims of abuse and residential care. Nearly all four case study countries supported 




The last, but not least, observation from the preceding analysis is that quality child 
protection plans and cost estimates of interventions were constrained by lack of 
comprehensive data and statistics, according to information obtained from some research 
participants. The dearth of data and statistics was more acute in Botswana and South 
Sudan than in Kenya and Zimbabwe. During the period of study, in Botswana and South 
Sudan there were hardly any recent child protection statistics across a wide range of 
indicators such as child marriage, corporal punishment, violence against children and 
child neglect. Given such a situation, it is impossible to estimate financial requirements to 
respond to protection risks.   
In its Concluding Recommendations to the Government of Zimbabwe, following 
submission of the State-Party Report (2016) about the situation of children, the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child observed “shortcomings in compiling, analysing and 
processing data relating to children’s rights (UNCRC 2016b: 08).”  To cover existing gaps, 
donors operating in four countries have been supporting initiatives to strengthen child 
protection data and information systems. A national database for child protection cases 
managed by the Department of Children Services was launched in 2014 in Kenya, with 
support from UNICEF. The database contains information from all counties of Kenya 
(GoK 2015). UNICEF also supported Violence Against Children Surveys in Kenya and 
Botswana. Regrettably, the Botswana report had not been published by January 2019, 
two years after the survey was conducted.  
It can be concluded, therefore, that for countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe, 
the problem is not lack of child protection plans, but their financing (Chibwana & Gumbo; 
2014; NCCS 2014; World Vision International 2021). At the basic level, the plans need to 
be costed and estimates included in medium term expenditure frameworks. The plans 
should also be informed by latest data and statistics. Whilst donors should be credited for 
catalysing the development of child protection strategies and plans, they inadvertently 
contributed to the lack of ownership by host governments. This has led to a dependency 





5.3 Child Protection Institutions in Case Study Countries 
 
The provision of sustainable child protection services does not only require 
comprehensive child protection plans: robust institutions are also part of the jigsaw. Child 
protection institutions should work together, in a coordinated and complementary manner, 
to deliver quality, sustainable and quality child protection services to all children 
(ACERWC 2018; Landgren 2005). It is institutions, and the professional workforce 
therein, which drive the implementation of child protection policies, laws, strategies, and 
plans. For child protection institutions to effectively perform their functions, they require 
adequate human, technical, and financial resources (GoK 2014; Save the Children 2009). 
With this understanding the two questions to be examined are how well funded the 
institutions are to deliver on their mandates, and how involved they are with budgeting 
processes. Answers to these questions, discussed in the paragraphs below, will lay the 
foundation for the analysis of the agency of these institutions in their efforts to advocate 
for increased government spending on child protection to be done in Chapter Eight.  
 The first, and perhaps central institution, with the mandate to coordinate child 
protection issues in every country, is the department responsible for children’s affairs. 
This department is usually found in social welfare related ministries. In South Sudan, for 
example, the Department for Children’s Affairs is housed under the Ministry of Gender, 
Child and Social Welfare (MoGCSW) whilst in Zimbabwe the Department of Child Welfare 
and Probation Services is under the Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Social 
Services (MLPSSW). A mere look at the names of the parent ministries shows that the 
child protection function is overwhelmed by several other responsibilities of the same 
ministry. For example, in Botswana, the Ministry of Local Government, under which the 
child protection function is located, has a very wide mandate, including social protection, 
rural development, urban planning, early childhood development, and community 
development. Child protection is only a sub-programme within the Department of Social 
Protection. In Kenya, child protection is housed in the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Protection, which has several other departments, directorates, and units. These include 




Occupational Safety and Health Services (DOSHS), Department of Social Development, 
Social Protection Secretariat, National Employment Authority (NEA), National 
Productivity and Competitiveness Centre (NPCC), and the Directorate of National Human 
Resource Planning and Development. In addition, the ministry is responsible for semi-
autonomous government agencies (SAGAs) notably the National Industrial Training 
Authority (NITA), Child Welfare Society of Kenya (CWSK), National Council for Persons 
With Disabilities (NCPWD), and the National Council for Children Services (NCCS) to be 
discussed in the next few paragraphs.18  
If one considers the case of Botswana and Kenya, it appears that child protection 
is competing for visibility with several other functions and programmes; first within the 
same department, and then with programmes in other departments. As the study shall 
demonstrate, it is usually child protection which is sacrificed because of several factors, 
such as lack of political appeal to politicians. Often, ‘politically savvy’19 programmes such 
as humanitarian assistance, gender empowerment, public works and livelihoods 
programmes are prioritised at the expense of child protection, as one research participant 
noted: 
It is usually child protection which suffers when there are many departments and 
programmes within a ministry. Given a choice between funding a public works program or 
campaign against child marriage, it is likely that the leadership will fund the former 
(Zimbabwe Interviewee 23, CSO, 2018). 
Research participants in Kenya also decried the practice by the government, observed in 
the past decade, of shifting the child welfare function from one ministry to another. At 
some point, child protection issues were housed in the State Department for Social 
Protection within the President’s Office, before being moved to the Ministry of Labour and 
East African Affairs, which was restructured to the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Protection in 2019. There are two main risks to this: firstly, child protection matters may 
not be properly understood by the new leadership; and secondly, child protection teams 
 
18 For more information about the ministry see https://laboursp.go.ke/# 
19 These are programmes which can be used easily by politicians to show their achievements. Most of them are 





are frequently exposed to new forms of political economy dynamics with a bearing on 
budget decisions within a given ministry. Given this reality child protection staff have to 
continuously raise awareness about key issues of concern to the new leadership, 
particularly the principal secretaries and ministers. One government official in Kenya 
commented on this point: 
Although the operational structure of the Department for Social Protection has not 
changed, it has been hard to cope with the changes in the top leadership. Nearly every 
two or three years, the cabinet secretary is changed. For every change, we have to pitch 
our work again, especially on child protection (Kenya Interviewee 14, Government official, 
2016). 
The implication of this is that positioning child protection interventions and institutions for 
funding may end up taking longer than necessary. In some cases, this has led to under-
funding of child welfare departments (to be discussed in detail in the next Chapter). In 
Botswana, for example, in 2018, there were only two staff members responsible for child 
protection within the Department for Social Protection (Botswana interviewee 29, 
Government official, 2018). The under-resourcing of child welfare departments, 
compared to others in the same ministry, was highlighted by an official from a donor 
organisation, who had received numerous requests for additional funding: 
Some people within the department of children and probation services have complained to us 
that their department is receiving a significantly lower share of the budget than others such as 
the Department of Social Services (mandated with public works, harmonised cash transfer 
and food-deficit mitigation programmes). Some of them read politics in this, arguing that 
programmes such as public works appeal more to politicians than child protection, and are 
therefore preferable. It is not surprising that the department for children and probation services 
is perennially under-funded (Zimbabwe Interviewee 14, Donor organisation, 2016).  
The political economy challenge faced by child welfare departments is how to position 
child protection for increased funding, given competing priorities. How effectively this will 
be done depends on the space, capacity, agency and leadership of the institutions in 
question (Rakner et al. 2004; Wildavsky 1984). Regrettably, as observed by one research 




the politics of budgeting” (Kenya interviewee 16, CSO, 2016). Details of this finding will 
be presented in Chapter Nine. 
The second type of child protection institution that the study looked at are National 
Children’s Councils/ Commissions. Out of the four countries selected for this study, only 
Kenya and Botswana have functional children’s councils. These were established through 
the Children’s Acts of 2001 and 2003 for Kenya and Botswana respectively. Although 
Section 184 of the Child Act (2008) of South Sudan provides for the establishment of an 
Independent National Children’s Commission, it had not been established by December 
2018. Zimbabwe does not have a similar structure, despite the Children’s Act (2003) 
providing for the establishment of a Child Welfare Council. However, following the 
adoption of the NAP for OVC for Zimbabwe (2006-2010), the government established an 
Inter-Ministerial Working Party of Officials at national level as well as specialised child 
protection committees to facilitate coordination of prevention and response services 
across the country. The Zimbabwe National Council for the Welfare of Children (ZNCWC), 
which could be mistaken as a government institution, is actually a registered NGO. Its 
contribution to child protection budget advocacy will be discussed later in the study when 
examining the role of civil society organisations in influencing public spending on child 
protection.  
The National Children’s Commission (NCC) in Botswana is the national 
coordinating body for the implementation of children’s rights that is expected to oversee 
the delivery of child protection services in the country. The NCC also coordinates the 
National Children’s Consultative Forum (NCCF), which is a platform for children’s 
participation in issues that affect them.  According to feedback from research participants, 
although on paper the NCCF is scheduled to meet four times a year, only one meeting 
took place in 2017 (Botswana interviewee 10, CSO, 2018). Nearly all respondents in 
Botswana who commented on the role of the NCC and the NCCF agreed that the two 
institutions are weak, partly because they lack the infrastructure and dedicated human, 
technical and financial resources to function effectively. One civil society official 




The NCC is a new structure. It is even struggling to establish its relevance despite being 
chaired by a person perceived to be close to the president. The NCC has not had any 
influence at all which I am aware of, when it comes to issues of public budgeting for child 
protection (Botswana Interviewee 2, CSO, 2018). 
The NCC relies on secretariat services from the Department for Social Protection in the 
Ministry of Local Government. The commissioners interviewed as part of this study found 
this arrangement to be problematic because it contributed to their ineffectiveness. One of 
them had this to say: 
As an independent commission, we rightfully deserve our own secretariat and budget. We 
cannot wait for an officer with so many other duties. This is why we are not able to 
implement much of our planned activities (Botswana Interviewee 3, Government official, 
2018). 
The NCCS in Kenya was established under Section 30 (1) of the Children Act (2001) as 
a body corporate to supervise and coordinate the planning and financing of children’s 
activities and to advise the government on all aspects related to children, including child 
protection. To achieve its mandate, the NCCS works through area advisory councils 
operational in all 47 counties and 229 sub-counties. Despite carrying a specific mandate 
to champion issues of public financing on children’s issues, the NCCS was found to be 
less active when it comes to budgeting for child protection, based on information received 
from research participants. This, however, is not unexpected considering that the budget 
for the NCCS itself is negotiated by the Directorate for Children’s Services in the 
Department for Social Protection. One government official in Kenya had this to say: 
The NCCS is an important institution, but it is yet to be as effective as expected. The 
organisation apparently is overshadowed by the Department for Children’s Services, 
which negotiates budget allocations on its behalf. We have only seen the NCCS active in 
monitoring charitable institutions, facilitating commemorative events, engaging children 
through the Kenya Children Assembly and a few such other activities and not on budgeting 
matters (Kenya Interviewee 13, Independent researcher, 2016). 
Although the NCCS and the NCC are structured differently, both have similar capacity 
challenges which negatively affect their effectiveness in influencing decisions about 




reported by many research participants and empirically supported by annual budgets of 
the two institutions. This means that these institutions do not have adequate resources to 
undertake proper research, consultations, and other engagements that may help them 
advance child protection in policy planning and budgeting (Botswana interviewee 2, CSO, 
2018; Kenya interviewee 53, CSO, 2019).  
Although both institutions are under-funded in relation to financial needs, the 
NCCS is in a slightly better position because it has its own budget line, albeit small (Kenya 
interviewee 9, government official, 2016). It also has a website 
(http://www.childrenscouncil.go.ke), a  strategy, and several documents in its name. 
However, this is not the case with the NCC in Botswana which has a scanty operational 
plan (Botswana interviewee 12, Government official, 2018) though not publicly available, 
was, however, shared with the researcher. Unlike in Kenya, where the head of the 
secretariat is a senior official within the State Department for Social Protection, the NCC 
is provided with secretariat services by a junior officer in the Ministry of Local Government 
(Ibid). 
Politically, the fact that the NCCS and the NCC are operationally supported by a 
government department makes them vulnerable to patronage by their lead departments. 
The lack of independence of the NCCS is therefore one reason why it is removed from 
mainstream public budgeting work, as the Department for Children’s Services takes a 
lead. During primary data collection, it came out clearly that the parent department was 
reluctant to give space and visibility to the NCCS, including during budget negotiations 
and approvals (Kenya interviewee 19, CSO, 2016). This is a tip of the iceberg regarding 
the balance of power within ministries, which often permeates into the sphere of 
budgeting. One civil society official from Kenya observed that: 
It is very likely that the Department for Children’s Services does not want a strong NCCS. 
They think it will make them irrelevant. They like the NCCS when it is fully subservient to 
the Director of Children’s services, but that should not be the case (Kenya Interviewee 4, 
CSO, 2016).   
Several stakeholders in Botswana and Kenya felt that the NCC and the NCCS, 




for their reconstitution in law, as seen in Kenya recently, and for more resources to be 
allocated to them if they are to effectively perform their functions. One government official 
demanded that the NCC be given its “own secretariat and budget” (Botswana Interviewee 
4, Government official, 2018). It is difficult for a secretariat to convene other ministries to 
discuss issues of concern to children when housed by a department in a ministry. This 
view was echoed by another official who clearly stated that the NCC should be 
independent of the Ministry of Local Government “in order to have teeth” (Botswana 
Interviewee 4, Government official, 2018).  
Although the politics of space between the NCCS/NCC and host ministries was an 
impediment to their participation in public budgeting, other factors also played a role, 
resulting in their failure to influence budget decisions about child protection. These include 
the perceived political profile and capacity of the chairperson and board of directors/ 
commissioners (Botswana interviewee 25, CSO, 2018; Kenya Interviewee 32, CSO, 
2016). Between 2012 and 2017 the chairperson of the NCCS in Kenya was widely 
perceived by research participants as a low-profile person with peripheral influence on 
the politics of the country, let alone the messy world of public budgeting. Paradoxically, 
although the chair of the NCC in Botswana, Ms. Boipulo Seithlalo, and her deputy 
Professor Gloria Jacques from the University of Botswana (in 2018), were perceived to 
have significant personal power and access to the former President of Botswana (Ian 
Seretse Khama), they did not do much to influence budget allocations towards children’s 
issues. On this point, a comment by a lecturer at the University of Botswana is worth 
noting: 
Some of the commissioners are close to the President. They are respected, but they are 
not using their power and influence to talk about the need to increase the government’s 
focus on children. We honestly do not know what they are doing (Botswana Interviewee 1, 
Academic, 2018).  
It is fair to conclude that although the NCC and the NCCS are undoubtedly important 
institutions, their power and agency in the sphere of public budgeting for child protection 
was evidently limited during the time of study (2015-2019). This is partly due to structural 




accountabilities within government, resource shortages, and the low profile of the top 
leadership, among other factors. The closest that the NCC, for example, came to be 
engaging with matters of budgeting is in 2017 when it planned to advocate with the 
government for increased resource allocation towards child focused sectors and 
programmes (Botswana interviewee 4, Government official, 2018). This goal is a 
testament to the under-funding of childcare and protection programmes. However, by 
2018 no concrete action had been taken to achieve this goal, even by admission of some 
of the commissioners (Ibid).  
 In addition to children’s commissions/ councils, all case study countries have 
established child protection coordinating institutions. In South Sudan, there is a child 
protection sub-cluster working group to coordinate the delivery of child protection services 
as part of the protection cluster in the delivery of humanitarian assistance (South Sudan 
interviewee, Government official, 2018). The sub-cluster coordinates resource 
mobilisation for child protection mainly from international sources. In Kenya, area advisory 
committees were established, under the Children’s Act (2003) to coordinate children’s 
activities at sub-national level (NCCS 2014). In 2005, Zimbabwe launched the multi-
sectoral National Child Protection Committee system, which was to be replicated at sub-
national level. Regrettably, most child protection committees in Zimbabwe were not fully 
functional during the time of study. This is mainly due to limited human, technical and 
financial resources. One NGO official was blunt on this issue, arguing that “it is sad that 
the government expect these structures to be funded by NGOs and communities who are 
already struggling for their survival” (Zimbabwe Interviewee 10, CSO, 2017). 
Unsurprisingly, with little or no funding from government, “most of these local structures 
are either not functioning at all, or only become active when there is funding from NGOs” 
(Kenya Interviewee 11, CSO, 2016). In South Sudan, for example, between 2015 and 
2018, the child protection cluster meetings were technically and financially supported by 
UNICEF, Plan International, Save the Children, and many other international non-
governmental organisations, with no funding from government (South Sudan interviewee 
7, CSO, 2019). Discussions during cluster meetings focused on topics such as 




humanitarian support as well as family tracing and reunification (South Sudan interviewee 
9, CSO, 2019; UNICEF 2017c). 
Another type of child protection institution relates to child justice, including the 
police, child justice/ victim friendly courts, and ombudspersons. Kenya, South Sudan and 
Zimbabwe have established child friendly courts (Chibwana & Gumbo 2014; GoK 2014; 
Muridzo & Malianga 2015). Child protection cases in Botswana are handled by any 
Magistrate’s Court.20 Section 192 of the Child Act (2008) in South Sudan provides for the 
establishment of juvenile courts to adjudicate on matters to do with childcare and 
protection as well as of children in contact with the law. In 2015, the Government of South 
Sudan (GoSS) launched its first ever Children’s Court in Rumbek, with support from Save 
the Children, which was to be presided over by Justice Michael Atem (Save the Children 
2015c). The Government also selected and trained a few people in the judiciary to serve 
as juvenile judges in various counties (South Sudan interviewee, Government official, 
2019).  
Kenya has several child justice courts. By December 2018, the government of 
Kenya had established children’s courts in 5 of its 47 counties (Kenya interviewee 31, 
Government official, 2016). In situations where children’s courts do not exist, specifically 
trained magistrates have been appointed to handle children’s issues. Similarly, the 
Government of Zimbabwe introduced the Victim-Friendly Court (VFC) system in the late 
1990s. The VFCs were conceptualised as a multi-sectoral system, which includes police, 
health, social welfare and legal services (Muridzo & Malianga 2015). The VFCs, which 
were considerably funded by donors during the early years are now poorly resourced, 
without requisite equipment such as cameras to enhance their child friendliness (Muridzo 
& Malianga 2015). At the end of 2018, most of the VFCs were not functional due to 
withdrawal of donor funding and no corresponding increase in state funding (Zimbabwe 
interviewee 22, CSO, 2018). This brings to the fore the sustainability challenges of 
foreign-funded child protection initiatives. To some of the child rights organisations, the 
 






failure “by the government to take ownership and finance their operations, suggest that 
this structure is not a spending priority” (Zimbabwe Interviewee 12, CSO, 2016).   
In all four countries, there are interventions to train police officers to handle child 
protection cases. In some situations, as is the case with Kenya, this led to the 
establishment of child/ victim friendly police posts or units. By December 2018, there were 
14 police stations with functional child protection units to handle cases of children in 
contact with the law and those in need of protection in Kenya (Kenya interviewee 36, 
Government official, 2018). The Government of South Sudan has also established gender 
and child desks in selected police stations in all counties, with financial and technical 
support from UNICEF and Save the Children. In Kenya and Zimbabwe, Save the Children 
also supported training workshops and production of learning materials targeting the 
police on the multi-sectoral management of cases of child abuse, as reported by the 
relevant officers who participated in the study.  
The fifth form of child protection institution is for oversight and accountability for 
children’s rights. Oversight and accountability institutions in selected case study countries 
come in different forms, with Kenya exhibiting the greatest diversity. Examples include 
the Anti-Female Genital Mutilation Board established under the Prohibition of Female 
Genital Mutilation Act (012), Child Welfare Society, National Gender and Equality 
Commission as well as Anti-FGM and Child Marriage Prosecution Units within the Office 
of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP). The War-Disabled, Widows and Orphans 
Commission and the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission in South Sudan fall within this 
category.  The same could be said of the Gender Commission in Zimbabwe. Institutions 
such as the NCCS and NCC, discussed earlier, are also accountability institutions as 
much as they are established to coordinate children’s services. It is regrettable that in 
none of the four case study countries was there evidence of the above child protection 
institutions being actively involved in advocating for increased spending on child 
protection. For the most part, as observed by one respondent in Kenya, “they were also 
fighting to be allocated an operational budget” (Kenya Interviewee 3, CSO, 2016). since 
their budgets are usually negotiated through a parent ministry. As discussed earlier, in 




Social Protection. This means that officials of the NCCS have no direct interface with 
ministries of finance to advocate for increased funding. This is the same predicament in 
which the NCC in Botswana found itself.  
The sixth type of child protection institution examined in this study provides 
residential care to children without appropriate parental care. Although institutionalisation 
of children is discouraged for not being conducive to optimal child development (Save the 
Children 2006; Chibwana & Gumbo 2014), residential care institutions abound in all four 
countries. In 2014, Kenya had 700 children’s homes, also called charitable institutions, 
inhabited by 48,000 children (NCCS 2014). In Botswana, 500 children were living in 
residential care in 2018 (Botswana Interviewee 24, CSO, 2018) and there are about 5500 
in Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe Interviewee 31, CSO, 2019). In Kenya and Zimbabwe, the law 
requires that these institutions be registered, and they are expected to follow approved 
standards of care (MoLSS 2011; GoK 2014). The majority of residential care institutions 
in Botswana, Kenya and Zimbabwe are managed and funded by NGOs such as the SOS 
Children’s Village, with a few receiving support from the government through monthly 
capitation grants.  
In Zimbabwe, for example, those caring for children living in residential care 
institutions, including family settings, dormitories, and village and community-based care, 
were supposed to receive US$15 per month per child as foster care fees between 2010 
and 2017. Unfortunately, these funds were rarely disbursed on time, if at all (Chibwana & 
Gumbo 2014: 23). Residential care institutions supplement government contributions by 
fundraisings from communities and private companies (Botswana interviewee 25, CSO, 
2018). Whilst it is easy for both private and public charitable institutions to source clothing, 
food and fees for children in residential care institutions, it is hard for them to mobilise 
resources to pay salaries for care givers and to repair infrastructure such as boreholes 
(NCCS 2014). A leader of one charitable institution in Botswana confessed to this problem 
of under-funding of salaries: 
It has been hard for us to keep our staff. We do not have funds to pay salaries. The 
Government is no longer supporting us. We thank God that we are getting some groceries 




Seventh, it is important to mention the role that national human rights institutions (NHRI) 
play in child protection (ACERWC 2018). Lately, the Kenya and Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Commissions have developed programmes to promote children’s rights, including setting 
up of children’s desks. Similarly, the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan has 
also been speaking out on involvement of children in armed conflict, and other grave 
violations against children (South Sudan interviewee 1, Government Official, 2017). A 
recent study by UNICEF and the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions 
(GANHRI) revealed that 75% of NHRI across the world work on children’s rights. Violence 
against children emerged as one of the top five topics that the NHRIs investigates (Stamm 
& Wurth 2018: 10). NHRI are also actively involved in state party reporting to treaty bodies 
including the UNCRC and the ACERWC. 
 Lastly, it is important to note that there are many other child protection institutions, 
across sectors, which should also be funded from government budgets. These include 
schools, clinics and hospitals, one-stop child protection centers, probation and 
rehabilitation centers, early childhood development centers, and youth friendly facilities 
(Davis et al. 2014; Hyslop 2008; Kostelny et al. 2014; NCCS 2014). The above discussion 
on child protection institutions only served to paint a picture of the breadth and scope of 
child protection institutions.  
While all the case study countries have made efforts to establish a variety of child 
protection institutions most of them are ineffective due to limited human, technical and 
financial resources (NCCS 2014; MoLSS & UNICEF 2010; Maundeni 2010; Chibwana & 
Gumbo 2014). In all four countries, there is a lack of skilled and motivated professional 
staff who can deliver child protection interventions effectively (Davis et al. 2014; World 
Vision International 2021). Shortages of social workers, trained counsellors and medical 
personnel, needed to provide quality child protection services within the continuum of 
care, were highlighted during interviews with research participants. One social worker in 
Zimbabwe working for a national NGO lamented the shortage of critical child protection 
staff: 
Social work in Zimbabwe is dying. Many people have emigrated to other countries in 




than 30% of the required social workers to follow up cases of child abuse (Botswana 
Interviewee 25, CSO, 2018).  
In 2010, the ratio of children to qualified social workers in Zimbabwe, for example was 
49,587:1 (UNICEF & MoLSS 2011). The shortage in terms of a qualified and professional 
workforce has resulted in frontline child protection services being delivered by unqualified 
volunteers through both formal and informal arrangements (Wessells 2015; Hyslop 2008). 
ANPPCAN’s (2015) assessment of national child protection systems in East Africa also 
revealed that although some countries have employed people with college degrees, many 
of them do not have specialised expertise in child protection, which has compromised the 
quality of child protection services.   
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
The preceding discussion has shown that all four countries have relatively robust child 
protection legal, strategy and institutional frameworks. The policies and laws are largely 
aligned with globally defined child protection standards outlined in the CRC (1989), its 
Optional Protocols, and in the ACRWC (1990). However, most child protection plans, 
except NAPs for OVCs, are not closely aligned to budgeting processes. Additionally, 
many of the plans are not costed. The chapter also established that all four countries 
have various forms of child protection institutions, but most of them are poorly funded to 
effectively perform their functions.  The next chapter will present empirical information on 














Trends in Public Spending on Child Protection in Selected 
Countries 
6.0 Introduction  
 
The aim of this chapter is to present empirical information on the size and composition of 
budget allocations to child protection in each of the four case study countries. The 
discussion herein is based on the researcher’s analysis of budget information extracted 
from numerous budget documents. The chapter is divided into three sections, with the 
first providing a brief overview of the extent to which child protection is visible in 
government budgets. The second section presents a detailed analysis of trends in budget 
allocations to child protection for each of the four countries, for the period 2011 to 2017. 
To enable cross country comparability, budgets in local currency were converted to 
United States of America dollars (US$). The third, and final section, provides a synthesis 
of emerging patterns about public spending on child protection.  
6.1 Visibility of Child Protection in Government Budgets 
 
To set the stage for a detailed analysis, a crucial observation ought to be made 
concerning the visibility of child protection in government budgets. In this study, visibility 
refers to the identifiability of budget lines on child protection in budget documents. If all 
four countries are analysed together, this study found that the visibility of child protection 
in government budgets varies considerably across ministries and countries. This finding 
is consistent with what was observed by Avati et al. (2018) in Malawi and by UNICEF in 
Bangladesh (UNICEF 2018e). The differences in visibility of child protection in budgets of 
selected countries were due to a range of factors such as budgeting approach, budget 
classification system, and robustness of the public financial management system. 




Kenya, is one approach to budgeting associated with comprehensive budget 
classification systems. Through this approach budget allocations are directed towards 
agreed programs and sub-programs with clear expected results and targets. To be 
effective, program-based budgeting requires development of a robust program structure, 
detailed budget templates, and solid performance monitoring systems (Robinson & Last 
2009).  
Of all four countries, Kenya had the highest number of visible child protection 
budget lines, an indication of the existence of programs and sub-programs to tackle child 
maltreatment. Examples of sub-programs that the researcher identified are: ‘children’s 
remand homes’, ‘integrated child protection services’, ‘alternative family care services’, 
‘child community support services’, ‘cash transfer to orphans and vulnerable children’, 
and ‘street children rehabilitation’. Direct child protection budget lines found in 
Zimbabwe’s budget books include ‘children in difficult circumstances’, ‘children in the 
streets fund’, ‘government social protection institutions’ and ‘victim friendly court’. Child 
protection budget lines in Botswana’s national budgets include ‘grants to charitable 
institutions’ such as Child Line and SOS Children’s Village and the ‘orphan care support 
programme’. A physical count of budget lines showed that Kenya had almost three times 
more visible child protection budget lines in its programme-based budgets than South 
Sudan and about twice more than Botswana and Zimbabwe.  
It was surprising that most of the government officials who participated in the study 
did not find any problems with the invisibility of child protection in their budgets – 
especially in Botswana. Their main argument was that resources for child protection were 
combined with other programmes. One official from Zimbabwe said that: 
It is not possible for a national budget to include every other small issue. What is important 
is that the government is doing something about children. If you look at the budget line on 
‘children in difficult circumstances’, it covers a lot of issues including response to violence 
against children. The same thing can be said about gender budgets, which include girls. 
We cannot have a budget line for every small issue which affects children (Zimbabwe 




Whilst there is some merit in this argument, there is a real risk that child protection may 
be dwarfed, and ultimately crowded out by ‘bigger’ programmes. There are also huge 
benefits of specifying allocations to child protection as recommended in GC No. 19 of the 
UNCRC (2016). The GC argues that disaggregated budgets with clear classification 
systems “provide a basis for States and other entities to monitor how budget allocations 
and actual expenditures affecting children are managed in relation to the budget 
principles” (UNCRC 2016: 19). If budgets are disaggregated, it also becomes easy for the 
government to report to national oversight institutions such as parliaments, treaty bodies 
such as the UNCRC and the ACERWC, and civil society organisations on how much they 
are spending on the implementation of children’s rights (ACERWC 2018; UNCRC 2016). 
GC No. 5 of the UNCRC (2003) on general measures of implementation is explicit about 
this point. In Section 51, it states that: 
“No State can tell whether it is fulfilling children’s economic, social and cultural rights “to 
the maximum extent of … available resources”, as it is required to do under article 4, 
unless it can identify the proportion of national and other budgets allocated to the social 
sector and, within that, to children, both directly and indirectly” (UNCRC 2003: 25). 
But, the invisibility of child protection in financial plans is also common among donors and 
CSOs. An analysis of data for South Sudan from the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) 
showed that donors too have the habit of lumping together resources for child protection 
with other programmes such as nutrition, education, livelihoods, and resilience building 
projects (OCHA 2017).  
The invisibility of direct child protection budget line items is suggestive of the weak 
link between plans and budgets. One is bound to argue this way because the legal and 
strategy analysis done earlier showed that most of the pertinent child protection risks are 
covered in national, sectoral, and issue specific plans. Naturally, one would then expect 
that these plans would be reflected in budgets of the respective countries. One civil 
society official in Botswana commented on this issue: 
Our problem in Botswana is not lack of child protection policies and plans, but 
implementation. Look, we are all worried about sexual abuse, corporal punishment and 




hear of is the orphan care support programme. Is that all we can budget for? (Botswana 
Interviewee 13, CSO, 2018) 
Most identifiable child protection budget lines were found in ministries responsible for 
social welfare, which coordinate child protection issues.21. This was despite child 
protection being a cross-sectoral issue which should be handled by several MDAs (NCCS 
2014; Save the Children 2009). Only in isolated cases were a few budget lines found 
within the ministries of justice/ judiciary (in the form of child justice or victim friendly 
courts), local government and home affairs/ interior (Avati et al. 2018; UNICEF 2014; 
UNICEF 2018e). Ministries such as education and health hardly had any visible budget 
lines that could be linked to child protection. This was unfortunate, considering that 
schools and health centres are key delivery platforms for both preventive and response 
services. On this issue, it is important to stress the point that was raised by the NCCS 
(2011:07) in Kenya that the problem is that some ministries such as education and health 
“find it difficult to allocate resources to child protection” because they think it is not their 
core mandate.  
 Child protection is also largely invisible in sub-national budgets. In two cities of 
Zimbabwe (Gweru and Harare) whose budgets were reviewed for the period 2014-2017, 
child protection was reportedly hidden under the budget line on ‘social services’. 
According to an official from the Harare City Council, that budget line also covered matters 
such as rehabilitation of children living on and off the streets. Overall, the budgets for 
these two cities were not sufficiently disaggregated to allow for the identifiability of specific 
child protection services. Child protection was also lumped with other social services in 
selected counties of Kenya. In some of the counties of Kenya, child protection is explicitly 
mentioned in County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs), fiscal strategy papers, and 
programme-based budgets. The Wajir CIDP (2013-2017), for instance, included the 
“construction of child protection centers” and “cash transfers for the orphans and 
vulnerable children in all sub-counties”. The county also planned to “hold public 
 
21 These Ministries are: Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (Botswana); Ministry of Gender, Child 
and Social Welfare (South Sudan); Ministry of Labour Social Security and Services (formerly the Ministry of Gender, 
Children and Development) and the State Department for Social Protection (Kenya); and lastly Ministry of Public 





sensitization on female genital mutilation”, although it ultimately did not commit resources 
to this later issue (Wajir County 2013: 247-250). In fiscal year 2014/15, the construction 
of child protection centres was budgeted for under the line item on “Gender, culture and 
social services” (Wajir County 2015). In Mombasa, child protection services were 
budgeted for under the “Children (Care, education, and environment)”, budget line 
(Mombasa County 2018). Other counties, including Mombasa, did not have a specific 
child protection budget line. The lack of easily identifiable budget lines in some counties 
also noted by the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research Analysis in its analysis of 
children, youth and women sensitive planning and budgeting in Kenya (KIPPRA 2020b). 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to access budgets of counties in South Sudan due to 
the armed conflict. As for Botswana, officials from the only local authority (Gaborone) 
visited by the researcher during primary data collection said their budget was an internal 
document, not publicly sharable.  
With this background, the next section will look at the size and composition of child 
protection budgets in selected countries. The analysis presented in this section is based 
on the researcher’s analysis using the methodology described in Chapter Four.  
6.2 Trends in Public Spending on Child Protection 
 
6.2.1 Size of Child Protection Budgets in Selected Countries 
The size of total budgets for child protection varied considerably in absolute terms and as 
a share of the total government budget. As indicated in Chapter Four, the total child 
protection budget is the sum of identifiable budget lines for programmes aimed at 
preventing and responding to child maltreatment. In 2016/17, for example, identifiable 
child protection budget allocations, from government’s own resources, to child protection 
in Botswana totalled $27 million, $205 million for Kenya, $62,931 for South Sudan and 





Source: Author, based on data from national budget books 
Whilst Kenya allocated the highest amount in absolute terms, Botswana spent more per 
child on child protection than all the other countries. Between 2010 and 2017, Botswana 
committed an average of $52 per child, Kenya $6, Zimbabwe $2, with South Sudan 
allocating only 5 cents per child (Figure 4). To a certain extent, the average per-child 
allocations (arrived at by dividing total allocations by the child population)  mirror the 
income of a country, measured by gross domestic product (GDP). In 2015, Botswana had 
the highest GDP per capita in 2010 constant prices of $7,613, followed by Zimbabwe 
($1,234), Kenya ($1,093),  and South Sudan ($730).22 The low per-capita funding to 
South Sudan is an indication of the fragile economy and impacts of war on public finances 
(IMF 2014; UNICEF 2017c).  
 
22 GDP figures drawn from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD, Accessed on 25 March 2021 
  
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17
Botswana 56,977,631 55,276,851 48,250,548 45,231,744 43,641,176 33,235,662 27,224,220
Kenya 96,169,866 97,696,070 69,811,141 113,284,29 167,583,79 191,718,79 205,618,14
South Sudan 87,073 851,084 90,056 687,305 139,609 155,390 62,931





























Source: Author’s compilation, based on data from national budget books 
A key finding from the analysis of budgetary trends between 2010 and 2017 is that the 
total visible budget allocations to child protection declined in nominal and real terms,23 for 
all countries except Kenya (Figure 4). In Kenya, the total visible child protection budget 
increased by 114 percent from $96 million in 2010 to $205 million in 2016/17 in current 
prices and about 98.5 percent after adjusting for inflation. During the same period (2010-
17), the total government budget increased by 28 percent in nominal terms. There was, 
however, a slight decrease in allocations in 2012/13 due to overall under-performance of 
revenues and grants ahead of the 2013 national elections. The total child protection 
budget for Botswana nominally declined by 52 percent from $56 million in the 2010-11 
financial year to $27 million in 2016-17. If inflation is taken into account, the budget 
declined by 46 percent mainly due to economic contractions which affected revenue 
generation, at the back of a global financial crisis. Total visible child protection budgets 
 
23 Nominal figures refer to the exact allocations as provided for in budget books. Real figures are arrived at by adjusting 
nominal figures for inflation. Per capita refers to allocations per person assuming the total child protection budget is 
divided equally amongst all children (0-18 years). 
 
2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17
Botswana 70.70 67.37 57.73 53.13 50.31 37.61 30.25
Kenya 4.85 4.79 3.33 5.26 7.59 8.46 8.84
South Sudan 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.01

































for South Sudan and Zimbabwe declined by almost a third during the same period in real 
terms, if inflation is considered.  
The decline in child protection budgets in Botswana and Zimbabwe is best 
illustrated by allocations to the ‘Street Children Fund’ and ‘Children in difficult 
circumstances’ in Zimbabwe as well as the ‘Juvenile Justice and After Care Service’ and 
‘SOS Children’s Village’ budget lines in Botswana. The allocation to the budget line on 
‘Children in difficult circumstances’ under the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare in 
Zimbabwe, declined by 80 percent, in nominal terms, from $1 million in 2010 to $200,000 
in 2016, whilst the allocation to the ‘Street Children Fund’ declined from $50,000 to $5000 
during the same period, yet the number of children living and working on the streets 
increased from about 9000 in 2010 to 12000 (UNICEF, 2016). In Botswana, the 
government allocation to SOS Children’s Village, for example, declined in nominal terms 
from BWP 1.3 million in 2010 to BWP 1 million in 2017, whilst in Zimbabwe allocations to 
the Children in the Street Fund dropped from $70,000 in 2011 to $5000 in 2017 (Figure 
5).  
 
































Child protection does not seem to be a political priority for majority of the selected 
countries. In Botswana, while total government budgets trended upwards, allocations to 
child protection, on average, declined between fiscal year 2010/11 and 2016/17 (Figure 
6).  
 
Source: Author’s compilation, based on data from national budget books 
When requested to comment on the reasons for the above trends, officials from Botswana 
blamed everything on depressed economic growth. One official said that: 
The Botswana economy has not been performing as per our expectations. As a result, the 
government has been pursuing a cautious fiscal policy. Nearly all government 
expenditures have been affected, including our own salaries (Botswana Interviewee 32, 
Government official, 2018). 
Whilst it is true that economic growth was below expectations between 2011 and 2017, 
the fact that the overall government budget increased when allocations to child protection 
tumbled means that other sectors and programmes benefitted to the additional revenue 
compared to child protection. As discussed in Chapter Nine, the government, especially 
during Ian Khama’s presidency, prioritised poverty eradication and livelihoods programs, 
housing schemes, and interventions to diversity the economy from the over-dependency 


























































Figure 6: Botswana: Total Government and CP Budgets (2010-17)




ministries of justice, home affairs, and health increased at a faster rate than to the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Services which coordinates child protection issues. In South Sudan, 
allocations to the social sector were significantly lower and never steadily trended 
upwards as did allocations to security and public administration sectors. This was despite 
the catastrophic nature of the humanitarian crisis caused by armed conflict on children 
(UNICEF 2017c). 
 Encouragingly, in Kenya, child protection appears to be a government priority, with 
total budget allocations increasing at a relatively faster rate than the total government 
budget (Figure 7). Kenya also allocated the largest share of its total government budget 
to child protection, if compared to the other three countries. In financial year 2016/17, 
Kenya allocated slightly over one percent of its national budget to child protection, 
followed by Botswana (0.47 percent), Zimbabwe (0.24 percent) and lastly South Sudan 
(0.01 percent). However, as a percentage of GDP, Botswana spent slightly higher on child 
protection (0.316 percent), followed by Kenya (0.224 percent), Zimbabwe (0.116 percent) 
and lastly South Sudan (0.006 percent).  
 
Source: Author’s compilation, based on data from national budget books 
No clear relationship could be established between total government budget and 

























































Figure 7: Kenya: Total Government and CP Budgets (2010-17)




protection (CP) budget increased as total government expenditure also went up. But 
between 2012 and 2013, CP budgets increased, while total government budget declined 
(Figure 8). No convincing explanations were provided for this except those gleaned 
through inference from comments made by some civil society representatives about 
budget credibility problems: 
Budgeting in South Sudan is not rigorous. Budget sector working groups are not functional 
anymore. Given decades of civil war, public finance management systems are still weak. 
At the same time, there is limited capacity in government to efficiently and effectively 
budget for all issues. There is therefore no clear public spending pattern (South Sudan 
Interviewee 11, CSO, 2018). 
 
Source: Author’s compilation, based on data from national budget books 
Total allocations to child protection in Zimbabawe trended downwards at a time when the 
total government budget increased (Figure 9). The largest decline was experienced in 

































































Figure 8: South Sudan: Total Government and CP Budgets (2010-17)





Source: Author’s compilation, based on data from national budget books 
Budget allocations to child protection shows low prioritisation and insufficiency of 
resources to ensure the delivery of quality child protection services. In this study, 
insufficiency of budget is measured by calculating the difference between financial 
requirements based on cost estimates in relevant national plans (where they exist) and 
what is committed in government budgets. For external resources, the study compared 
requested funds as outlined in financial proposals such as CAPs (which were presumably 
based on cost estimates) against what was ultimately committed. Taking year 2015 as an 
example, the Government of Zimbabwe allocated about US$8.5 million to child protection 
against a target of US$14.9 million in the second National Action Plan for Orphans and 
Vulnerable Children (NAP for OVC II). When looking at some of the allocations, one does 
not need sophisticated analysis to conclude that the US$5000 allocated to the Streets 
Children Fund in Zimbabwe in 2017, which translates to approximately 41 cents for each 
of the approximately 12,000 children living and working on the streets per year is 
inadequate. The same could be said of the meagre amount allocated to the entire 
Directorate on Child Affairs in South Sudan (US$ 62,931 per year in 2016/17).  
The insufficiency of child protection budget allocations led to limited reach and 
coverage of child protection services such as social assistance to orphans and other 




































































Figure 9: Zimbabwe: Total Government and CP Budgets (2011-17)




Project only reached 350 000 households in 2017 and 1,350,000 individuals. This figure 
is about 10 percent of the children living in ultra-poverty (World Bank 2017). The 
Harmonized Cash Transfer Programme24 (HCTP) in Zimbabwe failed to reach half of all 
rural districts since it started in 2011. In fact, as of June 2018 the programme had been 
scaled down from covering 20 out of 59 districts in 2015 to 9 in 2018 (UNICEF 2018c). 
The scale back was mainly triggered by the drying up of donor funding. The case of the 
HCTP is a typical example of the risks of donor dependence, an issue that has been 
extensively addressed in literature on donor aid to Africa (Bond 2007; Moyo 2009; Chang 
& Grabel 2014). Donor-driven programmes often face sustainability problems when 
external funding dries up (Moyo 2009).  
The meagre budget allocations to child protection especially in South Sudan and 
Zimbabwe is partly attributed to low budget ceilings for social welfare ministries. The 
analysis of ministerial votes relevant to child protection showed that ceilings for child 
welfare ministries were much lower than for ministries such as health, education, and 
defence. To illustrate this point, in 2018, in Zimbabwe, the Ministry of Public Service, 
Labour and Social Welfare received three percent of the total government budget 
compared to 7 percent for the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare and 6 percent for 
Ministry of Home Affairs and Cultural Heritage. In South Sudan, the Ministry of Gender, 
Children and Social Welfare, which is a key ministry under the Social and Humanitarian 
sector, is one of the least funded. Between 2010 and 2016, the ministry received an 
average of 0.17 percent of the total government budget. The War Disabled, Widows and 
Orphans Commission, which also belongs to this sector, as well as the Southern Sudan 
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, altogether received about 0.01 percent of total 
government budget during the same period.  
 
24 This is an unconditional cash transfer programme targeted at ultra-poor households, who are also labour constrained 
as part of the revised National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (NAP II for OVCs) 2011-2015. The 
programme is coordinated by the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare with technical support from 
UNICEF. The aim of the programme is to increase consumption to a level above the poverty line in order to help 
beneficiaries avoid risky coping strategies such as prostitution, child labour and early marriages. The programme also 
aims to contribute to the reduction of violence against children. The above objectives make the programme relevant to 
child protection. Eligible households receive US$20-25 depending on household size. The programme is funded by the 





Still concerning ministerial ceilings as they related to social welfare services, 
Botswana was in a slightly different position because the Ministry of Local Government 
and Rural Development, which houses child protection services, received relatively large 
ceilings compared to other countries. Between 2010 and 2016, the Government of 
Botswana allocated an average of 11 percent of its total budget to the Ministry of Local 
Government and Rural Development. However, higher ceilings did not mean that child 
protection would benefit. In fact, excluding the ‘orphan care programme’, child protection 
services only received 0.11 percent of the ministry’s budget. It can be argued, therefore, 
that under-funding of child protection also reflects low prioritisation of child welfare 
departments even within ministries responsible for child welfare services. This is an issue 
that will be explored more in Chapter Eight. In South Sudan, the entire Directorate of Child 
Welfare services within the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Welfare, received only 
three percent of the 2017/18 budget for the ministry. The Directorate is also under-staffed 
with total staff members averaging 14 between 2010 and 2016, against a total of 185 for 
the ministry (Figure 10). The study could not find numbers of staff in the other three 
countries. 
Source: Author’s compilation, based on data from national budget books 
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Figure  10: Number of Staff in the Child Welfare Directorate (South Sudan) 




From the preceding paragraphs, it can be concluded that  child protection received a very 
small fraction of available national resources both in per capita terms and as a share of 
the total government budget in all selected countries. Except for Kenya, the percentage 
change in budget allocations to child protection is lower than general changes in total 
government expenditures. This leads us to the conclusion that child protection is not a 
top spending priority of the respective governments.  
 At sub-national level, in the case of Kenya, although lumped with other programs, 
it is important to note that spending on budget lines on ‘children, youth, and women 
services’ modestly trended upwards. In Bungoma, the allocation to the programme on 
‘children, youth and women services’ increased from Kenya Shillings (KES) 0.3 billion in 
2014/15 to KES 0.45 billion in 2017/18. (KIPPRA 2020b:08). Similar trends were also 
observed in Wajir, Mombasa, Kitui and Machakos (KIPPRA 2020a). The main challenge 
is however that it is difficult to know how much of the composite budget was used 
specifically for child protection.  
6.2.2 Composition of Child Protection Budgets 
In all countries except South Sudan, budget allocations to child protection are skewed in 
favour of social assistance programmes. This finding is consistent with observations 
made by UNICEF (2018e) in Bangladesh. In 2015, for instance, social assistance 
programmes to orphans and other deprived children in  Botswana, Kenya and Zimbabwe 
accounted for an average 81 percent of child protection budgets (Figure 11). No social 
assistance programmes were identified in South Sudan funded by the government in 
2015.  

































Figure 11: Social Assistance Share of Total CP Budget in financial year 2015/16




A key component of social assistance programmes is orphan care support. Orphan care 
programmes, which includes consumption support and bursaries, play a key role in 
ensuring that children access education and other basic necessities such as food. Without 
access to such services, children are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation (Fang et al. 
2014; Save the Children 2009; UNICEF 2018e). In Zimbabwe, the Harmonized Cash 
Transfer Programme (partly funded through the Child Protection Fund) and the Basic 
Education Assistance Module, funded from the government’s own resources, took up 85 
percent of budgeted resources for child protection in Zimbabwe in 2015. The same trend 
was observable in Botswana and Kenya where about 95 percent  and 63 percent of child 
protection budgets in 2015/16 were meant for social assistance to orphans and other 
vulnerable children, respectively. By 2018, South Sudan did not have a national social 
support programme for orphans and other vulnerable children. This is despite the finding 
that social assistance programmes generally have more political appeal than initiatives 
such as campaigns against child marriage. One Member of Parliament in Kenya 
commented on why programmes such as the cash transfer are preferred to intagibles like 
psycho-social support to victims of child abuse: 
As a Member of Parliament I am judged by concrete things which I deliver to my 
constituency. People want food, school fees, dams and roads. This is what I am fighting 
hard to provide. I cannot go to voters and say you need empowerment, you need to know 
about children’s rights. They will say to me, Honorable, all we want is our children to be in 
school (Kenya Interviewee 18, Member of parliament, 2016). 
Notwithstanding the positive impacts on child protection, social assistance programmes 
alone are not enough to create a protective enviroment for all children. While it is true that 
lack of income, food, education and other essentials conduce abuse and exploitation, 
protecting children requires more than giving them cash. A full package of preventive and 
response services is required within a protective legal and policy environment (UNICEF 




Excluding social assistance programmes, 68 percent of the remaining child 
protection budgets between 2011 and 2017 were used to cover salaries, administration 
and coordination costs in all four countries, on average. Cross sectional data for the fiscal 
year 2015/16 confirms this (Figure 12). In all four countries, budgets for salaries, 
administration and coordination were above 50 percent. The second highest expenditures 
were for response services, taking up an average of 29 percent between 2011 and 2017. 
The most common response services included multi-sectoral management of cases of 
child abuse, child justice and placement of children in institutions of care.  
 Source: Author’s compilation based on data from national government budgets 
From the above figure, budgets for response services are significantly lower than for 
preventive programmes. If social assistance programmes are included, then the 
allocations to response services become  a drop in the ocean. Moreover, critical areas 
such as data and statistics are acutely underfunded (Figure 12).  
6.2.3 Financing of Child Protection Programmes 
Except for Botswana, being a middle income country, donors contribute significant 
amounts to the financing of child protection in the other three case study countries. 
Approximately 74 percent of the funding for cash transfer programmes in Kenya and 78 
percent in Zimbabwe was sourced from donors between 2011 and 2016. During the same 


























Figure 12: Composition of 2015/16 CP Budgets (less social assistance)
Staff, Policy and Coordination Data and Statistics




year, where from the government’s own resources. In contrast, across the borders of 
Botswana, the government of Zimbabwe contributed less than 30 percent to the Child 
Protection Fund, following a donor conditionality for the government to contribute at least 
20 percent. Unfortunately, according to information from some respondents, the 
Government of Zimbabwe at times failed to honour the 20 percent commitment.  
Data from interviews with key informants suggest that funding organisations such 
as USAID, DFID, World Bank and UNICEF were behind what one respondent called 
“booming cash transfer programmes for orphans and poor families” (Kenya Interviewee 
6, CSO, 2016). USAID was singled out by a number of respondents in Zimbabwe and 
Kenya as one of the first donors to give the focus on orphans an initial impetus through 
the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).25 Since its launch 15 years 
ago, the PEPFAR programme has supported about 6.4 million orphans and other 
vulnerable children in developing countries with a range of social assistance programmes. 
In Zimbabwe, the PEPFAR funding was channelled through NGOs such as Catholic 
Relief Services and also through UNICEF. In Kenya, between 2009 and 2017, the World 
Bank disbursed over US$120 million (about 74 percent of total costs), mainly in the form 
of concessional loans, towards the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children 
Project, which reached 350,000 households in 2017 (World Bank 2017). Although the 
initial focus was on orphans, especially those affected by HIV and AIDS, orphan care 
support programmes later metamorphosed into more general social assistance to the 
poorest and most deprived children and their families, regardless of whether they are 
orphans or not. The considerable funding of social assistance by donors in the case of 
Kenya and Zimbabwe, should not be misconstrued to mean that donors are disinterested 
in other child protection programmes. The challenge is that donor funding for other 
programmes is usually channelled through off-budget means via NGOs. These resources 
are often difficult to track. In Malawi, for example, 85 percent of child protection 
expenditures were financed by resources from donors outside government channels 
(Avati et al. 2018).  
 
25 The PEPFAR programme is an initiative of the United States of America President, launched on 28 January 2003 by 





In South Sudan, with an average government allocation of less than US$70,000 
per year to the Child Welfare Directorate, donors have become the main source of child 
protection financing. As argued earlier in this study, complex emergencies reduce a 
government’s capacity to mobilise domestic resources to finance child protection (Buckle 
1999; Chol 2016; De Waal 2014; IMF 2014, 2017). At the same time, in South Sudan, 
security expenditures consumed much of the available public resources. An analysis of 
aid flows to the child protection sector in South Sudan demonstrate the country’s 
dependence on donors to finance critical children’s services. Total donor commitments to 
the protection cluster, reported in the Financial Tracking Service for South Sudan, 
increased by nearly 600 percent from about US$11 million in 2011 to US$89 million in 
2017 due to growing protection risks worsened by armed conflict.  
Source: Author’s compilation based on data from the FTS (2018) 
Although total protection commitments by donors are significant and have trended 
upwards since 2011, they constitute on average three percent of all ODA flows to South 
Sudan. Regrettably, there is a yawning gap between commitments and disbursements. 
Between 2011 and 2017, on average, about 47 percent of donor commitments to the 
protection cluster were met. Only in three of the seven years studied (2010-2017) did 
South Sudan receive over 50 percent of donor commitments to the protection sector 







































Source: Author’s compilation based on data from the FTS (2018) 
Source: Author’s compilation based on data from the FTS (2018) 
To sum it up, child protection is financed from local and external resources in all four 
countries. However, the external share of funding varies depending on the macro-
economic circumstances of each country. While South Sudan and Zimbabwe are heavily 
dependent on external revenue to finance child protection services, Botswana – as a 
middle-income country – funds nearly all from domestic resources. Interestingly, however, 
the low priority of child protection in expenditure plans and the skewness of allocations 
towards a few elements of the national child protection systems is a common problem for 


































Figure 14:  Protection  Cluster share of total ODA Commitments to South 
























Figure 15: Share of Protection Cluster Commitments Disbursed
None Paid Share of Total Protection Commitments




6.3 Emerging Trends from the Budget Analysis 
 
From the analysis above, a few emerging trends about budget allocations to child 
protection can be distilled. To start, child protection services/ programs are largely 
unidentifiable across several ministries. This was observed at national and also sub-
national level in selected counties of Kenya and two municipalities in Zimbabwe. The 
visibility of child protection in government budgets was assessed through a line-by-line 
review of budgets of ministries and departments with responsibilities for child protection 
in each country. The study found that three out of four case study countries (Kenya 
excepted) have very few visible child protection budget lines. The limited number of 
clearly identifiable child protection budget lines does not seem to match the extensive list 
of protection risks affecting children in each of the selected countries. This is concerning 
because if an issue is politically relevant and nationally significant, it is not enough for a 
government to say it is doing something about it, behind the scenes; it must be seen to 
be doing it.  
The attention given to the visibility point in this study is not a misplaced expectation, 
nor a utopian idea. Precedence has already been set with other cross-cutting issues such 
as HIV and AIDS, gender, nutrition, and resilience (Allan 2015). The introduction of 
specific budget lines on these matters - including in the national budgets of Botswana, 
Kenya and Zimbabwe - supports the above argument. By coming up with specific lines 
on gender, and even establishing institutions for this, governments wanted to be ‘seen’ to 
be doing something about such topical issues. They should also do the same for child 
protection. It is also important to note, as discussed earlier in this Chapter, that 
international guidance has already been provided on the why and how of disaggregating 
budget allocations to programs which seek to improve the well-being of children 
(ACERWC 2018; UNCRC 2016). 
Secondly, child protection and social welfare services in general are hugely under-
funded in national government budgets. In all four countries, social welfare sectors 
comprising of child protection, disability, gender, social protection, the elderly, and poverty 




development, and security. As discussed above, in 2016/17, for instance, the ‘Social and 
Humanitarian Affairs’ sector in South Sudan was allocated one percent of the total 
government budget. At the same time, in the same year, 33 percent was allocated to 
security, 16 percent to public administration and 11 percent to the rule of law sector. The 
picture is not different at sub-national level, at least for Kenya, were data was available.  
Thirdly, the analysis proved that visible budget allocations are only for a few 
interventions, with many elements of a robust child protection system left under-funded. 
This finding seems to fly in the face of the dominant narrative within child rights circles, 
which presupposes that the ‘systems approach’ to child protection has been widely 
accepted and is being used. The conclusion then would be that the systems approach, 
although conceptually plausible, is yet to find meaningful application in the realm of fiscal 
policy and budget formulation. The persistence of issue-based approaches in child 
protection planning and budgeting is probably an indicator of the weak link between 
theory and practice. The same could be said of the ‘child rights-based approach’, which 
has struggled to find full acceptance in budgeting circles. Norton & Elson (2002) were 
probably right to argue that there is always conflict between rights demands and fiscal 
policy imperatives. This is despite the insistence by child focused civil society 
organisations that child rights demands and fiscal policies can be reconciled, as argued 
by a key informant: 
Public budgets should uphold child rights principles. At the basic level, budgets should 
reflect key child rights principles as best interests of the child and non-discrimination as 
required by the CRC. Otherwise we will have budgets which serve interests of a few, 
without creating equal opportunities for all to access essential services (Kenya Interviewee 
19, CSO, 2016). 
A brief comment on the rights argument is necessary at this stage. The view by some 
research participants that governments do not budget for child rights, but for specific child 
protection interventions and programmes is at times taken out of context. The problem 
arises when rights demands are taken literally without unpacking their practical policy 




for by child rights organisations is at the heart of the equity agenda, which implies a call 
for fair distribution of available resources (UNCRC 2003; UNCRC 2016).  
The fourth issue that emerged from the foregoing budget analysis is the skewed 
nature of allocations to different elements of a child protection system. From the 
composition analysis presented above, it became apparent that budget allocations to 
child protection are weighing heavily on social assistance programmes. If social 
assistance programmes are excluded, the remaining budgets are consumed by salaries, 
administration and coordination. Governments tend to prioritise institutional costs such as 
office coordination and salaries, as donors focus on specific programme activities. The 
allocation mix of child protection budgets is an issue that requires careful attention. 
Several elements of a child protection system, including but not limited to data and 
information management, development of professional work force, compliance, and 
monitoring and enforcement of child protection standards, deserve a fair share of 
available resources (ACERWC 2018; Save the Children 2010; World Vision International 
2021). Lack of balance in the allocation of resources to various elements of a child 
protection system, runs the risk of generating inefficiencies and ineffectiveness in the 
delivery of child protection services. Importantly, the sustainable delivery of children’s 
services requires strengthening of all general measures of implementation including 
strengthening coordination mechanisms, data and information systems, regular 
monitoring of children’s rights, public education, and awareness raising, as articulated in 
GC No. 5 of the UNCRC (2003). All these are made possible through commitment of 
resources via government budgets (UNCRC 2016).  
Lastly, the study revealed that the poorer and more fragile a country is the more 
likely it is dependent on external resources for financing child protection. Mainly because 
of its socio-economic circumstances, intricately linked to the protracted conflict, South 
Sudan has, for the past seven years (2011-2017), received the highest share of external 
assistance for child protection as a share of total child protection budget compared to the 
other three countries. Botswana received the least external support from donors, mainly 
because it is a middle-income country. This is consistent with recent trends in ODA flows 




is one. As a middle-income country, Botswana is expected to gradually move towards 
self-sustainability when it comes to financing its development.  
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has confirmed findings from other studies (Avati et al. 2018; Chibwana & 
Gumbo 2014; Pereznieto et al. 2011; Save the Children 2010; World Vision International 
2021) showing that child protection is largely invisible and under-funded in government 
and donor budgets. The chapter has shown that none of the four case study countries 
are allocating sufficient resources to child protection. In per person terms, the funding 
situation is dire in South Sudan and Zimbabwe. This confirms available literature (Buckle 
1999; Brochlehurst 2006; CPWG 2012; IMF 2014) which argue that situations of political 
instability and recurring emergences constrain the capacities of governments to mobilize 
resources to finance its development. The chapter also exposed the imbalances in 
allocations, with a few programs such as cash transfers benefitting from a considerably 
higher share of available budgets than programmes such as campaigns against harmful 
practices, to mention only one example. Lastly, the analysis demonstrated that 
governments of selected countries are investing a paltry of their resources in 
strengthening national child protection systems, contrary to what is recommended in GC 
No 5 of the ACRWC (ACERWC 2018) and in GC No 5 of the UNCRC (2016).  
 Altogether, the chapter provided a crystal-clear empirical case of the low priority of 
child protection and the insufficiency of budget allocations. With this solid background 
about the size and composition of child protection budgets, the stage is now set to 
investigate underlying reasons for these trends through a political economy lens. The 
cornerstones for the discussion which follows have been erected, and key political 
economy questions to be investigated discussed in Chapter Two have been reaffirmed. 
A few of them should be highlighted here. Why, for example, did child protection budgets 
for three of the four case study countries increased at a rate lower than general 
government expenditures? Why is that annual budget ceilings for child welfare ministries 
increased with a lower margin, almost every year between 2011 and 2017, when 




latter programmes are more important to politicians? Could it be that it is the communities 
themselves that demanded the above and not child protection services? Even within the 
same ministry, why is that budget lines for other programmes increased at a higher rate 
than child protection related budget lines? And even more intriguing, why is that when 
some ministerial budgets went up while allocations to child protection sub-programmes 
remained stagnant/ declined? As highlighted above, in Botswana for example, while the 
budget for charitable institutions such as Childline and SOS Children’s Village declined 
between 2015 and 2018, the budget for the parent Ministry of Local Government and 
Rural Development increased. These are the questions which form the heart and soul of 
the discussion in Chapters Seven to Nine. The aim is to examine a mosaic of political 
economy variables with a bearing on decisions on how much is allocated to child 
protection, starting with the impacts of socio-cultural constructions of childhood on budget 






















Impacts of Childhood Constructions on Budget Decisions  
7.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter assesses the extent to which socio-cultural constructions of childhood and 
children’s rights have influenced budget allocations to child protection in selected 
countries. The underlying presumption of this chapter is that society’s ideas about 
children and public officials’ understandings of child maltreatment, is closely linked to the 
type and level of public investment in child protection (Mason 2005; Mason & Steadman 
1997; Ridge 2015). The chapter is divided into two sections. The first investigates the link 
between prevailing socio-cultural constructions of childhood and public budgeting. With 
the aid of a few examples, this section will show how commonly held views about how 
children should be treated affect acceptance of, and subsequently demand for, certain 
formal child protection services which would normally be delivered by the government. 
The second section examines how conceptualisations of child protection by government 
officials have influenced decisions on the size and composition of budget allocations to 
child protection. The chapter concludes with a few key points on the relevance of socio-
cultural dimensions of political economy in an inquiry of this nature.  
7.1  The Link Between Prevailing Constructions of Childhood and 
Public Budgeting 
 
Prevailing socio-cultural constructions of childhood have implications on the type of child 
protection interventions that are prioritised by a given government in planning, 
programme development, and subsequently, in the allocation of public resources (Mason 
& Steadman 1997; Ridge 2015). When childhood constructions in a given society become 
hegemonic, their effects on social and economic policies also intensify (Chesnokova & 
Vaithianathan 2007; Mason & Steadman 1997). In an era where citizens are increasingly 
becoming vocal about their socio-economic rights and development needs, it is only 




negative political ramifications. Ideally, at least according to Evans (2005, 2010), the 
government should consider views from the society when making policy and 
programmatic decisions, in line with the theory of embeddedness discussed in Chapter 
Two.  According to Evans (2010), the degree to which a government is responsive to the 
needs of society is dependent on the level of its embeddedness in society, including how 
it reinforces or works within existing social norms. Unfortunately, some of the views held 
by society and socio-cultural practices undermine, rather than advance the well-being of 
children. In such cases, the state must have enough autonomy to decide what is in the 
best interests of children and families. It should also escape capture by a few groups 
advancing religious, cultural, and even class interests.  
In all four countries, it was apparent that the views that communities hold about 
children, bound together by religious beliefs and social norms and sustained by a range 
of institutions and processes, are a critical part of the political economy of public spending. 
Prevailing socio-cultural views about children exert indirect pressure on governments to 
develop (or not) certain child protection policies and programmes (Mason & Steadman 
1997; Nsamenang 2013). They also explain the persistence of certain practices that are 
not consistent with the provisions of the CRC (1989) and the ACRWC (1990). If we take 
female genital mutilation, for example, it is social norms that cause communities to see it 
as a “pre-marital investment” correlated with better marital outcomes such as being 
married to wealthier families and being likely to be the first wife in a polygamous 
relationship (Chesnokova & Vaithianathan 2007: 01). The question that begs an answer, 
which this chapter seeks to explore is: to what extent and how did dominant socio-cultural 
constructions of childhood in selected countries affect the treatment of child protection 
issues in government budgets?  
Governments respond in various ways to prevailing social norms, religious and 
cultural beliefs with a bearing on the enjoyment of child rights. The nature of the response 
is determined by likely social, political and economic ramifications. The ramifications 
depend on how widespread and deeply ingrained in society a certain practice is. At a 
macro-level, responses by the four selected governments can be framed into three broad 




The first option was to affirm the prevailing constructions by allowing them to 
continue as is. Under this option, if a government perceived the social status quo was 
harmonious with modern conceptions of child protection, needing no external 
intervention, it chose to leave things as they were. This essentially implied affirmation of 
community views on how children should be treated.  In Botswana for example, the 
practice of corporal punishment has persisted because it is a commonly accepted way of 
disciplining children and is at the time of the study was provided for in law, although 
condemned in international child rights commitments.  
The second option was to publicly go against prevailing socio-cultural 
constructions considered harmful to children. This, for the most part, is done as a sign of 
respect for international child rights commitments such as the CRC (1989) and ACRWC 
(1990).  Using the example of FGM, this meant development of laws and programmes to 
combat FGM and encourage commitment of resources, albeit insufficient as seen in the 
previous chapter, to implement planned activities. This is what the Government of Kenya 
opted for, when faced with pressure to stop FGM. Despite this move, FGM still continued 
in some areas as the next paragraphs will show. 
The third option was a compromise, which entailed performing a balancing act of 
respecting both social and legal/global constructions of childhood. This option was 
inherently problematic as it meant that governments had to do certain things to please 
several stakeholders, including communities and members of the international 
community. For instance, a government would enact a law to ban FGM to comply with its 
international child rights commitments, thereby pleasing the international community, but 
not enforce it for fear of backlash from some communities. Given such a scenario, from 
a public spending point of view, “it is most likely that the government will not commit any 
resources towards the implementation of the anti-FGM law” (Kenya Interviewee 8, 
Independent researcher, 2016). This latter option is motivated by the desire to be 
‘politically correct’, which may not be in the best interests of child protection. Studies by 
Linde (2014) and Ndofirepi & Shumba (2014) whose works were discussed in Chapter 
Two show that it is not always easy to reconcile globalised benchmarks on child 




constructions of child protection in the majority world, deeply rooted in social norms and 
belief systems.  
Regardless of which of the above options was adopted by each of the four case 
study countries, the study established a link between socio-cultural constructions of 
childhood and decision-making on budget allocations to child protection. The main link, 
which confirms earlier studies by Mason (2005), and Mason and Steadman (1997), is that 
prevailing socio-cultural constructions of childhood have a bearing on the acceptance of, 
and demand for, certain child protection services by communities. The study proved 
Mason and Steadman’s (1997) main argument that society’s views of what constitute 
child maltreatment has a bearing on what interventions are expected of government. If 
communities feel a certain way of raising children does not amount to child maltreatment, 
chances are low that they would expect a funded government programme on it. The study 
found that the resultant lack of demand for government intervention communicated a 
message to policy and budget makers that the issue is not a priority to them. Ultimately, 
the child protection issue in question was not prioritised in plans and budgets. The 
opposite is also true, at least in theory. A few examples of practices that are widely 
accepted internationally as child maltreatment, although sometimes contested locally, will 
help illustrate how hegemonic views about raising and treating children impacted on child 
protection planning and budgeting in selected countries. The discussion will start with 
FGM, which, although widely practiced in some parts of Kenya and South Sudan, is 
recognised as a harmful practice (UNFPA & UNICEF 2013; Wessells 2015).    
In South Sudan and parts Kenya, FGM, which is prohibited in national legislation 
and globally condemned by child rights campaigners, has persisted because some of the 
communities consider the practice acceptable. In fact, FGM is seen by some communities 
as a critical process in the life course of a woman (ANPPCAN 2014; Kostelny et al. 2014) 
and is also increases “the marriageability” of a girl (Chesnokova & Vaithianathan 2007:3). 
Commenting on this issue, one respondent said that: 
This practice (FGM) which you condemn as violence against women and children, is an 
integral part of our society and faith. This has been done for generations. Why should the 
government start a war against its people… against its values and beliefs? (Kenya 




In Wajir County of Kenya, for instance, FGM is practiced by 98% of communities (KNBS, 
PSRI &UNICEF 2016). In this area, both local communities and the traditional leadership 
seem to be acting in collusion to ‘rebuff’ efforts by the national government to stop FGM. 
According to the CRC (1989) and the Kenya Children’s Act (2001) FGM is illegal and a 
violation of human rights. The Children’s Act (2008) of South Sudan also condemns this 
practice, even though it is widely practiced in some areas. Although there are institutions 
such as the Anti-FGM board in Kenya, which have been established to lead the fight 
against the practice, the law prohibiting FGM has not reduced its prevalence in counties 
such as Wajir significantly. This is illustrative of tensions between social norms and legal 
constructions of childhood (Kostelny et al. 2014).  
In areas where FGM is entrenched such as Wajir County in Kenya, it is 
unfathomable that communities will demand from the national or county government 
some kind of action or programme, let alone resources to fight this practice because the 
law says it is bad. If laws were everything needed to end harmful practices, then FGM 
would be history in Kenya. Unfortunately, the painful reality is that it’s one thing to have a 
child protection law and another for it to be embraced and followed by communities. The 
case of Wajir, is therefore illustrative of the challenges that governments face in an 
endeavour to enforce child protection laws when certain social norms are hegemonic. 
The net result is that the issue in question (FGM) was not a child protection priority for the 
communities, except NGOs who were “struggling to penetrate the county with their 
messages saying that FGM is bad” (Kenya Interviewee 20, Media, 2016). This conclusion 
was empirically proved by lack of concrete funded government programmes to combat 
FGM within the county between 2012 and 2018. Strangely though, the Wajir County 
Government cited FGM as a child protection risk in its County Integrated Development 
Plan (CIDP), as highlighted in Chapter Five. Again, this shows the political correctness of 
some governments of mentioning certain things as problems in policies and laws but do 
nothing in practice.  
Child marriage is another harmful practice, from which children need to be 
protected, that can help illustrate the impacts of socio-cultural constructions of childhood 
on the demand for certain child protection services. Despite the existence of legal 




Zimbabwe, the practice continues, because of a mosaic of socio-cultural norms, beliefs 
and economic realities in which families find themselves (Kwanisai 2016; UNFPA & 
UNICEF 2018; Wessells 2015). Arguably, therefore, the continuation and acceptance of 
child marriage in selected countries is a reflection of the intricate political economy of 
‘marriage markets’ located at the intersection of traditional practices and the 
‘commodification’ of sexuality. Beneath the surface of this ‘informal industry’, wherein 
children are married off before attaining the legal age of majority (18) are systemic issues 
of poverty, gender-relations, sexuality and social norms about the meanings of marriage 
relationships (Wodon et al. 2018). In addition, there is also another layer of social factors 
such as the desire to start a family, peer pressure, and lack of educational opportunities 
(Biti 2016; Kwanisai 2016; UNFPA & UNICEF 2018).   
The study found that some communities still accept child marriage as a way of 
“protecting girls from pre-marital sex, unwanted pregnancy and shame” (Kenya 
Interviewee 48, CSO, 2019). Economically, the bride price (groceries, cattle, goats and 
cash) that parents receive as part of the marriage ceremony is one of the key incentives 
for child marriage (Kostelny et al. 2014). Regardless of the underlying drivers of child 
marriage, a sizeable number of research participants argued that some of the 
communities they work with did not think child marriage requires a “whole government 
programme” to respond to it via the government budget (Zimbabwe Interviewee 3, 
Academic, 2016). To support this line of thinking, one respondent argued that this is why 
the government has not “gone out there to initiate programmes to actively prevent and 
respond to child marriage” (Zimbabwe Interviewee 4, Academic, 2016).  
 In all four countries, for various reasons, there was no demand from communities 
for governments to fund implementation of the national strategies to end child marriage. 
One of the reasons given was that communities have “so many pressing issues which 
they need government funding for – school, food, shelter – other than ending child 
marriage” (Zimbabwe Interviewee 4, Academic, 2016). With this view, there is minimal, if 
at all, expectation of budget allocations to programmes to end child marriage, despite a 
growing body of evidence of its negative social and macro-economic consequences 
(Wodon et al. 2018). The financial contribution of governments to the fight against child 




laws, policies and child protection strategies, which are gathering dust in offices” (Kenya 
Interviewee 1, CSO, 2016). In Kenya, South Sudan and Zimbabwe, it was evident from 
feedback from research participants that child marriage is one area where there is a huge 
gap between child protection policy pronouncements in policies and real financial 
commitments in government budgets. To be fair, however, a sizeable number of research 
participants were outraged by child marriage, arguing that this heinous practice was 
robing children of their future.  
The third example of a practice that is considered as child maltreatment by some, 
yet acceptable to other members of society, is corporal punishment. According to 
feedback from research participants, corporal punishment is widely accepted in all four 
countries as a ‘tool’ for training and disciplining children. Beating and denial of food and 
play for perceived wrongdoing are acceptable methods of parenting. A considerable 
number of respondents, including those within government, did not see beating of a child 
for ‘not obeying’ his/ her parents or guardians as maltreatment. In the words of one of the 
research participants, “beating is a sign of love to children. It is part of training a child to 
grow up well” (Kenya Interviewee 23, Government official, 2016). Some respondents 
even argued that parents should not be “deprived of their right to train and discipline their 
children the way they see fit for as long as they are not hurting them” (Kenya Interviewee 
9, Government official, 2016). Others went further to question why NGOs “commit scarce 
resources to run workshops about parenting, a thing that our forefathers have been doing 
for generations (Kenya Interviewee 5, Government official, 2016).” One government 
official from Botswana also said that: 
I cannot hand over the right to guide and discipline my children to social workers, the 
police and teachers. Tell, me, if your child is misbehaving or taking alcohol, do you call 
government? There are many issues flooding the courts that are better addressed at 
family level (Botswana Interviewee 14, Government official, 2018)  
The implication of the above, and many other hegemonic beliefs, which shape prevailing 
socio-cultural constructions of childhood, is that communities do not see the need for 
donors and governments to come up with funded programmes on corporal punishment 
to try and change what many people think is a ‘normal’ practice in raising children. In 




schools and in their homes. They associated this legal ban with high cases of 
delinquency, drug abuse and bad behaviour. The words of one Member of Parliament 
captures this sentiment: 
Most families today are grappling with delinquent children. Now we hear of cases were 
children shout at their parents and even threaten to sue them and to take them to jail. All 
this started when government was pressured by you NGOs to ban corporal punishment. 
Ask people of my age why they are successful. It’s because our parents beat us when we 
misbehaved… not this idea of saying we must just look at children so as not to violate their 
rights (Kenya Interviewee 15, Member of Parliament, 2016)  
 
Corporal punishment was, therefore, not described by many as ‘violence against 
children’, except by respondents from child rights focused organisations. The latter group 
was categorical about this issue, condemning it as a violation of children’s rights. The 
divergent views show that corporal punishment is an emotive issue for many people which 
is yet to find traction in public budgeting spheres. This calls for constant dialogue and 
negotiations among communities, CSOs, and government officials across sectors and 
social classes to build consensus on the way forward (ACERWC 2018; NCCS 2014; 
Wessells 2015).  
 Child labour is another controversial example where hegemonic views held by 
communities in selected countries had a bearing on the extent to which certain child 
protection initiatives are demanded by communities or not. Whilst labour laws in all four 
case study countries prohibit children from being involved in harmful work, many children 
still spend considerable time farming and vending in highways and marketplaces during 
school hours, to mention a few examples of child labour. This finding is consistent with 
earlier studies by Okoli (2009) and UNICEF (2017) that child labour is prevalent in many 
African countries because it is socially acceptable. Using Nigeria as an example, Okoli 
(2009), whose work was reviewed in Chapter Two, observed that many parents and 
guardians do not see any problem with children being involved in farming, fishing, and 
vending to help their parents increase their household income. Subsequently, the parents 




related programmes, for which they see no necessary governmental response. This view 
is typified by a comment made by one research participant: 
Yes, keeping children out of school is not good, but given the nature of deprivations 
amongst families, it is unwise for the government to stop children from helping their 
struggling parents through farming and selling some things during weekends or after 
school (Zimbabwe Interviewee 7, Academic, 2016).  
In the end, as is the case with many other harmful practices discussed, communities in 
the four countries did not demand any action from government to respond to child labour 
practices. It was mainly child-focused CSOs and child welfare departments who were in 
the forefront of speaking against child labour. Not surprisingly,  
the burden of financing the fight against child labour in Kenya has been placed on the 
shoulders of NGOs and their donor counterparts such as the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) (Kenya Interviewee 54, CSO, 2020).  
According to several research participants, communities feel that issues such as child 
labour and corporal punishment discussed above should be “handled more by families 
and less by the government” (Botswana Interviewee 14, Government official, 2018). The 
same reasoning was highlighted by another respondent from Zimbabwe:  
I do not think that the government should intervene in all social matters such as marriage, 
culture, religion, parenting and disciplining of children. Some of these can be handled at 
family level without overstretching the civil service (Zimbabwe Interviewee 8, 
Academic,2016).  
Judging by the number of respondents who were of the same mind as the two quoted 
above, it is fair to conclude that many community members in all four countries feel that 
the family has a big role to play in shaping child protection practices. It follows, therefore, 
that they do not see a great need for a whole funded government programme on the 
same. No doubt the family is a key part of a national child protection system (Aries 1962; 
Wessells 2015), but it should not be isolated from formal (government led) preventive and 
response services (Landgren 2005; Wessells 2015). The point, however, remains that if 
communities feel that the government has no role intervening in ‘private’ family matters, 
they will not demand or expect it to commit resources to what they do not consider as 




protection programmes by governments in resource allocation. Before wrapping up this 
session, it is important to stress one point about the role of the family in child protection.  
A family focus should not be misconstrued to mean that households are free to do 
anything they want with their children, including forcing them into harmful practices, as 
erroneously argued by some research participants. What is important, as argued by 
Landgren (2005: 218-21) is to connect family and community-based strategies with 
national child protection systems. This is a matter that the Government of Botswana 
seems to have understood. In its preamble, the Botswana National Plan of Action for 
Orphans and Vulnerable Children (2010-2016) states that the Government shall promote 
a paradigm shift from a focus on individual children to “empowering families through 
transformative approaches” (GoB 2010:03). The transformative approaches include child 
sensitive social protection and expansion of opportunities for children to access education 
and other essential services (GoB 2010:03-7). As argued by UNICEF (2008:04), national 
child protection policies and programmes should aim to make family, community and 
government systems work together in a complementary manner. Overemphasis on the 
family or government systems alone, may undermine efforts to create a sustainable child 
protection environment for all children. Remarks made by a government official from 
South Sudan shed light on this point: 
Whilst it is true that the family plays a key role in child protection, child abuse occurs in 
and outside the home: in schools, streets, religious spaces, and many other public places. 
Responding to child abuse therefore requires communities and the government to join 
hands (South Sudan Interviewee 1, Government official, 2017).  
In the above paragraphs, selected practices considered as child maltreatment 
were used to demonstrate how hegemonic views held by policymakers and other 
members of society influence decision-making on budget allocations to child protection. 
But society also hold views about certain child protection strategies, an example being 
adoption of children. Several respondents interviewed during the study felt that adoption 
of children, with no blood relation to a given family, was “alien to Africa” (Botswana 
Interviewee 15, CSO, 2018). It was not surprising, therefore, that many families shunned 




According to one respondent, “If adoption were to happen then certain rituals needed to 
be performed to ensure that the concerned child is accepted by the ancestral spirits of a 
given family” (Zimbabwe Interviewee 5, CSO, 2016).  
The disinterest by communities in adoption meant that this practice was not seen 
as a viable policy option for assisting children without appropriate parental care in 
selected countries. Instead, communities preferred residential care to adoption, although 
institutionalisation of children is now widely discouraged (Save the Children 2009). The 
attitude of communities in all four countries towards adoption communicated something 
to government officials about what child protection programmes are acceptable to them. 
Insights from a social worker in Botswana underscored this point: 
The views held by society, including some government officials, about children’s rights 
have contributed to low demand for child protection services such as adoption and foster 
care (Botswana Interviewee 26, Government official, 2018).  
The net effect of the above-mentioned views was that governments did not feel pressured 
to commit significant resources to adoption services. In Botswana, for example, partly 
because of society’s view of adoption, the government did not have a programme to 
support adoption. One of the members of the NCC also lamented why the government 
was dragging its feet on the development of a legal framework to guide adoption in the 
country.  
It is clear from the preceding discussion that numerous social norms shape views 
about how children should be treated and raised; and how society accepts or rejects 
certain child protection measures. The prevailing constructions of childhood determine 
locally defined parameters on what constitute child maltreatment. This ultimately has 
implications on the design and acceptance of certain child protection policies and 
programmes. Notwithstanding the above arguments, the influence of social constructions 
of childhood should not be overrated, as many forces are working against them. As one 
research participant noted: 
A strong child protection tide fighting harmful social norms has risen, driven by a globally 
connected civil society and supported by multilateral institutions such as the United 
Nations, which is forcefully speaking against harmful practices and social norms which put 




globalised constructions of childhood which they signed up to by ratifying CRC, CEDAW 
and the ACRWC (Kenya Interviewee 22, CSO, 2016).  
As confirmation to the above quote, the study found that in all four countries there are 
several NGOs campaigning against child marriage, corporal punishment, sexual abuse, 
FGM, child labour, and several other harmful practices. NGOs such as Girls Not Brides, 
have gone further to advocate for public financing of these campaigns as well as 
programmatic responses to prevent and respond to the problem of child marriage.  
Child led organisations such as junior parliaments and councils are also part of the 
child protection movement campaigning against harmful child rearing practices. Through 
the CRC (1989), children in all parts of the world, at least on paper, have become rights 
holders, capable of forming and expressing opinions on issues which affect them, 
including child abuse and neglect (Linde 2014; Sloth-Nielson 2012; Myers 2006). 
Increasingly, governments are under pressure to be seen to be supporting these 
campaigns, even financially. There is also a call for governments to finance activities of 
child-led organisations such as junior parliaments. Despite this progress on the child 
participation front, feedback from respondents showed that there is hidden fear of giving 
children ‘too much’ freedom and space to challenge adults. It is therefore not surprising 
that governments of all the four countries invested very little, if at all, in child participation 
structures such as junior parliaments, national youth councils and youth clubs. Most of 
the child participation initiatives found in the four case study countries were financed by 
NGOs such as BONELA in Botswana, KAACR in Kenya and Save the Children in South 
Sudan and Zimbabwe.  
  In concluding this sub-section, it should be noted that prevailing ideas about how 
children should be raised and treated have resulted in some child protection issues being 
under-prioritised in government budgets. The under-prioritisation partly emanates from 
their low demand by communities. Whilst newspaper articles, workshop discussions and 
advocacy papers by NGOs showed evidence of communities demanding governments to 
invest in education, health, and social assistance for example; there were hardly any 
public voices demanding financial support from government on programmes to do with 




The above issues were also not visible in budget advocacy papers by NGOs. With little 
or no demand for such services, the onus is on governments to proactively take measures 
to commit resources towards the protection of children. In the final analysis, in the 
absence of pressure from communities, the risk of child protection remaining invisible and 
under-funded in local and national government budgets increases.  
7.2  Effects of (Mis)Conceptions of Child Protection by Public 
Officials 
 
The aim of this sub-section is to highlight the implications of how child protection is 
conceptualised by government officials on budget decisions. The underlying logic is that 
the way government officials understand child protection influences their programme 
priorities and ultimately budget decisions (Mason & Steadman 1997). The understandings 
also influence the pace and intensity of enforcement of international commitments on 
child protection. Public officials are critical in child protection because they are the 
mediators between the state and their families as they interpret protection risks and 
translate them into concrete programmes (Mason 2005: 56-58). Police officers, teachers, 
and social workers, for example, have the potential to reinforce, complement and even 
undermine child protection policies and practices through their work (Mason 2005: 57). A 
key finding from this study, explored in this sub-section, which is closely related to the 
previous discussion, is that the way child protection is conceptualised by policy and 
budget makers has a bearing on interventions which are prioritised in resource allocation. 
It became clear during primary data collection that there is no consensus amongst 
government planners and budget makers on what constitutes child protection.  
There are several reasons why there is no consensus on the meaning and practice 
of child protection. Key among them is the influence of social norms, belief systems, and 
varied professional backgrounds (ACPF 2006; Mason 2005; Kostelny et al. 2014). 
Another reason put forward by several research participants is “lack of professional and 
or on-the-job training of relevant government officials about child protection” (Zimbabwe 
Interviewee 24, Independent researcher, 2016). The way social workers in child welfare 




other departments. What was however intriguing, was that conceptualisations of child 
protection were not uniform even in the ministries coordinating child protection 
programmes. In Kenya, for example, one official in the Department for Social Protection 
defined child protection as “all efforts to promote and protect children’s rights” (Kenya 
Interviewee 17, Government official, 2016), with another government official in Botswana 
stating that child protection is “basically about improving the well-being of children” 
(Botswana Interviewee 8, Government official, 2018). These definitions are not aligned to 
the National Child Protection Framework for Kenya. This raises questions on whether 
child protection staff are oriented about child protection policies and strategies in their 
country, or not.   
The diversities in conceptualisations meant that various terms were used to 
describe child protection. Only a small fraction of research participants within government 
(roughly 15%), used the term child protection in a correct and consistent way. Most 
research participants seemed comfortable with terms such as ‘child welfare’, ‘child rights’ 
and ‘child well-being’. This reflected poor understanding of child protection. One 
respondent, for example, fudged a definition of child protection as “a new, if not alien, 
term for child welfare, which is about well-being” (Botswana Interviewee 28, Academic, 
2018). Concurring with the above, another research participant wondered why the study 
was not using “better and easily understood concepts such as child welfare” (Kenya 
Interviewee 10, Government official, 2016). Furthermore, other research participants had 
reservations with the term violence against children in reference to child abuse, arguing 
that such “activist framing of issues will only repel cooperation from some communities 
and government officials (Zimbabwe Interviewee 24, Independent researcher, 2018). In 
Zimbabwe, for example, according to one Member of Parliament (MP), “violence against 
children is associated with political violence and not about harms to children, we should 
use terms such as child welfare (Zimbabwe Interviewee 30, Member of parliament, 2018)  
Conceptual clarity is an important issue because when something is not properly 
understood, it is difficult to draw programmatic parameters and to delimit child protection 
spending. Whether child protection is the right term or not, the key takeaway from this is 




makers, as the discussion below will show. In some cases, and as argued by James 
(2010: 486) it is contested. Such contestations have consequences for child protection 
policy and budgeting (Mason & Steadman 1997: 32). In Chapter One, a working  definition 
of child protection was provided, as “preventing and responding to violence, exploitation, 
and abuse against children – including commercial sexual exploitation, trafficking, child 
labor and harmful traditional practices, such as female genital mutilation/cutting and child 
marriage” (UNICEF (2006:01). With this definition as a backdrop, now is the time to 
discuss key misunderstandings of the concept in policy spaces and their implications on 
decisions on how much should be allocated to child protection. 
Firstly, as highlighted above, child protection was conflated by many public officials 
with ‘child welfare’ services to be provided to the poorest children and their families. Such 
services include educational assistance, food handouts, and cash transfers. The 
researcher is of the view that whilst it is true that social assistance contributes to child 
protection, describing child protection as child welfare is misleading. The problem of this 
comes when governments develop child protection interventions. The child welfare 
conception, for the most part, gives prominence to charitable acts like the discredited 
institutionalisation of abandoned children and provision of shelter and food to deprived 
children, with little emphasis on accountability, rights and justice (Mitchel 2006: 124-136). 
It also runs the risk of child protection being loosely seen as everything to do with 
provision of basic needs to children. If this logic were to be accepted then all investments 
in education, health, nutrition, water, and sanitation would be counted as child protection. 
Whilst to some extent all these can contribute to the reduction in the vulnerability of 
children to maltreatment, they have other objectives other than child protection. In fact, 
child protection is secondary to other objectives such as learning, survival and 
development of children.  
The view that child protection is about improving well-being of children, explains 
why most respondents singled out school bursaries, free primary education and orphan 
care support as ‘flagship’ child protection programmes. One official from Kenya argued 
passionately that: “the most important child protection programme is free primary 




12, Government official, 2016). A Member of Parliament (MP) in Zimbabwe also had a 
similar welfarist view of child protection: 
our greatest challenge is to provide children with the basic needs they require - to send 
them to school and to give them food, clothing and shelter, other issues such as personal 
freedoms and participation will come later (Zimbabwe Interviewee 16, Member of 
Parliament, 2017). 
No doubt, keeping children in school certainly contributes to child protection because it 
prevents them from marrying early, for example, but education has other objectives 
beyond child protection. It can be argued, therefore, that in a welfarist conception there 
is always a risk that core actions to prevent and respond to maltreatment of children are 
either overlooked or given peripheral attention in favour of provision of basic services 
such as food, shelter, school fees, and clothing.  
During primary data collection, most respondents could not readily discern the 
difference between need and right, or protection and provision. Given such 
misconceptualisations, there is high risk, again, that programmes aimed at providing 
basic services such as water, education, and health can be counted as investments in 
child protection. In the end, as argued by one research participant, this will lead to “more 
spending on education, health and livelihoods programmes at the expense of pertinent 
programmes to prevent and respond to violence against children” (Zimbabwe Interviewee 
17, Government official, 2017). 
Moreover, there is a risk that governments may place too much focus on poor and 
deprived children, without making efforts to create a protective environment for all 
children, regardless of their social and economic circumstances. This is exactly what 
happened in Zimbabwe with the launch of the Child Protection Fund in 2010 as a vehicle 
for financing the NAP for OVC. The framing of child protection as a national program on 
OVC created an impression that orphans and the poorest are the only categories of 
children in need of protection. One respondent exposed this biased view:  
Our challenge is that we have neglected poor children and families. True child protection 
is taking care of poor children, especially in rural areas. This is an area where government 




Yes, taking care of poor children through a range of charitable acts, including educational 
assistance, contributes to the reduction of children’s vulnerability to abuse and 
exploitation (Sanfilippo et al. 2012; Sheahan 2011), but child protection is much more 
than that. Other interventions such as tackling harmful practices, protecting children on 
the move, reducing climate related vulnerabilities, and stopping all forms of violence 
against children are equally important. In all this, arms of government such as the police, 
judiciary, and medical personnel play a role besides social welfare departments. To be 
impactful on child protection, programmes seeking to alleviate the suffering of children 
should therefore be supplemented by, and deliberately linked to, other preventive and 
responsive services, including those listed above.  
The child welfare perspective also meant that child protection interventions would 
be confined to one or two ministries. With such confinement, other ministries did not see 
themselves as having the responsibility to budget for child protection. This is exemplified 
by the words of one senior official in the Ministry of Education in Botswana, who stated 
that: 
Yes, we are happy to use our schools to disseminate information about child abuse, but 
you cannot expect us to go to the Ministry of finance and say give us money to do some 
work on child protection. That is way out of our education mandate. Such issues should 
be financed from the allocation to the Department for Social Protection. Our focus is on 
teaching and learning materials, and education infrastructure (Botswana Interviewee 29, 
Government official, 2019). 
The above view explains the limited number of visible budget lines on child protection in 
most ministries other than those responsible for social welfare. The lack of visible child 
protection budget lines was partly because some ministries (health for example) did not 
necessarily see child protection as their responsibility. Although one ministry may have 
the responsibility to coordinate child protection interventions, leaving everything to one 
ministry demonstrates ignorance of what it takes to deliver sustainable child protection to 
all children. Regrettably, when designing interventions and budgets for child protection all 




It is important to note, however, that, the development of national and thematic 
strategies on child protection has led to a gradual shift from the ‘orphans and poorest 
children’ trap to a more contemporary conceptualisation of child protection in recent 
years. The contemporary conceptualisation recognises that sustainable child protection 
can only be achieved through multiple interventions in several sectors including social 
welfare, justice, education, health and security. Kenya’s National Child Protection 
Framework typifies contemporary conceptualisations of child protection, underscoring the 
imperative of a continuum of interventions from prevention, to early response and 
recovery. As discussed in Chapter Five, the child protection framework is conceptualised 
as a “complex and multi-sectoral matter” calling for “collaboration between formal and 
informal systems and amongst stakeholders” (GoK 2014: 23). Moreover, child protection 
should be seen through rights, welfare, and development lenses, and not one. 
The second commonly held view, which is also problematic, is that child protection 
was equated with efforts to promote children’s rights. There is no better way to capture 
this view than to quote what one research participant from South Sudan said “child 
protection is basically about children’s rights. It is a new global order in the way society 
treats children. It is never about charity” (South Sudan Interviewee 5, CSO, 2018).  
Although it is true that child protection is about children’s rights, not every right as 
outlined in the CRC (1989) falls within the definition of child protection. As is the case with 
a welfarist notion, there is a risk that core elements of child protection may not get the 
attention they deserve if such a broad conceptualisation were to be adopted.  
A final poorly conceptualised idea of child protection, deduced from interviews with 
key informants, with far reaching implications on child protection financing, was the 
portrayal of child protection as a western construct to be funded by foreign donors. Some 
research participants went to the extent of arguing that donors have “the moral obligation 
to finance what they are promoting” (Kenya Interviewee 5, CSO, 2016).  The ‘foreignness’ 
of child protection was highlighted by one respondent in South Sudan:  
Child protection is an issue that is promoted mainly by international organisations like 
UNICEF, Save the Children and War Child, all of which originate from rich countries (South 




Yes, western countries were instrumental in the formulation of the global consensus on 
child rights leading to the CRC (1989), but to say that child protection is alien to Africa is 
to completely miss the point. Several writers on African childhoods, including Sloth-
Nielsen (2014) and Ndofirepi & Shumba (2014) have argued that Africans had their own 
methods of protecting children from abuse and exploitation including excessive beating 
from their parents. In all four case study countries, the perceived ‘foreignness’ of child 
protection was cleverly used by some government officials to justify dependency on 
donors to finance certain child protection programmes much more than other areas such 
as education and health. In South Sudan and Zimbabwe, for instance, there was evident 
dependence on donors to finance OVC programmes and child protection campaigns.  
7.3  Concluding Remarks 
 
Through this chapter, the study has demonstrated that underfunding of child protection is 
not a purely technical budgeting problem but a manifestation of socio-cultural 
constructions of childhood that fall within the realm of cultural political economy. Firstly, it 
was established that social constructions of childhood determine how children should be 
treated and raised, in line with earlier findings by Ndofirepi & Shumba (2014) and Mason 
& Steadman (1997), among other social constructivists. The prevailing social 
constructions of childhood highlighted by research participants in all four countries were 
connected intricately to widely practiced social norms and religious beliefs. Tensions were 
observed between local and global constructions of childhood. Local communities 
continued, for example, to practice FGM, child marriage and corporal punishment 
regardless of them being outlawed in national statutes. Second, and linked to the first 
point, prevailing views about childhood had a bearing on conceptualisations of child 
protection, that is, what is considered as child abuse (or not) in a given community.  
Third, and following from the above, dominant constructions of childhood 
influenced the demand for, or acceptance of certain formal child protection services by 
communities which were rolled out by the government or provided for in law. 
Subsequently, the low demand for certain child protection services resulted in low 
prioritisation of several crucial child protection programmes in government budgets. 




prevailing constructions of childhood, affected the composition of child protection budgets 
in selected countries. The erroneous equating of child protection with child well-being 
resulted in some of the governments prioritising welfare type of child protection activities 
such as social assistance to orphans than accountability and justice for victims, for 
example. In such instances, several elements of a national child protection system were 
ignored or left under-funded. Additionally, the lack of consensus within government on 
what child protection encompasses made it difficult to apply systems thinking in resource 
allocation. The next chapter explores how the state apparatus, fiscal decentralisation and 
the extent to which government is embedded in society has influenced public spending 




















Impacts of Fragility, Decentralisation and Global Forces on 
Decisions on Child Protection Spending 
8.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter examines governance related political economy variables which influenced 
decisions on budget allocations to child protection in case study countries. As highlighted 
earlier in the theoretical framework, this chapter draws inspiration from the writings of 
Acemoglu & Robinson (2001), Evans (2010), and Fritz et al. (2009) about the political 
economy of public spending from a governance perspective. Their writings focus on the 
structural set-ups, functionalities, and capabilities of a state to effectively mobilise, 
equitably allocate and efficiently utilise public resources. The capabilities are influenced 
by the country’s level of fragility, leadership ideology, and power-relations between central 
and sub-national governments (Buckle 1999; Brown & Raddatz 2014; Chol 2016; Collier 
2007).  
 The rest of the chapter is divided into four sections. The first section explores the 
impact of the state fragility, governance culture, and fiscal decentralisation on budgeting 
for child protection. The second section critically assesses the autonomy and capacity of 
public finance management institutions to equitably and effectively allocate public 
resources to all sectors, including child protection. In the third section, CSOs’ efforts to 
influence decisions on public spending on child protection are discussed. The last section 
investigates the extent to which a myriad of global forces influenced national decisions 
on budget allocations to child protection in each of the selected countries.   
8.1  Implications of Fragility, Governance Culture and Fiscal 
Decentralisation on Budget Decisions 
 
The study confirmed earlier assertions by Gasper et al. (2018), Hart et al. (2015) and IMF 
(2017b) which found that fragility, governance dynamics, and the levels of fiscal 




financial management. Using South Sudan and other countries involved in armed conflict 
as case studies, Hart et al. (2015: 12-17) observed that the level of fragility affect a 
country’s revenue generation capacity, budgeting, and expenditure processes. The 
researcher made the same observations during the study period in South Sudan and 
Zimbabwe.  
Fragility in South Sudan contributed considerably to the weakening of the capacity 
of public finance management institutions to mobilise, efficiently allocate, and effectively 
utilise public resources (De Waal 2014; IMF 2014, 2017). The weakening of public finance 
institutions was exacerbated by erosion of trust amongst ministries, departments, and 
agencies involved in public budgeting (Chol 2016; Kameir 2011). Waning trust led to 
centralised public budgeting, clientelism, and interference with normal budgeting 
procedures by the top leadership (Chol 2016; Gasper et al. 2018; Kameir 2011). The 
situation in South Sudan not only led to the fall in government revenues (IMF 2014, 2017), 
it also exacerbated child maltreatment (ACERWC 2014; UNICEF 2017c) and worsened 
child wellbeing indicators (UNICEF 2019). Commenting on the impact of the political 
situation in South Sudan, one research participant said the following: 
The economy and revenue base are not performing because of the war. Oil production 
has been interrupted. As a result, the government does not have the revenue to run the 
administration. Whatever little resources available are now being prioritised for security 
and political survival (South Sudan Interviewee 7, CSO, 2019). 
Although Zimbabwe was not involved in armed conflict throughout the period of study, 
there were several episodes of political and economic instability between 2000 and 2019 
(Moore 2012, 2014a, 2014b). These include politically motivated violence especially 
during elections, contested legitimacy of the government, low investor confidence, food 
insecurity, hyperinflation, international isolation, and militarisation of the state (Mlambo & 
Raftopoulos 2010; Moore 2014b; Sachikonye 2012). When plagued with all the above 
challenges, it is unlikely that the state apparatus will function optimally, let alone deliver 
a strong protective environment for all children.  
As expected, due to multiple political, economic, and humanitarian crises, public 
finances went on a nosedive, service delivery to children weakened, and poverty 




headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) as a percentage of the population increased 
from 21.4 in 2011 to 33.9 in 2017 while the coverage of social safety net programmes, 
including cash transfers to vulnerable children, plummeted from 27.7 percent of the 
population to 11.4 percent, over the same period (World Bank 2021). Analysis done by 
the researcher showed that at the height of the crisis between 2005 and 2008 government 
revenue declined in real terms by almost 50 percent due to the economic fallout. By the 
end of 2020, the economy of Zimbabwe was still under-performing. The GDP per capita 
(in 2010 constant US dollars) declined by six percent from $ 1,263 in 2017 to $1,183 in 
2019 (Ibid). A wealth of literature exists to show that macro-economic challenges such as 
hyperinflation, low foreign direct investment, cash, fuel and electricity shortages usually 
take a toll on the government’s capacity to sustainably finance the delivery of essential 
services (Collier 2007; IMF 2014; Kameir 2011; Mueller 2008). It is not surprising, as 
discussed in Chapter Six, that allocations to key child protection budget lines such as 
‘Children in difficult circumstances’, and ‘Street Children Fund’ in Zimbabwe tumbled 
between 2011 and 2017.  
Of the four case study countries, fragility impacted South Sudan and Zimbabwe’s 
public finances the most. As public revenues became limited, spending priorities of the 
respective governments also changed, with more attention given to political survival than 
social development issues like child protection. Mainly because of the economic fallout 
induced by armed conflict the gross national expenditure for South Sudan (in constant 
2010 US$) declined from $9.3 billion in 2011 to $7.7 billion in 2015. This means that the 
government had less money to finance its plans in 2015 than it had four years ago.  
Political fragility also shaped the governance culture in South Sudan and 
Zimbabwe to some degree, which in turn had a bearing on public budgeting. The shift in 
the governance culture26 affected the robustness of budget debates in Parliament, as well 
as the extent to which public finance management institutions were given the space to 
effectively perform their roles. Whilst on paper all four countries describe themselves as 
‘democracies’, feedback from research participants revealed that there were unique 
governance challenges which permeated the public budgeting sphere in each country. In 
 
26 In this study, governance culture refers to the openness, robustness and integrity of interactions, decision making 





Zimbabwe, due to intense electoral contestations, the government became increasingly 
paranoid, and the its relationship with civil society organisations and donors soured 
(Chiroro 2013; Kagoro 2005; Sachikonye 2012). The human rights situation also 
deteriorated, making it hard for citizens, and even parliamentarians to openly criticize the 
government on how it was using public resources (Moore 2014b; NGO Forum 2002; 
Sachikonye 2012). One respondent in Zimbabwe stated that “even ministers and 
Members of Parliament (MPs) are afraid to criticise cabinet positions on spending 
priorities for a given year” (Zimbabwe Interviewee 1, Academic, 2016).  
It is important to note, however, that even politically stable countries such as 
Botswana also exhibited shortcomings in their governance practices. While this is not the 
focus of this study, it may help to reflect on what some of the respondents said, and how 
this affected public budgeting. To the surprise of the researcher, several research 
participants in Botswana indicated that despite the portrayal of the country as democratic, 
some citizens and politicians alike were not free to go against the government, especially 
during the era of Ian Khama, when it comes to crucial decisions about spending priorities, 
for fear of reprisals. This was despite the ‘Budget Pitsos (public hearings) conducted by 
the government during the budget approval stage. Remarks by one respondent captures 
this sentiment: 
Contrary to the perception that has been created out there, many people in Botswana are 
not free to criticise the Government. It is hard for people to come out in the open and say 
the government is misallocating national resources (Botswana Interviewee 7, Academic, 
2018). 
The implications of this is that it was difficult for MPs, media, CSOs, and other 
stakeholders in case study countries (especially in Botswana and Zimbabwe) to publicly 
object to certain budget proposals.  
The governance culture was in a way associated with the level of budget 
transparency. The study found that public debate on budget allocations was not robust in 
countries where comprehensive budget information was not publicly available (IBP 2017). 
The Government of Botswana, for example, did not publish online the full draft of budget 
estimates to allow for comments and reviews by various publics between 2011 and 2017. 




publicly for discussion before approval in Parliament (Ibid). These two documents only 
provide top line and aggregated figures about expected revenues and expenditures. This 
meant that public discussions were only limited to the information in the summarised 
budget. Unfortunately, the budget speeches mostly highlighted ‘big programmes’ on 
energy, mining, education, social protection, health and poverty eradication, with no 
mention of child protection. In such situations, it was difficult for CSOs to know whether 
child protection issues where adequately covered or not in government budgets. Access 
to budget information was raised by several NGOs in Botswana as an issue of 
governance concern.   
Apart from fragility and the governance culture, the study also examined impacts 
of fiscal decentralisation on public spending on child protection. In GC No 5 of the UNCRC 
(2003), issues of “decentralization, federalisation and delegation” are listed as important 
general measures of implementation. In Section 40, the UNCRC (2003: 27) stresses the 
fact that it is the responsibility of national/ federal governments to ensure that “devolved 
authorities do have the necessary financial, human and other resources to effectively 
discharge responsibilities for the implementation of the Convention”. Accordingly, when 
designing national child protection systems, it is important for the government to think 
through the necessary fiscal decentralisation systems and relationships between national 
and devolved authorities to ensure efficient service delivery.  
Fiscal decentralisation is defined by Mudaki & Musaviru (2012) as the process 
whereby a government gives sub-national authorities such as counties in Kenya the 
mandate and autonomy to mobilise, allocate, and manage their own resources, including 
those transferred from the central government. The parameters and extent of fiscal 
decentralisation are outlined in national constitutions. Of the four case study countries, 
Kenya, is more advanced in fiscal decentralisation than the other three. This means that 
counties (sub-national governments) in Kenya have more autonomy and space to decide 
how they utilise available resources than their counterparts (districts and provinces) in 
Botswana and Zimbabwe especially. The Fourth Schedule of Kenya’s National 
Constitution, adopted in 2010, outlines core functions and responsibilities of county 
governments. Some elements of child protection and care are amongst devolved 




Public Finance Management Act (2012) of Kenya. Feedback from research participants 
seems to suggest that public participation structures such as the County Budget and 
Economic Forum are also active. 
Despite repeated pontifications about decentralisation in Botswana, South Sudan 
and Zimbabwe, national governments wield significant power when it comes to how public 
resources are managed and allocated. This means that local authorities are at the mercy 
of national governments in terms of how much resources are made available every year 
to invest in child protection. The type of decentralisation in Botswana, South Sudan and 
Zimbabwe is akin to de-concentration where only certain functions are given to sub-
national governments with the central government retaining ultimate authority on 
management of national resources (Mudaki & Musaviru 2012). Recurring civil war stood 
in the way of deeper fiscal decentralisation in South Sudan as much as fear of losing 
political control in Zimbabwe is. The question that concerns this section is whether fiscal 
decentralisation enabled or undermined investments in child protection.  
An analysis of county budgets in Kenya done by UNICEF (2014) and Save the 
Children (2015) showed that fiscal decentralisation has the potential to increase the total 
amount of government spending on child protection. The researcher’s own analysis of 
budget documents of selected Counties27 confirmed the same. The analysis showed that 
following the constitutional decision to devolve some functions, some counties, including 
Busia, Bungoma and Wajir introduced budget lines on child protection. According to some 
research participants, this was not happening before 2010, during the era of the old 
constitution. In fiscal year 2016/17, Busia County allocated Kenya Shillings (KES) 3.4 
million (US$38000) to ‘child rehabilitation and custody’. In the previous year, about KES 
19 million (US$214,000) was allocated for the construction of a Child Protection Centre 
(CPC) to serve as a one-stop centre for children facing protection risks. In financial year 
2013/14, the Wajir County allocated KES60 million (US$667,000) for the construction of 
child protection units. Bungoma County made an allocation of KES56 million (US$62,000) 
in financial year 2015/16 up from KES25 million ($27,000) in 2014/15 to primary child 
protection services. The net effect of this is that the volume of resources invested in child 
 





protection in Kenya increased, if county allocations were added to what was provided for 
in national budgets.  
Devolution in Kenya has, however, not been smooth, particularly in the context of 
public budgeting. Power-play within counties, especially between Members of County 
Assemblies (MCAs), the Governor, and the national government, was observed between 
2013 and 2017. There were several areas of contention between Counties and the 
national government, some of which relate to the total amount to be transferred to 
Counties, with the latter advocating for a larger share. Other issues of concern included 
responsibilities of counties in procurement of health equipment and adherence to public 
finance management guidelines (Kenya Interviewee 16, CSO, 2016). Budget execution 
challenges were also observed between 2013 and 2015, but the situation has since 
improved. In 2014 and 2015, for instance, the Kenya National Auditor expressed concern 
that that county governments were violating public expenditure management rules and 
failing to properly account for all disbursed resources (Nation Newspaper, 23 May 2014). 
These reports led some research participants to argue that “devolution has become a 
new frontier for corruption in Kenya” (Kenya Interviewee 16, CSO, 2016).   
Due to limited access to budgets for sub-national authorities in Botswana, South 
Sudan and Zimbabwe, it was not possible to establish how much local governments were 
allocating to child protection, if at all. Despite this challenge, research participants 
provided valuable comments on whether local governance structures have helped push 
the child protection agenda forward or not. In Botswana and Zimbabwe, several research 
participants observed that child protection was not a pertinent issue in local planning and 
budgeting. Only city councils such as Harare and Gaborone had programmes to remove 
and rehabilitate children living on the streets and to support a few institutions offering 
residential care to children without appropriate parental care. In the Harare City Council 
such programmes were financed through a budget line on ‘social services’.  
Child protection issues did not feature prominently in budget consultation meetings 
organised by local authorities. Information collected from research participants showed 
that local government planning meetings were dominated by issues such as roads, 
marketplaces, schools, energy, waste management and health centres. In Botswana, 




discussions for rural district councils, as reported by some research participants. 
Commenting on the role of local level consultative structures such as Kgotla meetings in 
Botswana from the perspective of child protection, one research participant observed that: 
There is hardly any discussion on child protection in Kgotla meetings. What we hear are 
long lists of problems and requests for support from the central government about schools, 
roads and bursaries. If communities are not talking about roads, then they are receiving 
notices of upcoming rallies and food handouts or they are being asked to contribute labour 
to a community project (Botswana Interviewee 30, CSO, 2018).  
A respondent in Botswana added that: 
Whilst in theory district level structures such as the Kgotlas are opportunities for 
communities to influence development and budget decisions, including on matters to do 
with children, in reality, they are used by the national leadership to legitimize and validate 
their decisions and spending priorities (Botswana Interviewee 7, Academic, 2018).  
Another point that came out from the study is that a considerable number of respondents 
were of the view that child protection issues such as corporal punishment, child marriages 
and neglect were best handled by family and community structures. They did not except 
formal government structures to take a lead role on this unless it was a very serious issue 
such as “abduction, killing, and raping of children” (Botswana Interviewee 10, CSO, 
2018). This is in line with the discussion in the previous chapter on the role of families in 
child protection.  
 Even if child protection issues were to be raised in local planning and budgeting 
fora, feedback from some research participants suggest that connecting lines between 
local level consultations and budgeting are very weak. One research participant in Kenya 
commented on this matter: 
The National Constitution of Kenya has excellent provisions on public participation in 
budgeting. In keeping with the spirit of the Constitution, County governments hold pre and 
post budget meetings to consult citizens about the budget. Unfortunately, no one knows 
what happens to everything that we say. When you look at the approved budget, you 
wonder if that is what people said during consultations (Kenya Interviewee 13, 




The effectiveness of local structures as platforms for budget consultations is influenced 
by formal and informal power dynamics (Sobhee 2009). In Botswana, traditional chiefs 
(DiKgosi), especially those aligned to the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), have 
much influence on decisions at local level and determine what issues from local meetings 
will be taken up for discussion to the national government. The same can be said about 
local structures in Zimbabwe. The Chiefs, for the most part promote the national 
government’s agenda at local level rather than pushing up local agendas. Government 
officials who work at sub-national level in Botswana, interviewed as part of the study, 
testified to the skewed power relations between central government and local authorities, 
arguing that sometimes lower level structures are taken merely as implementers of what 
is decided upon at national level:  
We only see the budget being presented in Parliament. As social workers who handle all 
these cases of child abuse, we are never consulted or involved in the determination of 
child protection spending priorities. All we receive is communication that the social welfare 
budget has been cut, so we must be prudent in the way we utilize allocated resources 
(Botswana Interviewee 31, Government official, 2018).  
In Botswana, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe the reality, according to many respondents, 
is that child protection is not top on the public spending agendas of local governments. 
Here, the problem is not necessarily local structures, but that child protection is already 
missing in national spending priorities. However, from the case of Kenya, it can be 
concluded that deeper levels of fiscal decentralisation hold the possibility of increased 
public spending on child protection, assuming other factors such as political will and the 
requisite understanding of child rights are there. However, it is important to stress that 
allocations to child protection were found to be very low compared to financial needs 
(Save the Children 2015; KIPPRA 2020b).  
8.2  The Link Between Capacity of Public Finance Management 
Institutions and Effective Budget Allocation 
 
Two political economy questions which continue to interest researchers on public 




effectively mobilise, allocate, and utilise public resources (Black et al. 2013; Cangiano et 
al. 2013; Gasper et al. 2018). The ability of budget institutions, especially ministries of 
finance, to equitably allocate available resources and uphold public budgeting principles 
is partly dependent on the space politicians give them to do so (Lewis et al. 2010; Rubin 
2013). Issues of autonomy and capacity of public finance management institutions are 
important as they indirectly affect the entire budget process, which subsequently has an 
association with how much governments allocate to child protection. In all four countries, 
most research participants posited that ministries of finance were not completely 
independent from the country’s top leadership, although this varied from one country to 
another. Ministries of finance in Botswana and Kenya were deemed to be relatively more 
independent than in South Sudan and Zimbabwe. In Botswana, one academic, while 
acknowledging the capacity of the Ministry of Finance to effectively perform the budgeting 
function, also highlighted the power and undue influence of the top leadership of the 
country: 
Although the Ministry of Finance is staffed with Botswana’s most competent personnel 
and generally seen to be objective, one cannot rule out the subtle influence of the 
presidency, especially on matters close to his heart such as poverty eradication and social 
assistance to people in rural areas. You should ask yourself why is it that certain 
programmes continue to be starved of resources when budgets of poverty eradication 
programmes are increasing? (Botswana Interviewee 5, Academic, 2018). 
Owing to civil war, as highlighted earlier in this study, it has been difficult for the 
Government of South Sudan (GoSS) to make progress in strengthening its public finance 
management institutions.  This point corroborates studies by De Waal (2014) and the IMF 
(2017b) which showed how governance and public financial management systems were 
weakened by high levels of fragility in South Sudan. Normal processes of prioritisation 
and budget negotiations were often replaced with political earmarking of resources, 
centralised decision-making, and clientelist public spending (Deléchat et al. 2015; Hart et 
al. 2015).  In such cases, areas such as child protection, with minimal political appeal, 
were neglected.  
 In Zimbabwe, the Ministry of Finance was widely perceived to be less independent 
of the top leadership and of the ruling political party. Some respondents even considered 




government, and now Emmerson Mnangagwa (current president of Zimbabwe)” 
(Zimbabwe Interviewee 31, CSO, 2018). The concern here was that the ministry tended 
to openly push agendas that were prescribed by the top leadership including:  
Quasi-fiscal operations by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and numerous pork-barrel type 
subsidies and indigenisation programmes targeting newly resettled farmers and local 
elites linked to the ruling party (Zimbabwe Interviewee 10, CSO, 2016). 
What the researcher deciphered in all four case study countries is that there is an 
association between weak public finance management institutions and poor articulation 
of child protection in government budgets. The weaker and less autonomous a public 
finance management institution is, the more likely it is to fail to efficiently allocate 
resources to all sectors and programmes. In the end, areas such as child protection are 
neglected. The discussion on the autonomy and capacity of government officials to 
budget and spend effectively should also be understood within the context of developing 
public financial management systems in Africa (Black et al. 2013; Chang & Grabel 2014).  
8.3  Civil Society Efforts to Influence Public Spending on Child 
Protection 
 
For centuries now, civil society, which is sometimes seen as the fourth estate in addition 
to the executive, legislature, and judiciary (Bond 2007; Chiroro 2013; Pietrzkt 2001), has 
become an arena where ideas are generated, contested, and hegemonic constellations 
constructed (Gramsci 1971; Ncube 2010). In the context of public budgeting, civil society 
is the site were diverse groups of people churn out a wide range of communications to 
form and promote their ideas on what should be prioritised in government budgets 
(Gramsci 1971; Hibbs 1977). This sub-section interrogates the extent to which civil 
society organisations in selected countries have interacted with or sought to influence 
decisions on budget allocations to child protection and alter fiscal politics surrounding the 
same.  
In all four-case study countries, there are CSOs operating in the child protection and 




the extent to which they are advancing the child protection agenda, however, varies from 
country to country as the paragraphs below will show.  
As a small country, with a population of slightly over two million, Botswana has very 
few CSOs in the child rights sector. Most of them are involved in the delivery of child 
welfare services. Examples include Love Botswana, SOS Children’s Village, Bana Le 
Tsatse, Childline and Mpule. Due to limited donor funding, most of these organisations 
depend on government funding for their survival. SOS, for example, received an average 
of BWP1.2 million (US$120,000) allocation from government annually, between 2014 and 
2017.28 The Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (BOCONGO), 
Ditshwanelo and BONELA are the few CSOs which have been involved in budget 
analysis and advocacy, with a focus on children - although not specific to child protection. 
BOCONGO and Ditshwanelo, which used to receive funding from the government, now 
face serious financial constraints, since the government stopped funding them in 2012. 
Some research participants attribute this to their “critical tendencies, which probably 
annoyed the government” (Botswana Interviewee 16, Academic, 2018). It is difficult for 
most CSOs to speak against the Government of Botswana, as they risk reprisals from the 
government that funds them.  One academic in Botswana noted that:  
The few organisations that are in Botswana have to play nice with the government, 
otherwise the space for engagement will shrink further and funding taps closed. 
Notwithstanding funding and operating environment related constraints, CSOs such as 
BOCONGO should be credited for successfully advocating for participatory budgeting 
which led to the launch of Budget Pitsos (Public meeting on the budget) in 2010 (Botswana 
Interviewee 5, Academic, 2018).  
As an umbrella body of NGOs, BOCONGO’s budget advocacy covered a wide range of 
issues, including general child welfare matters such as education, sports, water, and 
health. The organisation did not have a specific focus on child protection. The few position 
papers analysed by the researcher did not have any messages on child protection. In 
recent years, BOCONGO, BONELA and a few other organisations facilitated the 
 





establishment of the Botswana National Child Rights Coalition, which is now a common 
platform for child rights lobbying and advocacy, including on matters of budgeting for child 
protection. However, due to limited human, financial and technical resources, the 
Coalition has not done much to influence budgets in favour of children. The Coalition is 
supported by the Regional Psychosocial Support Initiative (REPSSI), the Child Rights 
Network of Southern Africa (CRNSA) and Save the Children. REPSSI is also supporting 
the establishment of Children’s Councils at local level in a bid to promote child 
participation in local governance, including budgeting for sectors and programmes 
relevant to children (Botswana Interviewee 10, CSO, 2018).  
Overall, the influence of civil society organisations in Botswana on budget 
decisions has been very limited, but their relationship with the government is relatively 
cordial. The limited influence of CSOs on decisions on how much governments allocate 
to child protection is partly a result of limited capacity and weak knowledge of the 
budgeting process. One research participant involved with several CSOs, which sought 
to influence budget allocations in Botswana admitted that: 
Frankly speaking, we have been punching above our weight. Our budget advocacy has 
sometimes not been well-timed. Often, we get into the budgeting process late when the 
budget is tabled in Parliament. At that stage, there are limited opportunities for meaningful 
influence. It is also difficult for us to undertake comprehensive budget analysis because 
detailed budget books are rarely shared with the public by the government. As a result, 
our analysis is limited to what is presented in Parliament by the Minister of Finance. 
Furthermore, most of our members lack the capacity to analyse budgets. It seems we are 
shooting in the dark (Botswana Interviewee 6, CSO, 2018). 
From the preceding discussion, it is fair to say that CSOs in Botswana did not succeed 
as much in influencing budget allocations to child protection. Three things stand out on 
why this was the case, from what is presented above. Firstly, their advocacy has been 
general, pushing a broad child rights agenda, and not specifically child protection. 
Secondly, most of them have limited knowledge about the budgeting process and the 
politics accompanying it. Lastly, there is no evidence found in Botswana that a child 
protection specific budget analysis was done to inform budget advocacy. Budget 




however important: CSOs in upper-middle-income countries like Botswana often struggle 
to get funding if compared to those in low-income countries such as South Sudan and 
Zimbabwe (Pietrzkt 2001; Zinecker 2011).  
 In Kenya, several CSOs are involved in budget analyses and advocacy from a 
child rights perspective (Save the Children 2015; UNICEF 2014). In 2016, of all four case 
study countries, Kenya had by far the highest number of CSOs involved with children’s 
issues, exceeding 700. This is based on lists of NGOs shared with the researcher by 
several coalitions including the Kenya Association for the Advancement of Child Rights 
(KAACR). The quantum of CSOs corresponds to the total population of Kenya, estimated 
at 52 million in 2020 (World Bank 2021). A sizeable number of CSOs are involved in 
‘child-friendly’ budgeting initiatives through the KAACR and the Children Agenda Forum 
(Kenya Interviewee 11, CSO, 16). Research institutes such as the Kenya Institute for 
Public Policy Research Analysis and the Institute of Economic Affairs Kenya have also 
been involved in monitoring and measuring spending on social sectors and areas such 
as child protection (KIPPRA 2020, 2020b; Save the Children 2015).   
During primary data collection, several child-focused CSOs confirmed their 
involvement in budget advocacy initiatives, arguing that public participation in budgeting 
is provided for under the Public Finance Management Act (2012). These include Save 
the Children, World Vision, Investing in Children Society, Health Rights Advocacy Forum, 
National Taxpayers Association of Kenya, Child Fund, KAACR, Institute of Economic 
Affairs, and the Kenya Institute of Public Finance. Child protection matters also featured 
in position papers and budget briefs produced by some of the above organisations 
(KIPPRA 2020b; Save the Children 2015). Some of the organisations were financially 
supported by the Investment in Children Fund, Save the Children, and UNICEF.29  In 
2014, UNICEF commissioned child budget analysis studies, with a specific component 
on child protection, in ten counties of Kenya. The study showed that 5 of the 10 counties 
targeted had introduced budget lines on child protection (UNICEF 2014). Save the 
Children conducted similar studies in 2015 but only in five counties (Save the Children 
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2015). The main finding from the studies is that three of the five selected counties had 
committed resources for the construction of one-stop centres to assist victims of abuse 
(Ibid). Save the Children’s studies were done under the auspices of a project called ‘Child-
friendly county budgets’, implemented in five counties notably Siaya, Kakamega, Kwale, 
Wajir and Mombasa. Results of the analyses were disseminated in workshops and used 
to engage with the respective counties and with the national government. Messages were 
also disseminated via email and social media platforms (Kenya Interviewee 11, CSO, 
2016). 
CSOs in Kenya have claimed some successes, but also acknowledged their 
shortcomings when it comes to effectiveness of their analyses and advocacy to influence 
decisions on budget allocations. Save the Children and KAACR, for instance, have 
claimed that the increased spending on child protection by some of the counties such as 
Wajir, Kwale and Mombasa is mainly because of their budget advocacy (Kenya 
Interviewee 22, CSO, 2016). Organisations such as Amref Health Africa, Plan 
International, Generation Africa, and World Vision have also claimed that it is through 
their lobby and advocacy that the Government of Kenya established institutions such as 
the Anti-FGM Board with budgetary allocations from the national budget (Kenya 
Interviewee 11, CSO, 2016). Among other actions, in April 2018, Generation Africa hosted 
the first ever African Youth Summit on FGM to mobilise political will to combat the harmful 
cultural practice. The Summit, which engaged government officials before and after the 
conference, was attended by participants from 17 African Countries including South 
Sudan. In 2015, ANPPCAN organised a regional conference on how to finance child 
protection, which was attended by more than 25 countries in Africa. The above are 
examples of how CSOs in Kenya sought to influence public spending on child protection. 
The researcher participated in the above meetings. He also made a presentation during 
ANPPCAN’s above-mentioned conference.  
Child-led groups such as the Kenya Children’s Assembly (Junior Parliament) have 
also been speaking on the need for improved public investments in child protection 
through the resolutions they came up with at the end of their annual meetings. In 2017, 




We are concerned that children in Kenya continue to suffer violence, abuse and 
exploitation. Many have been forced to drop from school due to early marriage. 
We therefore call upon the government to increase investments in child protection 
(Kenya Children’s Assembly, 2017: 02). 
As is the case with most child led groups, the closest example being the Junior Parliament 
of Zimbabwe, most of the resolutions rarely reached people who matter in public 
budgeting. At best, they received media coverage and were disseminated through email 
and social media platforms, with minimal engagement between children and budget-
makers. For this and perhaps many other reasons beyond the scope of this study, some 
research participants see Junior Parliaments as: “mere talk shows for elite children, which 
are sometimes manipulated by politicians and even NGOs. Yes, they allow children to 
voice out their concerns, but then what?” (Zimbabwe Interview 31, CSO, 2018). 
Unfortunately, by not paying attention to the issues raised by children, policy and budget 
makers deprive themselves of the opportunity to understand, from children themselves, 
issues that they wish to be prioritised in government budgets. Children know exactly how 
child maltreatment takes place in private and private spheres. They also have good ideas 
on how child maltreatment can be tackled (Adu-Gyamfi 2014; NANGO et al. 2010).  
In South Sudan, the civil society space during the period of study (2015-2019) was 
dominated by international CSOs, including War Child Holland (WCH), Plan International, 
Vision Fund and Save the Children. In 2011, Save the Children supported the Ministry of 
Gender, Child, Disability and Social Welfare (MoGCDSW) to develop a handbook on child 
responsive budgeting. The main aim of the handbook was to help policy-makers and 
CSOs with tools on how to analyse budgets through a child rights lens and to provide 
them with guidance on how to navigate the complex budgeting sphere (Muchabaiwa 
2012). Child protection was flagged as one of the key priority areas to focus on in budget 
advocacy, since it is usually under-funded. In this handbook, Muchabaiwa (2012:13), 
observed that “in spite of a body of evidence to show that ‘prevention pays’, current levels 
of government spending on prevention of violence against children remain very low.”  
In 2011 and 2014 Save the Children also trained 46 and 52 MPs in South Sudan 




programmes which benefit children (South Sudan Interviewee 7, CSO, 2019). The focus 
of the training workshops was to equip parliamentarians with skills on how to assess the 
child friendliness of national budgets and how to check if all key programmes supporting 
survival, learning, development and protection of children are being responded to in 
government budgets. During this training, child protection was used as a case study to 
demonstrate the need to address issues such as sexual abuse, family reunion and 
integration, children without appropriate parental care and protection of children from 
armed conflict (South Sudan Interviewee 17, Government official, 2018). The training 
workshops were co-organised by the Parliamentary Lobby Group on Children led by Hon 
Mary Nawai (2011-2014). The initial training workshop was preceded by a child budget 
analysis study done by an independent consultant. The analysis traced allocations to 
several ministries and departments which contribute to improved child well-being (Save 
the Children 2012c).  
All the above efforts, which were seemingly in the right direction to advance the 
child protection agenda, were thwarted by episodes of civil war between 2014 and 2018. 
The war shifted the focus of most CSOs from long term development to humanitarian 
assistance (OCHA 2017; UNICEF 2017c). Efforts to strengthen public budgeting systems 
were also halted. A shift from analyses and advocacy type of interventions to delivering 
life-saving services such as provision of food aid, family tracing, psychosocial support and 
refugee support was witnessed amongst international NGOs such as Save the Children 
(South Sudan Interviewee 9, CSO, 2018).   
In Zimbabwe, the National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NANGO) through an initiative called the Child Friendly National Budget Initiative (CFNBI) 
has been the main actor in child budget advocacy since 2001 (Muchabaiwa 2010). The 
CFNBI was a joint initiative of NANGO and Save the Children. UNICEF, National Youth 
Council and the Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe joined the CFNBI in 2010. NGOs such as 
the ZNCWC, the Poverty Reduction Forum and the Child Protection Society have also 
been involved in the CFNBI, although their participation has been irregular (Zimbabwe 
Interviewee 31, CSO, 2018). Through the CFNBI, a handbook was developed on how to 




2010). Although the handbook was broad in scope, it provided several examples which 
relate to child protection such as how to track budget lines related to child protection, 
most notably the budget line on ‘children in difficult circumstances’, which is mainly about 
child protection.  
The CFNBI gave birth to other initiatives like the Ten-Point Plan, whereby children 
annually outlined ten key demands (branded Ten-Point Plan) they wanted considered in 
the forthcoming budget, after consulting their counterparts. One of the founding members 
of the CFNBI had this to say about the impact of the CFNBI on budgeting for child 
protection: 
The CFNBI has been one of the most consistent voices on the need to invest in children. 
Every year some analysis is done to assess the child friendliness of the national budget, 
results of which are used to engage ministries and portfolio committees of the Parliament 
of Zimbabwe. The CFNBI has been given a consultative status with the Ministry of 
Finance. That is a big milestone for children. Despite this, lately, the quality of analysis 
has gone down, and the issues have become general (Zimbabwe Interviewee 31, CSO, 
2018). 
During the study, an official from the Ministry of Finance acknowledged that the CFNBI 
was consistent in its engagement with the Government of Zimbabwe as it advocated for 
improved public spending on child-focused sectors and programmes. Whilst the study 
found evidence that the CFNBI had indeed registered a meaningful presence in policy 
and budgeting circles, challenges were also highlighted. One research participant felt that 
“its momentum has gone down” (Zimbabwe Interviewee 38, CSO, 2019). The main 
shortcoming of the CFNBI is that it did not delve deep into public spending on child 
protection in all relevant ministries other than the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and 
Social Welfare. The analysis and recommendations were more general, focusing on a 
range of child welfare issues. On this point, one respondent noted that “child protection 
was invisible and mostly obscured by big issues such as health and education in 
advocacy messages by the CFNBI” (Zimbabwe Interviewee 38, CSO, 2019). It is fair, 
therefore, to say that whilst the CFNBI resulted in increases in other social sector 
allocations such as education and health, its impact on child protection between 2011 




To sum it up, aggregated efforts by child-focused CSOs in all four countries to 
influence budget allocations to child protection have been minimal, and at best modest. 
The limited impact of CSOs could be attributed to shortcomings relating to economic 
analysis and budget advocacy skills, non-prioritisation of child protection in position 
papers, legitimacy questions, timing of budget advocacy actions and limited access to 
budget documents to inform analysis and advocacy. Most child rights-focused CSOs 
contacted during the study admitted that they have limited knowledge of public finance 
management processes, budget cycle and the fiscal politics. The majority also 
acknowledged their limited impact due to poor execution of their advocacy strategies. 
One government official in Kenya, provides a tip of the iceberg regarding some of the 
limitations of advocacy activities by CSOs:  
Year after year, we receive press - statement type of budget lobby papers, with 
recommendations that are difficult to operationalize. In most of their lobby papers, there 
is virtually no meaningful analysis of fiscal space and policy options. We can almost guess 
what a particular NGO is likely to demand from us…. more money for children (Kenya 
Interviewee 37, Government official, 2018).  
As hinted earlier in the case of Botswana, some of the advocacy actions by CSOs were 
poorly timed. For the most part, CSOs became very active only during the approval stage 
of the budget cycle. As argued by Muchabaiwa (2012) and by NANGO et al. (2010), 
engagement at this tail end of the budget formulation stage does not always yield positive 
results. The problem of limited access to budget documents was found to be a big 
challenge in Botswana because CSOs did not have a basis for analysis and advocacy. 
As highlighted earlier, only the budget statement presented by the Minister of Finance 
was posted online together with a simplified version (about 10 pages), called the People’s 
Budget. The rest of the budget documents were available in hardcopy at an exorbitant 
price (about US$15 per copy), but after the budget was approved by parliament.  
CSOs’ effectiveness in influencing budget decisions was also hindered by 
competition for turf and visibility, confrontational relationship with the government and 
fixation on commonly raised social sector issues notably education, health, water and 




the latter, the study observed that child protection was largely missing in key demands by 
CSOs concerning child friendly budgets. The Children’s Ten Point Plan in Zimbabwe is 
illustrative of this. For each year, between 2014 and 2018, the Plan did not have a single 
point on child protection. This begs the question: if child protection is not top on the 
priorities of child-focused organisations, will it ever be an issue for ‘non-child welfare’ 
organisations and ministries?  
Despite any limitations in their advocacy actions, it can be gleaned from the 
preceding paragraphs that there is an emerging momentum across several countries 
wherein CSOs are pushing for child friendly budgets. Child protection is slowly becoming 
an area of focus. Issue-based budget analyses and advocacy initiatives focusing on 
specific child protection topics such as ending child marriage, FGM, and child justice are 
also steps in the right direction (KIPPRA 2020b; Save the Children 2015). However, the 
ultimate impact of CSOs will also depend on the operating environment (Chiroro 2013). 
Lately, there are reports of shrinking civil society space and confrontational relationships 
between CSOs and governments in all four countries. Adversarial relationships make it 
difficult for the government to consider contributions from NGOs in good faith (Kagoro 
2005). In the end, this makes the idea of civil society embedding in state structures for 
the purposes of shaping development agendas as argued by Evans (2005, 2010) a pipe 
dream. When not fully embedded, along the lines suggested by Evans (2010), the default 
setting is for CSOs to play the role of pressure groups instead of being anchors of state 
policies and decisions (Pietrzkt 2001).  
8.4 Global Forces Influencing Decisions on Public Spending on Child 
Protection 
 
In this last section, the study examines how global forces have influenced decisions on 
public spending on child protection. Global forces encompass a paraphernalia of ideas, 
influences, processes, and institutions beyond the borders of a country which have a 
bearing on national decisions on budget allocations (Bond 2007; Montgomery et al. 2003). 
These include international child rights commitments, child rights state-party reporting 




tapestry of global forces there are positive or negative incentives for governments to 
pursue certain fiscal policy choices. Some of the forces are ‘carrots’ whilst others are 
‘sticks’ depending on the situation at hand, affecting national decisions on budget 
allocations to child protection (Bond 2007; Booth 2011; Bruno 1994). The motivation to 
investigate the impact of global forces on child protection arises from the realisation that 
it is not only internal state factors which affect decisions on how public resources should 
be allocated, external forces also matter (Booth 2011; Moyo 2009; UNCRC 2016). These 
factors fall within the realm of international political economy (Bruno 1994; Bursztyn 2015; 
Caporaso & Levine 2004).  
In discussing the role of global forces, building on the literature review in Chapter 
Two, it is only logical to start with international child rights commitments such as the CRC 
(1989), ACRWC (1990), related General Comments as well as Human Rights Council 
Resolutions. The above were extensively discussed in Chapter Two. The purpose of this 
section is not to repeat what was discussed in Chapter Two, but to present information 
that came out from primary data collection. Across all four countries, most respondents 
converged on the view that there is need for awareness raising on international child 
rights commitments related to public spending. None of the government officials from all 
four case study countries interviewed as part of this study had heard about General 
Comment No 19 of the CRC (2016) on ‘Public Spending for the Realization of Children’s 
Rights’ nor the Human Rights Council Resolution (2015) on ‘Investing in the Rights of the 
Child’.  
A key finding from all four countries is that while international child rights 
commitment have informed the formulation of laws and policies which relate to child 
protection as discussed in Chapter Five, there was very limited evidence of their use in 
the sphere of public budgeting. Some of the officials from ministries of finance did not 
even think that child rights structures such as the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
were in a position to advise them on how to mobilise, allocate, and utilise resources, even 
in the area of public spending on child protection. Below is what an official from the 




To be honest with you, we have not heard about the General Comment on public spending 
on children that you are talking about. I also did not know that child rights institutions 
(Committee on the Rights of the Child) have developed guidelines which relate to public 
spending. We rely on guidance from international finance institutions such as the IMF and 
the World Bank and other expert institutions such as the Collaborative Africa Budget 
Reform Initiative (CABRI) (Kenya Interviewee 36, Government official, 2018).  
The above quote shows, as expected, that ministries of finance have strong relationships 
with financial institutions rather than child rights organisations. The challenge for child 
rights organisations is to forge strategic alliances with institutions such as the IMF and 
the World Bank to leverage their influence on budgeting. 
There is however a ray of hope. Institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund are weighing in on the macro-economic consequences of 
child maltreatment. This has started with the quantification of the economic costs of child 
maltreatment and establishment of the linkages between child protection and economic 
development (Mitra et al. 2020; Wodon et al. 2018). In 2020, the IMF released a working 
paper on the link between ending child marriage and economic growth. The paper found 
that “if child marriage were ended today, long-term annual per capita real GDP growth in 
emerging and developing countries would increase by 1.05 percentage points” (Mitra et 
al. 2020: 04). It is commendable that international financial institutions (IFIs) are 
recognizing the economic value of child protection. Increasingly, they are joining forces 
with other UN agencies such as UNICEF, UNFPA, and UNWOMEN in encouraging states 
to put in place measures to create a protective environment for children and their families. 
The ‘Gender Budgeting’ training initiative of the IMF is also a step in the right direction. 
The initiative aims to help governments to consider the needs and vulnerabilities of girls 
and women – including to abuse and exploitation- in the formulation of government 
budgets.30 A concern has however been raised by social justice activists that international 
financial institutions often sacrifice human rights for macro-economic stability. In some 
cases, as argued by Stubbs and Kentikelenis (2017:01) “undermine the enjoyment of health 
 






rights, labour rights, and civil and political rights, all of which have deleterious 
implications”. Only time will tell if their growing appreciation of the impacts of violence on 
children on economies will bear fruit. But for this dream to come through, child rights 
organisations have an important role to play by leveraging the above and other analyses 
to guide budget decisions.  
Beyond international child rights commitments, the study also found out that other 
global frameworks are not widely used at national level. Despite all the resources that 
went into the development and adoption of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda for Financing 
the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development, none of the officials from ministries of 
finance referenced this document, even after being probed. The same could be said of 
several resolutions by ministers of finance on public finance management topics during 
African Union meetings. It is fair to conclude, therefore, that the impact of international 
child rights commitments and even finance specific resolutions such as the Addis Ababa 
Action Agenda on Financing for Development on public spending on child protection 
remain more in the sphere of potential than practical value.  
The second global factor examined during the study is the role of donors. From the 
interviews with research participants, the study discovered that whilst there was evidence 
of donors consistently speaking on health, education, water and social protection 
financing, there was little happening around child protection. In all four case study 
countries, the researcher found that donors have supported studies on health and 
education financing. For example, according to information collected from research 
participants, The World Health Organisation (WHO), for example, trained government 
officials in Botswana, Kenya and Zimbabwe on how to compile national health accounts 
and to mobilise additional resources for the health sector. Nothing of this sort had 
happened in relation to child protection in the four case studies, except for the 
establishment of a Child Protection Fund in Zimbabwe. By focusing on traditional social 
sectors such as health and education, donors have, unknowingly, to some degree, 
implied that child protection is also not a ‘priority’ to them. One civil society representative 




For your information, the under-spending on child protection is not only an issue for our 
governments. Donors too aren’t doing enough. Ask the big multi-lateral donors how much 
of their budgets go to child protection. Very little. We have struggled to get our child 
protection projects funded by several donors. I see them as part of the problem (Zimbabwe 
Interviewee 41, CSO, 2019). 
This view has been echoed in literature. For example, as discussed in Chapter Two, Save 
the Children (2010:04) observed that donor funding to child protection during 
emergencies has been “too little and too late”. The empirical analysis done in Chapter 
Six, which showed that child protection received a very low proportion of total 
humanitarian flows to South Sudan between 2012 and 2017 attest to the same. Some 
research participants however were of a different opinion, arguing that donors have 
supported many child protection programmes. This point was captured by a civil society 
official in Zimbabwe: 
Donors have done a lot for children in this country from legislative reform to training of 
social workers, police officers and magistrates to handle cases of child abuse. But they 
could have done more to encourage government to set up robust financing mechanisms 
for child protection, using domestic resources as was done with HIV and AIDS through the 
AIDS Levy (Zimbabwe Interviewee 41, CSO, 2019).  
The first part of the quote provides a hint on some of the support provided by donors in 
making the case for improved investments in child protection, especially in the past few 
years. These are discussed briefly below.  
Firstly, although not necessarily involved in budget negotiations with ministries of 
finance, donors have indirectly sought to influence public investments in child protection 
through conditional seed and match funding arrangements, policy advice, technical 
assistance offered to governments and the numerous researches they undertake. Seed-
funding and technical assistance serve as carrots for governments to implement a given 
programme, with the hope that the Government would take over after some time. In some 
cases, donors demanded that government contribute staff or a certain amount of 
resources as conditions to obtaining a grant related to child protection. In Zimbabwe, for 




Government to contribute 20 percent of the required funding for the Harmonized Cash 
Transfer Program (HCTP). The Government was therefore expected to contribute US$5 
million every year between 2011 and 2015 towards the HCTP. However, as discussed in 
Chapter Six, most of this money was never disbursed, as the government indicated that 
it had limited resources to contribute, with some respondents arguing that the government 
is prioritising security spending. The downside of the above condition is that it tied 
government to one child protection programme to the disadvantage of others. As a result, 
several other areas such as case management, children’s courts and preventative 
programmes were under-funded from the government’s budget. For example, allocations 
to the Street Children Fund declined from about $70,000 in 2011 to $5,000 in 2017, as 
discussed in Chapter Six.  
Secondly, it is donors who funded civil society budget advocacy initiatives 
discussed above. This is in addition to direct funding of several child protection 
programmes in selected countries as well as the development of GCs and Resolutions 
on investing in children. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter Five, many of the child 
protection strategies and plans were developed with financial and technical assistance 
from donor organisations. The development of the National Child Protection Framework 
of Responsibilities in Kenya (2015-2022) and The Operational Manual for The National 
Case Management System for the Welfare and Protection of Children in Zimbabwe 
(2013), to pick only a few examples, were funded by donors. International finance 
institutions have also supported governments to mobilise resources for child protection. 
In Kenya, the World Bank helped the government mobilise US$126 million for the social 
cash transfer programme, the majority of which being a concessional loan, between 2012 
and 2017 (World Bank 2018). In addition, donors also sponsored global child protection 
initiatives such as the Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children and the Global 
Partnership to End Child Marriage. All these initiatives have been accompanied by 
modest resources to catalyse child protection actions at the country level especially by 
the poorest countries. 
The downside of donor support is that governments often do not have the space 




budget means (mostly via NGOs). Majority of government officials who participated in this 
study confessed that they did not know how much NGOs received in the name of child 
protection and how they used the resources. Some of the officials said the same thing 
about programmes of major donors. They also added that they were not consulted when 
donors decided whom to fund, and for what issues. Some of them said that consultations 
by donors on spending priorities were superficial in some instances. One government 
official commented on this point:  
It is not that donors do not consult us, but rather, they have mastered the art of consultation 
for legitimation. In most cases, they come with preconceived programme designs which 
are sold to us in a subtle way (Zimbabwe Interviewee 29, Government official, 2016).  
A government official from Kenya also observed that: 
Instead of donors helping us to strengthen frontline service delivery and the national child 
protection system, they come to us and say we have money for training on parenting. In 
a way, they are saying all these years you did not know how to properly parent your 
children, there is a new and better way of doing so. This is not in line with our spending 
priorities (Kenya Interviewee 31, Government official, 2016) 
Faced with such a situation, one official said that due to lack of resources, most African 
governments “have no option but to accept whatever resources are brought by donors, 
regardless of conditionalities” (Zimbabwe Interviewee 41, CSO, 2019). Such a situation 
usually results in lack of ownership, ineffective and unsustainable child protection 
programmes.  
Lastly, in recent years, donors have thrown their weight behind the case for 
increased public spending on child protection by supporting budget analysis by CSOs, as 
well as capacity building initiatives. Some of the support is provided through initiatives 
such as the Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children.  
 In conclusion, global forces, especially international child rights commitments have 
informed the content of child protection policies and plans to a noticeable extent. 
However, their influences on child protection spending have been limited. They are also 




initiatives, conditional matching, and seed-funding. Recent interests by international 
public finance institutions such as the African Development Bank, World Bank, and the 
IMF on child protection topics such as ending child marriage is a promising development 
whose potential impact on public spending on child protection should be monitored. On 
their part, financial institutions also have a long way to go in embracing human rights in 
the design of economic policies, and in their advice to governments as recommended by 
Stubbs and Kentikelenis (2017).  
8.5 Concluding Remarks  
 
This chapter discussed the political economy dynamics relating to the structure and 
functioning of the state. Firstly, it showed that fragility and governance cultures have direct 
impacts on public finance management. In situations of fragility, fiscal rules are overridden 
by politicians. Using Kenya as an example, the study showed that fiscal decentralisation, 
has the potential to result in increases in budget allocations to child protection if national 
and local expenditures are added together. In cases where public institutions have 
requisite autonomy and capacity, the risk of unfair distribution of public resources is 
reduced. The chapter also demonstrated that civil society and global forces influence 
budget decisions directly and indirectly at the national and local level. Initiatives by CSOs 
on budgeting for children are also promising, if sustained. Also, their influence is 
dependent on their relationship with their governments and the operating environment. 
The next chapter will discuss how fiscal politics throughout the budget cycle has affected 











Politics Impacting on Public Spending on Child Protection 
9.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter is the last instalment of the study’s findings. It focuses on the influence of 
fiscal politics on budget decisions, through the lens of child protection. To 
comprehensively discuss how fiscal politics has impacted on public spending on child 
protection, a budget cycle approach is followed. A budget cycle approach looks at the 
politics of budgeting around the five main stages of budgeting, notably: planning, budget 
formulation, budget approval, budget implementation, and auditing. The study focused on 
the first three stages in line with the study objective.  
The first stage (budget planning) entails setting of annual spending priorities and 
determination of budget ceilings for individual ministries and departments (Cangiano et 
al. 2013). The second stage (budget formulation) is when individual ministries and 
departments come up with budget estimates for a given year guided by ceilings, priorities 
set out by the cabinet, cost estimates in plans, and expected revenue (Cangiano et al. 
2013; Rubin 2013). Before compilation of the national budget, each ministry is invited to 
a discussion with the ministry of finance/ treasury to ensure alignment of their budget 
estimates with ceilings provided, national priorities and other guidance on resource 
allocation. Draft budget estimates by each ministry are then submitted to the ministry of 
finance/ treasury, which has the responsibility of compiling the national budget. The third 
stage (budget approval) is when the draft budget compiled by the ministry of finance is 
tabled before parliament for discussion and approval. After approval, the budget will be 
ready for implementation, which is stage four of the budget cycle. The final stage is about 
reporting, accounting and auditing of resources disbursed and utilised by ministries and 
departments.  
The chapter is structured as follows: the first part discusses fiscal politics during 
the budget planning stage, with a focus on how interests and ideologies of the political 




The second part examines fiscal politics during the budget formulation stage, paying 
attention to the positioning of child protection within ministries and governments. The third 
part delves deeper into fiscal politics during the budget approval stage, in order to assess 
the extent to which parliamentarians advocate improved investments in child protection. 
The chapter concludes with a summary of key themes emerging from the discussion.   
9.1  Political Economy Dynamics in the Determination of Spending 
Priorities  
 
In the first stage of the budget cycle, when spending priorities are decided upon by the 
top leadership, fiscal politics manifests itself in the way the top leadership advance their 
interests and ideologies thereby influencing annual budget ceilings for ministries (Black 
et al. 2013; Norton & Elson 2002; Wildavisky 1984). Most notably, the top leadership in 
selected countries influenced national spending priorities by emphasising certain sectors 
and programmes, with political appeal to them, in their vision documents, manifestos and 
in public speeches, of which child protection was not. Child protection was conspicuously 
missing amongst top public spending priorities of the presidency in all four countries 
during the period of study. This conclusion was arrived at after analysing public 
pronouncements by presidents, their deputies, ministers, and party leaders. These 
include state of the nation addresses, budget statements, fiscal policies, political party 
manifestos, speeches in opening sessions of parliament, and during political rallies. When 
it came to heads of states, the study focused on the personal and political interests of Ian 
Sereste Khama (2009-2017) of Botswana, Uhuru Kenyatta (2013-19) of Kenya, Salva Kiir 
(2011-2019) of South Sudan, and Robert Mugabe (2000-2017) and Emmerson 
Dambudzo Mnangagwa (2017-19), both from Zimbabwe.  
 As an indicator of its low political profile, child protection was poorly articulated in 
national development plans. Ideally, national development plans set the tone for what is 
prioritised in medium term expenditure estimates and in annual budgets. Only a few child 
protection risks such as orphanhood were specifically mentioned in the 11th National 
Development Plan for Botswana (2017-2023), the South Sudan National Development 




Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET) (2013-2018). Child protection concerns 
such as child marriage, abandonment, child neglect, and child-trafficking, to mention only 
a few examples were missing completely. One would argue that the under-prioritisation 
of child protection in annual budgets was associated with its poor expression in national 
development plans. A civil society representative in Zimbabwe summarised this 
observation when he said that: 
Although child abuse is a recurring problem affecting everybody including politicians, the 
truth is that child protection is a none-issue in our national development plan. To be 
honest, child protection is left to specialised ministries such as the Ministry of Labour, 
Public Service and Social Welfare (Zimbabwe Interviewee 19, CSO, 2017).  
From both formal and informal pronouncements by the political leadership, it appears that 
the development priorities of heads of states in all four countries, in the period under 
review, revolved around economic growth, poverty eradication, security, and 
infrastructure creation. In Botswana, for example, Ian Khama’s developmental interests 
centred around three issues: poverty eradication, employment creation, and improving 
public service performance. Attainment of the above goals became the vehicle to 
mobilizing political support. Khama’s interests were repeatedly expressed in public rallies, 
stakeholder meetings, and state of the nation addresses. His poverty eradication agenda 
gave prominence to social safety nets for the poorest and most deprived families, 
especially those living in rural areas. In his 2013 budget speech, Kenneth Matambo, 
former Minister of Finance in Botswana, captured Khama’s fascination with social safety 
nets well: 
Mr Speaker, the Government continues to address problems of poverty and destitution by 
targeting the vulnerable and less fortunate members of the society through provision of 
cash transfers, food baskets, feeding schemes, shelter, and labour-based public works 
programmes (Matambo 2013). 
Whilst the former president of Botswana, Ian Khama, concentrated on poverty eradication 
as a means of achieving economic growth, president Uhuru Kenyatta’s development 
ideology seemed to be that of infrastructure led economic growth, which he hoped would 




focused on huge infrastructure projects in key sectors such as health, education, transport 
and housing. In his own words, during the State of the Nation address on 2 May 2018, 
Kenyatta stated that “when I took office in 2013, my administration promised and 
delivered the most aggressive surge of infrastructure development in Kenya’s history.” 
The focus on infrastructure was confirmed by a civil society leader, who observed that: 
Uhuru and Ruto (deputy president) want to prove that they are developmentalist. Their 
focus is on big infrastructure projects. The government is adamant with the construction 
of the standard gauge railway from Nairobi to Mombasa. The expansion of the Jomo 
Kenyatta Airport has not stopped despite fiscal pressures. The issues you are talking 
about… of child protection… are nowhere near Uhuru and Ruto’s plans (Kenya 
Interviewee 32, CSO, 2016). 
In South Sudan and Zimbabwe, security considerations, political survival, and responding 
to humanitarian crises were top on the spending priorities of Salva Kiir and the late Robert 
Gabriel Mugabe, respectively. The overwhelming political, economic and humanitarian 
crises in South Sudan crowded out funding from areas such as child protection (Deléchat 
et al. 2015; IMF 2017). In Zimbabwe, as the government focused on rolling out policies 
and programmes to prop-up the Mugabe leadership, social welfare spending ceased to 
be an expenditure priority. Mugabe’s political survival tactics were bankrolled through 
pork-barrel projects veiled as ‘black-economic empowerment’ programmes (Moore 
2012). His acceptance speech after the 2013 presidential, parliamentary, and local 
government elections illustrates this point: 
Our policy reflexes must be oriented towards the goals of indigenisation and economic 
empowerment of our people. This was the centrepiece of our manifesto. This is what the 
people voted for. It must become the centrepiece of our development endeavours 
(Mugabe, 2013). 
Throughout the last decade of his contested rule, Mugabe tried to paint a picture of a 
caring but vilified government, frustrated and isolated by the international community 
because it forcibly took land from the erstwhile colonialists. Several commentators such 
as Sachikonye (2012) and Raftopoulos (2013) have however dismissed this ‘caring 




sponsored violence during election years, promulgation of draconian laws, corruption, 
economic growth inhibiting policies, and mismanagement of public resources as evidence 
to support their claims. It is a matter of public knowledge that elections in Zimbabwe have 
been marred with physical, sexual and emotional violence, even against children 
(Muzondidya 2013; Sachikonye 2012). Reports from NGOs such as the Human Rights 
NGO Forum in Zimbabwe, showed that election-related violence resulted in large scale 
displacements of families, forced migration, sexual abuse, and denial of essential 
services to children due to their parents’ political affiliation (Munro 2011; Muzondidya 
2013; NGO Forum 2002; Sachikonye 2012). Some respondents even went to the extent 
of saying that the political leadership in the country sometimes become so powerful that 
they become institutions unto themselves.  
 The focus on political survival and macro-economic issues by most leaders of the 
case study countries should not be misconstrued as misplaced political manoeuvring. As 
argued by Hibbs (1981), governments will always do everything in their power to influence 
macro-economic indicators in order to gain political acceptance. The focus on the macro-
economy more than child protection was justified by one respondent who said the 
following:   
Child protection is not campaignable. One cannot go to the electorate and say I have 
protected children from abuse. Politicians want things that concern the well-being of 
everybody: the economy, employment, roads, fuel, hospitals and malls... things that are 
tangible. Child protection is not (Botswana Interviewee 20, media, 2018). 
Whilst taking note of the above point, macro-economic issues should not be dismissed 
as completely irrelevant to child protection. If carefully thought through, poverty 
eradication efforts and investments in health, social protection and education can reduce 
the vulnerability of children to abuse and exploitation. A vibrant child protection system 
relies on solid education, health and housing infrastructure, to mention only a few 
examples (Landgren 2005; Save the Children 2009: UNICEF 2018e). The challenge for 
governments, is to deliberately link macro-economic investments to efforts to create a 
sustainable protective environment for all children. Evidence from several countries has 




reduce children’s vulnerability to abuse and exploitation (GoK 2012; Sanfilippo et al. 2012; 
Sheahan 2011). In a way, such programmes help governments tackle risks such as child 
prostitution, child labour, early pregnancies, and child marriage (UNICEF 2018e). As one 
senior government official in Botswana said:  
The government believes children should have food, school fees and housing… that is 
child protection. By so doing, we minimise their chances of them getting into early 
marriage, after dropping from school. This is the reason why the OVC program is wholly 
funded from domestic resources (Botswana Interviewee 11, Government official, 2018) 
Notwithstanding the above view, one cannot rule out the political motivations of some of 
the big infrastructure, social assistance and macro-economic development programmes. 
Commenting on a myriad of social assistance programmes rolled out by Ian Khama of 
Botswana such as the youth development fund, public works programmes, and the 
Ipelegeng,31 one respondent criticised them for “reinforcing Khama and his Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP)’s position more than they protected children from abuse” 
(Botswana Interviewee 9, academic, 2018).  Similar sentiments were shared by a 
respondent in Zimbabwe: 
The free maize, seeds and school fees being given by Robert Mugabe’s government is 
never meant to improve the well-being of children, but prop-up his waning political support 
(Zimbabwe Interviewee 24, Independent researcher, 2018).   
Officials from ministries of finance usually take a leaf from their political superiors on what 
to prioritise in national and local government budgets. It is therefore common that most 
politicians seek to control and influence decisions by ministers of finance in a manner 
which reinforces rather than undermine their interests (Black et al. 2013). Ministries of 
finance are also the main target of economic policy advice from international finance 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and the 
African Development Bank (ADB) (Moore 2014a; Stiglitz 2002). These institutions also 
 
31 Ipelegeng is a Government Initiative or programme whose main objective is to provide short term employment support 
and relief whilst at the same time carrying out essential development projects that have been identified and prioritised 
through the normal development planning process. See http://www.gov.bw/en/Ministries--
Authorities/Ministries/Ministry-of-Local-Government-MLG1/Tools-and-Services/Services1/Ipelegeng-Project1/, 





have their own biases and interests when it comes to economic policy thrusts (Bond 2007; 
Moyo 2009).  
 In all four countries, the budget analysis done by the researcher showed that 
budget ceilings for child protection related ministries tended to increase at a slower pace 
than ministries such as home affairs, defence, education and health which are close to 
the hearts of top politicians. In part, as argued by one respondent, this implies that “child 
protection is not seen as a critical area for steering national development and 
guaranteeing the political survival of incumbents” (Zimbabwe Interviewee 26, Academic, 
2018).  
Throughout the study, several respondents characterised social and child welfare 
ministries as ‘less powerful’ and ‘less prioritised’ in resource allocation. This is an issue 
that is also echoed by Chang and Grabel (2014) in their study of public spending trends 
in Africa. The perceived lack of power and low political profile of child welfare ministries 
made it difficult for them to negotiate for higher budget ceilings. Additionally, in times of 
austerity and poor economic performance, child welfare ministries suffered the largest 
cuts compared to other ministries. Black et al. (2013) argue that budgets of powerful 
ministries rarely suffer budget cuts, even in times of austerity. Information collected from 
all four countries showed that government ministries are not treated the same when it 
comes to increases in budget allocations. In a pointed manner, one respondent said: 
It is naïve to think that all ministries are treated the same. Naturally, there are powerful 
ministries such as local government, home affairs and defence, which are central to the 
safety, security, and political survival of the party leadership. These are prioritised in 
resource allocation because they are the power-bases of the incumbent government 
(Kenya Interviewee 21, CSO, 2016). 
An official from the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare in South Sudan did not 
mince her words about how low ceilings affected allocations to child protection: 
Our ministry always gets the smallest ceiling compared to other ministries. The 
government allocates very little resources to us… only enough to keep the office running, 




donors to implement child protection programmes (South Sudan Interviewee 25, 
Government official, 2019). 
Even within the ministry which coordinates social and child welfare issues, child protection 
programmes received less attention than other programmes. In Botswana, for example, 
whilst the budget for social protection stagnated, the budget for rural development in the 
same ministry increased. Commenting on why child protection programmes received 
lower ceilings, compared with other programmes in the same ministry and also if 
compared with other sectors, one respondent in Kenya argued that: 
The availability or lack of water, education and health services has potential to shape voters’ 
views regarding overall performance of the government. If health and education are in a mess, 
then the reputation of the government is at stake. But if there are children who can’t go to 
school because of bullying, or because they do not have appropriate parental care, business 
will continue as usual (Kenya Interviewee 22, CSO, 2016). 
Opposition party leaders also seek to influence ministries of finance with their policy 
messages. Unfortunately, in all four countries issues of child abuse, neglect, and 
exploitation were also not top on their spending priorities. Like their counterparts in 
governments, opposition parties only addressed child protection issues in a piece-meal 
manner in their manifestos and rarely talked about increasing spending on child 
protection. In 2018, for example, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Alliance’s 
manifesto (led by Nelson Chamisa) only mentioned child protection in passing by 
committing the party to: 
Enacting the necessary laws and reforms necessary to protect children, including the 
abolition of child marriages, and the enactment of a new Children’s Act... and protection 
against harmful labour practices including child labour. 
Although the background of the above quotation is not clear, what is known is that nearly 
a third of women in Zimbabwe are married before the age of 18, making child marriage a 
big issue in the country. Child labour is also rife (MoLSS & UNICEF 2010; UNICEF 2017). 
The 2018 manifesto of the MDC-T party in Zimbabwe, led by Thokozani Khupe raised 




Many households can barely afford a meal and let alone health care cover, especially 
child-headed households, widows, the elderly, orphans, the terminally ill and some of 
those living with disabilities and albinism. Taking into cognizance the very limited 
resources, the MDC-T government shall endeavour to …assist with cash transfers and 
nutritious food support.  
The 2013 manifesto of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) in Kenya (led by Raila 
Odinga) also mentioned issues to do with child protection although in a superficial way: 
Children are vulnerable to poverty, more so those with disabilities and those residing with 
older or chronically poor or ill persons. The fate of street children continues to be ignored 
yet the streets are a learning environment for delinquency and a life of crime. The 
government, in partnership with development partners, is currently implementing a cash 
transfer targeting OVCs. The program is however reaching only a small proportion of the 
children in need (currently only 90,000 households). The ODM Government will upscale 
cash transfers to vulnerable households and individuals, including orphans and vulnerable 
children. 
Elsewhere in the manifesto, the ODM mentioned a few more child protection problems 
such as drugs and substance abuse, neglect of the male child and child labour.  
An interesting point from the political party manifestos reviewed as part of this 
study is that social assistance programmes were touted as the panacea for all risks faced 
by children. Moreover, the views about child protection held by top politicians in the 
selected countries were the same, regardless of whether they came from the ruling or 
opposition parties. Overall, child protection was not a development priority of the top 
leadership of each of all four countries.  
9.2 Political Economy Dynamics During Budget Formulation 
 
Several political economy dynamics were found to be at play during the budget 
formulation stage of the budget cycle in all four countries, which had a bearing on budget 
allocations to child protection. These include a) power-play within and between ministries 
as they jostle for limited resources, b) data deficiencies, and c) politics during budget 




Cayeros and Magalon (2003), Gasper et al. (2018) and Norton & Elson 2002, among 
many.  
9.2.1 Power-Play Within and Between Ministries 
A notable political economy variable which affected budget allocations to child protection 
at budget formulation stage was the perceived political profile and influence of child 
welfare ministries, as well as power-relationships with other ministries. This finding is 
consistent with earlier studies by Norton and Elson (2002), Pereznieto et al. (2011), Save 
the Children (2010), World Vision International (2021), and Wildavsky (1984) who 
observed that ministries often engage in subtle wars of maneuver as they seek to position 
themselves for recognition by the top leadership and for more funding of their 
programmes from the national budget. As argued in Chapter Six, child welfare ministries 
in selected countries grappled with the perennial problem of low political profile and 
subsequently low budget ceilings. To break through this shell, one senior government 
official from Botswana realised the need to take the initiative to push the child protection 
agenda forward. She said the following during a face-to-face interview:   
In the past few years, we have successfully defended allocations to the OVC program 
because of robust internal and external lobbying escalated to the level of the Ministry of 
Finance. If you don’t push your issues… nobody will. In one year, I had to pull together a 
concise paper articulating how much I needed, for what and what will happen if the 
programme is not funded. I guess my case was compelling. At some point in time I had to 
make a presentation to our Minister and later to the Ministry of Finance about this. At the 
end, our efforts paid dividends. Competition for resources is real (Botswana Interviewee 
17, Government official, 2018) 
What comes out of the above quote is the need for child welfare ministries, and other 
departments responsible for child protection, to rise up to the challenges associated with 
the politics of budgeting. At the basic level, they have to master how the politics of 
manoeuvring and positioning for more resources within and amongst ministries is played, 
and how to make certain issues, such as child protection, matter to the top leadership 




The story shared by the official from Botswana above also shows that it is 
dangerous for child rights organisations to think that planners and budget makers have 
the same knowledge and passion about child protection as they have. In fact, they must 
take the initiative to mobilise constituencies of support and continuously make a case for 
improved investments in child protection. In doing this, individual agency, as highlighted 
by Baltussen (2006) in his study of priority setting of public spending in developing 
countries, plays a role.  Baltussen (2006) observed that individual agency, enhanced by 
personal charisma, connections and expertise, makes some government officials 
influential than others. Easterly & Levine (1997) also identified several factors which make 
some people more influential, persuasive and effective in their political manoeuvring 
during the budget process. Chief among these is their own professional qualifications and 
experiences, proximity to the presidency, knowledge of the public finance management 
system, affiliation to a political party with the majority in parliament and their own 
charisma. Easterly (2013) also emphasised the power that comes from association with 
powerful institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.  
Another important point to note about individual agency, is the profile of the 
leadership in a given ministry.  If one considers that some of the leaders in child welfare 
ministries in Kenya, South Sudan and Zimbabwe, during the period of study, were either 
new in government or not holding senior party positions, then this argument deserves 
further interrogation. In Zimbabwe, for example, the Ministry of Labour, Public Service 
and Social Services (MLPSSW), which coordinates child protection issues, has, for 
several years, been led by ministers who were less experienced in politics and with no 
child protection background. For example, Honourable Pauline Mpariwa, who was the 
minister during the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2009 to 2013 in Zimbabwe, 
was a trade unionist, completely new to government. Before being appointed minister, 
she was a member of the national executive of the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC) party. The same could also be said of Honourable Petronella Kagonye, who was 
minister in the same ministry between 2016 to 2017. She had no social work background 





The degree to which individuals have power to influence national spending 
priorities also depends on which ministry they come from (Chang & Grabel 2014). 
Information collected from respondents revealed that officials from economic sectors such 
as finance, energy, mining and tourism tended to have more influence than social welfare 
ministries. The reason being that social welfare services are perceived as “less critical” 
(Zimbabwe Interviewee 38, CSO, 2019). In addition, child welfare ministries are not given 
so much attention because they are perceived as ‘spenders’ which do not generate 
government revenue as much as other ministries. One independent researcher from 
Kenya had this to say about this issue: 
Child welfare ministries are not only less prioritised, they are also demeaned for being 
consumers of government resources, who do not bring anything to national coffers. Such a 
view means that budgets of ministries perceived to be revenue generators sometimes 
increase with a higher percentage than child welfare ministries. (Kenya Interviewee 8, 
Independent researcher, 2016) 
Downplaying the significance of a ministry on the grounds of its revenue generation 
capacity is, arguably, a display of ignorance of how sustainable development works. A 
body of evidence exists showing links between social and economic development, the 
latest being the seminal work by Wodon et al. (2018), showing that there are massive 
economic gains from ending violence against women and children, including increased in 
lifetime earnings.  
 The idea of ‘powerful’ and ‘weak’ ministries means that there is often a set of other 
informal structures and power relationships that influence decision-making on budget 
allocations (Chang & Grabel 2014; DFID 2007). In some cases, the president’s relatives 
appeared to have more influence on budget decisions than their counterparts who were 
not.  For example, when Robert Mugabe’s nephew, Patrick Zhuwawo, became the Deputy 
Minister of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment in 
Zimbabwe, the ministry’s budget shot up from US$23 million in 2009 to US$76 million in 
2012. From this budget, an average of $2.3 million per year, equivalent to 4% of the 
Ministry’s budget, was spent on income generating activities for young women between 




reduction of young girls’ vulnerability to economic exploitation. Zhuwawo’s position was 
enhanced by his minister, Saviour Kasukuwere, who once worked for the Central 
Intelligence Organisation of Zimbabwe. Their ministry supported young people, including 
girls who had dropped out of school, with finances to start small income-generating 
projects, although accused of favouring young people which supported their political 
party. Zhuwawo and Kasukuwere’s personal profiles and relationships with figures in 
powerful positions enabled them to argue for increased budgetary allocations to their 
ministry. Regrettably, allocated resources were distributed in a clientelist way, according 
to the feedback from some research participants. 
 Another factor that influenced the power play between and among ministries 
observed in Botswana, Kenya and Zimbabwe was the lack of coordination amongst 
ministries, departments, and agencies. Zimbabwe provides a classic example. The 
Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Social Welfare (MoLPSSW) and the Ministry of 
Health and Child Welfare were reportedly involved in turf wars instead of cooperating in 
making a case for increased investments in child protection. Officials from the MLPSSW 
argued that their ministry was the ‘rightful’ one to coordinate all child protection services 
and not the Ministry of Health. By implication, the officials were saying that all child 
protection related resources should be allocated to them. On the other hand, officials from 
the Ministry of Health contended that they too had a role in child protection since they 
were given the mandate to coordinate the implementation of the National Program of 
Action for Children, from as far back as 1994. Asked to comment about this issue, one 
official from the MLPSSW said that: 
It is a matter of public knowledge that we are the ministry that coordinates child protection 
services. Resources for child protection should therefore be allocated to us. If anything, 
the Ministry of Health was only requested to lead state party reporting to the CRC 
Committee, back then, and to lead the development of the National Program of Action. 
The Ministry of Health carries a health and not child protection mandate (Zimbabwe 
Interviewee 11, Government official, 2016). 
The above view exposes protectionist tendencies by ministries in a bid to get more 




protection should sit and who should be allocated what resources is completely 
misplaced. It defeats the purpose of the systems approach to child protection planning 
and budgeting. Instead, as guided by systems thinking, both ministries should perform 
complementary roles with regards to child protection. Whilst the MLPSSW focuses on 
case management, the Ministry of Health is expected to provide medical services to 
assist, for example, survivors of sexual abuse. An official from an international donor 
organisation also observed the infighting between the two ministries: 
The MLPSSW and the Ministry of Health tend to de-campaign each other to donors and 
most probably to the Ministry of Finance as they seek to position their programmes for 
more funding (Zimbabwe Interviewee 27, Donor organisation, 2018). 
Turf wars discourage collaboration by ministries and other stakeholders. They become 
more pronounced when resources are scarce and budget processes are less inclusive 
and open (Black et al. 2013; Wildavsky 1984). 
Suspicion and mistrust amongst ministries also compromised constructive 
dialogue between social sector ministries and ministries of finance. Officials from child 
welfare related ministries perceived that ministries of finance were “very powerful and 
patronising, sometimes not willing to understand child protection issues” (Zimbabwe 
Interviewee 28, Government official, 2018).  On their own confession, some social welfare 
ministries found it difficult to negotiate with the Ministry of Finance as their budget 
submissions were always revised downwards. One official noted the following: 
It is not always easy for us to defend our budgets. Even if we have a compelling case, our 
budgets will not be increased at the same pace as other ministries, which I do not want to 
name. Every year, our management has to explain the same things over and over again, 
but still nothing significantly changes (Zimbabwe Interviewee 33, Government official, 
2018). 
The above quote shows how evidence for more and better spending on child protection 
is sometimes ignored by policymakers. Ministries of finance, in a way, then become 
accomplices in the advancement of private and political interests of the country’s top 
leadership. Moving forward, the challenge facing ministries of finance is not only how to 




to also understand the scope of child protection interventions. As indicated in Chapter 
Seven, most officials in ministries of finance do not fully understand child protection. As 
one respondent said, “child protection is ultimately lost in economic translations” 
(Zimbabwe Interviewee 31, CSO, 2018).  
Whilst it is fair to expect ministries of finance to have some idea about child 
protection, this should not be stretched to expect them to have in-depth knowledge about 
all thematic issues as their core business is economic. As summarised by one respondent 
in South Sudan:  
Ministries of finance tend to be interested in big-picture macro-economic issues of fiscal 
discipline, economic growth, employment creation, and poverty eradication and less about 
ending child marriages and beating of children in school (South Sudan Interviewee 9, 
CSO, 2018). 
The above respondent was fairly balanced in his characterisation of Ministries of finance. 
Generally, officials from Ministries of finance are more receptive to, or better understand 
issues, if they are more economic than social. This is not unusual considering that the 
Ministries of finance are staffed mainly with economists and accountants. However, they 
cannot abrogate their responsibility to ensure all sectors and programmes get a fair share 
of available resources.  
Due to their greater focus on the economy, Ministries of finance are sometimes 
perceived by child welfare ministries and child focused NGOs as not very supportive of 
child protection. Some child rights activists who participated in the study even blamed 
them for standing in the way of increased public spending on child protection. One child-
focused NGO in Zimbabwe had this to say: 
Child protection is missing on the Ministry of finance’s radar. I guess their interest is on 
inflation, interest rates, budget deficits, national production and such other macro-
economic issues. Year-in-year-out we have told them about the need to allocate resources 
to the multi-sectoral management of child sexual abuse and to the Street Children Fund, 
but nothing has changed. Our issues just do not matter to them (Zimbabwe Interviewee 




In Kenya and Zimbabwe, Ministries of finance rejected the above and other allegations 
that they favour economic over social development programmes and that they are not 
supportive of child protection interventions. They argued that it is the responsibility of 
relevant ministries to promote their programmes, show how they contribute to national 
development, and to defend their budgets instead of blaming everything on the Ministry 
of finance and the political leadership. One official from the Ministry of Finance in 
Zimbabwe stated that: 
We cannot be blamed for not prioritising child protection in government budgets. There 
are so many competing priorities. Tell us why your issue is more important than others. 
Why does it warrant such and such resources? Everything should be clear to us. If 
ministries fail to put up a good case and to play the politics of budgeting, well, that is none 
of our business. Most submissions from some of these ministries are mainly about salaries 
and administration costs, without a clear programme behind it. Our role is to assess if 
submissions from ministries meet budgeting standards and are in line with set priorities. 
We cannot accept a budget that only has workshops, fuel, and salaries (Zimbabwe 
Interviewee 21, Government official, 2018).  
This view was also echoed by officials from the Ministries of finance in South Sudan and 
Botswana. Making the case for increased spending on child protection also demands 
strategic use of quantitative analysis, including of the costs and benefits of doing so (Fang 
et al. 2012; World Vision International 2021). Unless ministries responsible for child 
protection make a ‘strong investment case’, quantitatively and qualitatively, and also 
understand the politics at play to know how to advance their issues in the game of 
budgeting, their programmes will continue to be under-funded (Kenya Interviewee 13, 
Independent Researcher, 2016).  
In support of the above view, an official from the Department of Social Protection 
in Botswana described how she engaged officials from the Ministry of finance and the 
political leadership to protect child protection budgets against imminent cuts in 2015 and 
2016. Narrating her story, she said that she developed concise position papers containing 
key social, economic and political arguments for the extension and expansion of the OVC 
programme. The position papers were used to convince the Ministry of finance during 




children’s wellbeing and protection. Part of the 2015 position paper of the department 
read as follows: 
As a Government, we have made progress to improve the well-being of children through 
the orphan care programme. We cannot afford to reduce spending to this programme now. 
If this were to happen, many children will slide back into poverty. Such a situation will 
make them vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.  
The above brings to the fore an important issue in public budgeting: investment case-
making. This is a process of leveraging evidence and various arguments (economic, 
political, legal and social) to engage with policy and budget makers on why it is crucial for 
the government to invest in a certain area (UNICEF 2015f). Investment case-making 
involves presentation of analysis of the costs of inaction on the one hand and benefits of 
investments on the other, among other things (Fang et al. 2012; Mitra et al. 2020; 
Pereznieto et al. 2014; UNICEF 2015f). An example of a cost of inaction analysis was 
undertaken by Pereznieto et al. (2014) which sought to estimate the costs and economic 
impacts of violence against children as discussed in Chapter Two. The study showed how 
much governments across the world were losing a lot, social and economically, because 
of violence against children.  
Most investment cases focus more on quantifiable costs such as loss in 
productivity and revenue and benefits to appeal to economists in ministries of finance. 
Unfortunately, they tend to disregard other intangible results such as impacts on self-
esteem, performance in school, and time of marriage (UNFPA & UNICEF 2013). The child 
protection investment case developed by UNICEF in 2015, targeting donors, should 
therefore be commended for presenting balanced picture, using both quantitative and 
qualitative arguments. In this investment case, UNICEF (2015f: 07) passionately 
described the cost of not investing in child protection as follows: 
Children who have been severely abused or neglected often experience learning 
difficulties and perform poorly at school. They may have low self-esteem and suffer from 
depression, which can lead, at worst, to risky behaviours and self-harm. 
In all four case study countries, most stakeholders agreed that the technical case for 




parliaments. One civil society representative from Kenya summed this up nicely by 
saying: 
The need for education, health and water is common knowledge, but as for child 
protection, a lot still needs to be done to ensure we are all on the same page. More 
evidence, awareness raising, lobbying, and advocacy is required to get Ministries of 
finance to understand why investing in child protection is important, and how to do so 
(Kenya Interviewee 33, CSO, 2018) 
Although it is important to lobby the Ministry of finance, line ministries responsible for 
specific child protection programmes also need to be engaged. Whilst the Ministry of 
finance has the responsibility to issue budget ceilings and compile national budgets, it 
does not make all the decisions about allocations within a government department. It is 
the relevant ministries and departments which decide how to allocate resources amongst 
competing priorities given the budget ceiling provided by the Ministry of finance. Child 
protection programmes should be prioritised first in their respective departments and 
ministries, before draft budgets are shared with the ministry of finance. 
 From the foregoing, it can be concluded that the under-funding of child protection 
in government budgets starts with low prioritisation by the top leadership and its poor 
articulation in national development plans. This is partly because child protection lacks 
the political appeal and tangibility to be used by politicians for them to gain political 
mileage. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter Seven, the meaning and programmatic 
parameters of child protection are not sufficiently known by many policy and budget 
makers. The preceding section also showed that the low profile of child welfare ministries, 
as well as skewed power- relations between child welfare and economic ministries have 
hindered rather than advanced the case for increased spending on child protection. Given 
this scenario, child protection advocates have no option but to enhance their agency and 
to leverage is there up to date and comprehensive data on child protection to inform 
decision-making? This is the questions that the next section seeks to answer.  
9.2.2 Budget Formulation Compromised by Data Deficiencies  
The right allocation decisions are informed by latest data and statistics. This include 




past spending, and forecasts of financial needs. Data and statistics is one of the general 
measures of implementation of children’s rights. In section 48 of the GC No 5, the UNCRC 
(2003: 28) states that “collection of sufficient and reliable data on children, disaggregated 
to enable identification of discrimination and/or disparities in the realization of rights, is an 
essential part of implementation”. Ministries and departments responsible for budget 
allocation to children require information about how much is required to implement 
planned programmes over a given period (ACERWC 2018; UNCRC 2003, 2016). 
Unfortunately, as already discussed in Chapter Five, lack of comprehensive data and 
statistics has made it difficult for governments to cost child protection plans. This 
obviously weakens the case by child protection advocates as this is tantamount to asking 
for help, but not knowing what help one requires. The lack of cost estimates was acute in 
Botswana and South Sudan. In South Sudan, only the National Action Plan to End Child 
Marriage (2018) was costed, with financial and technical support from donors. In Kenya 
and Zimbabwe, there were a few costed plans such as the National Plan of Action for 
Orphans and other Vulnerable Children. Other sectoral and thematic plans which relate 
to child protection were not costed. Cost estimates are also required to make a case for 
increased ministerial ceilings and to justify changes in budget allocations to specific child 
protection services. As one government official admitted “costing of plans is one area, 
which we need to improve” (Botswana Interviewee 12, Government official, 2018).  
 Lack of cost estimates is only one side of the story. The other side is the availability 
of comprehensive child protection data and statistics. In all case study countries, except 
Kenya, there was a general lack of comprehensive and reliable data and information 
about various forms of violence against children. In Botswana and South Sudan, for 
example, there was virtually no publicly available national data on the incidence of child 
marriages, child abandonment, and violence against children, to mention only a few key 
child protection indicators. In 2016, UNICEF supported the Government of Botswana to 
undertake a violence against children survey, but the results of the survey had not been 
published by April 2019. The statistics on orphans and vulnerable children which were 
used in Botswana during the study period were mainly from routine programme data and 
not from a comprehensive national survey. One can argue that this may result in faulty 




and 2017, only Kenya had completed a national violence against children survey, which 
was partly funded by donors. If the occurrence and magnitude of protection risks faced 
by children is not known, it is difficult to make a case for more and better spending on 
child protection. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, data is also a key mediating political economy 
variable. Its absence can be used by politicians to justify inaction and certain budget 
allocations. Given this likely risk, it is therefore crucial for social sector ministries to ensure 
that there are robust child protection data and information systems. Unfortunately, as 
seen in Chapter Six, research, data, monitoring and evaluation are hugely underfunded 
elements of the national child protection system. Lack of resources to carry out 
comprehensive surveys such as violence against children surveys and multiple indicator 
cluster surveys (MICS) was cited by some stakeholders as a major problem. Others did 
not agree, arguing that:  
The real problem is not data, but lack of political will and understanding of why it is 
important to prioritise child protection in government budgets. What more data do you 
need when newspapers are awash with stories of child sexual abuse and neglect? 
(Botswana Interviewee 22, Academic, 2018)  
The above quote does contain grains of truth, but the danger in it is that it gives primacy 
to one factor – political will – over another (data). The reality is that they are not mutually 
exclusive. In fact, they are complementary. Data is required to galvanise political will, and 
when there is political will, timely and comprehensive data is still needed to guide planning 
and budget allocation to specific child protection programmes. Thus, the importance of 
data and statistics in budgeting and planning cannot be underestimated. Using a systems 
approach, it is therefore crucial that governments plan and fundraise from both domestic 
and international sources for the strengthening of child protection data and information 
systems. Such a system would allow for the collection of both routine (programme) as 
well as survey data. This information is needed to monitor child protection indicators but 
also to inform budget decisions. In countries such as South Sudan where external 
resources constitute a significant portion of the total child protection budget, there may 




fundraising efforts. Data is needed at each stage of the budget cycle, including during 
pre-budget consultations, discussed below.  
9.2.3. Politics of Budget Consultations and Prioritisation  
Each of the four case study countries has national and local platforms to consult 
stakeholders about spending priorities and related fiscal policy issues in a given year. 
These platforms are found within and across ministries, and parliaments. Some of the 
consultative processes are led by Ministries of finance. When functioning effectively, at 
least in theory, structures such as budget sector workings and budget hearings serve as 
spaces for constructive negotiations, trade-offs and consensus building on how available 
resources should be prioritised amongst competing priorities (Cangiano et al. 2013; IBP 
2018). In Botswana, and Kenya, examples of structures include County Budget and 
Economic Forums and Budget Pitsos (Hearing), respectively. Due to war Budget Sector 
Working Groups in South Sudan had stalled but exist on paper. Unfortunately, the above 
structures did not always work as intended due to fiscal politics, skewed balance of power 
amongst participants, information asymmetries, and operational challenges. Some of the 
structures only exist on paper or at best meet irregularly to tick the box. Whichever way 
they are structured and function, budget consultation platforms, can either be 
opportunities or stumbling blocks to enhance the profile of child protection in budgeting 
as the following paragraphs will show. 
 Thematic based structures, such as Sector Working Groups (SWGs)32 in Kenya, 
created relatively more opportunities for child protection issues to be raised at sectoral 
level, more than broad based structures such as Budget Hearings (Pitsos) in Botswana. 
In Kenya, child protection issues are covered under the Social Protection, Culture and 
Recreation SWG. Although SWGs have been welcomed by child protection practitioners 
as opportunities to discuss the need to invest in preventive and response services, a few 
concerns have been raised. The first is that “there are so many issues that are discussed, 
 
32 There are ten Sector Working Groups (SWGs) in Kenya, which are platforms for budget consultations. These are 1) 
Agriculture, Rural and Urban Development; 2) Energy Infrastructure and ICT;3) General Economic and Commercial 
Affair’s; 4) Health; 5) Education; 6) Governance, Justice, Law and Order; 7) Public Administration and International 
Relations; 8) National Security; 9) Social Protection, Culture and Recreation; and 10) Environmental Protection, Water 




to the extent that core child protection issues are sometimes overlooked” (Kenya 
Interviewee 53, CSO, 2019). The second challenge is that “senior people or those who 
have been in civil service or NGOs for long tend to dominate the discussions because of 
their prior knowledge and personal power” (Kenya Interviewee 53, CSO, 2019). This 
points to power-play within SWGs on the basis of seniority, experience, and also personal 
charisma of participants. The third problem is that budget consultative structures tend to 
generate long lists of ‘priorities’ which are not accompanied by concrete discussions on 
financial trade-offs. The ultimate prioritisation is then done by planning and budgeting 
officers in ministries and departments, behind closed doors. Fourth, some of the meetings 
are “rushed as the chairperson wants to cover all areas under each SWG, leaving no 
room for meaningful discussion” (Kenya Interviewee 53, CSO, 2019). Lastly, as argued 
by the International Budget Partnership (IBP) (2018:03), it is difficult to tell whether “public 
views were taken into account or not” (IBP 2018:03). The problem here is that there is 
usually no due process to carefully consider views of stakeholders on what should be 
prioritised in the forthcoming budget. The same concern was raised in Zimbabwe about 
pre and post-budget hearings convened by the Parliament. Several research participants 
complained that after making presentations to the Parliamentary Committee on Social 
Affairs: 
The only thing that we see are summarised presentations in the main Chamber. We do 
not know if line ministries or the Ministry of Finance ever discuss submissions from various 
stakeholders (Zimbabwe Interviewee 22, CSO, 2018).  
From the foregoing, there are still many challenges with consultative structures which 
demand reform (IBP 2018). If the status quo continues, the intended purposes may not 
be achieved, with child protection suffering because of reasons raised earlier. Most 
research participants agreed that there is still a lot that needs to be done to position child 
protection in thematic working groups. Beyond SWGs, child-focused organisations should 
also aim to push child protection during discussions in other sectors such as education, 
security, and health (Kenya Interviewee 6, CSO, 2016). For this to happen, national 
children’s councils such as the NCCS in Kenya and the NCC in Botswana have crucial 




 However, broad based structures such as Budget Pitsos in Botswana manifested 
a lot more fiscal politics which undermined child protection than SWGs. One official from 
a civil society organisation based in Botswana commented on this matter:  
The Budget Pitsos by the Ministry of Finance are a political legitimization process with no 
bearing on how much resources should be allocated to child protection. If anything, the 
government only uses these meetings to justify the annual budgets and to inform citizens 
about its spending priorities in a given year (Botswana Interviewee 18, CSO, 2018). 
The fiscal politics at play usually revolves around interest groups seeking to advance their 
own agendas without listening to other voices. Unfortunately, as one research participant 
observed “powerful groups such as private sector, trade unions and farmers’ 
organisations tend to be listened to, and or given much airplay than child rights groups” 
(Zimbabwe Interviewee 13, Independent researcher, 2016). 
At the same time, as argued by some research participants, the tendency for the 
Ministry of finance is to be defensive and or to be politically correct by acknowledging 
contributions without making firm commitments to change anything or seriously reflecting 
on them. Moreover, the consultations sometimes come at the tail end of the budget 
formulation process, when ministries have already crafted their draft budgets. Lastly, 
broad based consultations, involving many stakeholders, usually focus on macro-
economic issues such as tax rates, infrastructure projects, subsidies and employment 
creation and less on thematic matters such as child protection. Thus, the content and 
nature of fiscal politics at play have so far not significantly helped advance child protection 
agendas. Notwithstanding the above limitations, the significance of multi-sectoral 
structures is that they are chaired by officials from Ministries of finance. If child protection 
issues are powerfully raised, and a clear case made, there are chances that some 
budgetary action may be taken.  
 In Zimbabwe most of the public consultations on the budget were conducted by 
the Parliament and not by the executive between 2015 and 2019. Only rarely, and 
sometimes upon request by stakeholders, did the Ministry of finance call for budget 




their budgets. A government official from a social sector ministry in Zimbabwe admitted 
that there are weak mechanisms for public consultations on the budget:  
Surely it is good for us to consult with stakeholders, but ceilings usually come late to us. 
As a result, there is very limited time to consult with all our stakeholders. What we end up 
doing is to ask each department to come up with its budget proposals to be submitted to 
the directorate of planning and budgets within the Ministry of finance. Another challenge 
is that the ceilings are usually so low, with some resources earmarked. This makes 
consultations meaningless. To be honest, it is common for departments to simply adjust 
previous budgets for inflation (Zimbabwe Interviewee 15, Government official, 2017)  
Similar sentiments were echoed in Botswana and South Sudan. For South Sudan, 
conditions of war made it difficult to undertake necessary budget consultations. 
Unfortunately, weak budget consultations and lack of proper prioritisation of 
interventions within a ministry or department, increases the risk of fiscal politics and 
subsequently leads to inequitable and inefficient allocation of resources (Bradstein 2003). 
Studies on the political economy of public spending in Ghana and Malawi undertaken by 
Rakner et al. (2004), showed that when there is no open dialogue about how resources 
are to be allocated, it is likely that there is a parallel set of informal incentive systems and 
interests at play, influencing allocations, behind the scenes. They further argue that such 
informal systems and incentives “make a mockery” of the approved and legal processes 
of public budgeting (Rakner et al. 2004: 17).  
 In summary, whilst in theory budget consultation structures are opportunities to 
make a case for improved spending on child protection, the reality on the ground is that 
a lot still needs to be done to make these structures to work as expected. Also, in line 
with Article 12 of the CRC (1989), it is important to create platforms for meaningful child 
participation in planning and budgeting. The preceding discussion has shown that the 
way these structures are run and the fiscal politics at play, have not, as yet, helped 
advance the case for more spending on child protection. But we should not throw away 
the baby with the bath water as child protection practitioners need to do their homework 
on how best to use these platforms and navigate the politics at stake. The next section 




9.3 Political Economy Dynamics During Budget Approval 
 
In this sub-section, the study examines fiscal politics during budget approval. Specifically, 
it assesses the extent to which parliamentarians in selected countries promoted and 
defended public investments in child protection when their national budgets were tabled 
in Parliament for discussion and approval. Like any other public spending matter, child 
protection, in theory, is vulnerable to the interests, balance of forces and incentives 
available to Members of Parliament (MPs) during the budget approval stage (Norton & 
Elson 2002; Baltussen 2006). The fiscal politics at this stage revolves around MPs 
seeking to defend and advance their political party positions about spending on specific 
sectors and programmes. This political manoeuvring manifests during debate at 
committee level and also in the main house, when the draft budget estimates are 
discussed by all MPs.  
Before delving into the details of how MPs in selected countries sought to influence 
public spending on child protection, it is important to make general observations about 
factors influencing their functions and effectiveness with regards to public budgeting. The 
first is the political party composition of a given parliament (Rotberg & Salahub 2013: 7-
11).  In situations where one party, particularly the one in power, has a significant majority, 
debate and decision-making tend to be along party lines (Parliamentary Centre 2011: 11). 
In such cases, MPs tend to rubber stamp decisions made by the executive and or party 
structures. In practice, this implies that ruling parties will take advantage of their numbers 
to pass budgets which advance their interests and can easily use that majority to object 
to proposals by opposition parties (Parliamentary Centre 2011). In Kenya, this is 
commonly described as the ‘tyranny of numbers’33 by the media, academics and political 
commentators. This phenomenon was also observed in Botswana, whereby the ruling 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) used its majority in Parliament to pass laws and 
budgets. Unfortunately, as argued by one respondent, “too much loyalty to a political party 
 
33 The term is used frequently in Kenya to refer to the majority advantage that the ruling Jubilee Party has over its 
opponents. In the 11th parliament, elected in July 2017, Jubilee has 167 MPs compared with the opposition’s 141. See 
for examples:  https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Tyranny-of-numbers-in-Kenya-parliament-agenda-/2558-





tends to cloud rational thinking and curtail debate in parliament” (Botswana Interviewee 
10, CSO, 2018).   
The second factor is the ‘culture of debate’, which is part of the governance culture 
discussed in the previous chapter. Despite the tyranny of numbers, the researcher 
observed that Kenya had cultivated a culture of open dialogue whereby individual MPs 
were free to express their views even if they were not in line with the official party position. 
This was partly because the Parliament was full of coalition of political parties, making it 
hard for all MPs to tow a single line. This conclusion was arrived at after a comparative 
analysis of parliamentary debates beamed live on national televisions of Botswana, 
Kenya and Zimbabwe between 2015 and 2018. In 2016, for example, Joseph Nkaissery 
who was Kenya’s Minister of Interior, publicly disagreed with Henry Rotich, the Minister 
of finance during parliamentary debate, over the low allocation given to the police, yet 
they belonged to the same political coalition (Shiunda 2016).  Open debate allows MPs 
to raise child protection issues which affect their constituencies without fearing reprisals 
from their political party leaders.   
 Thirdly, as observed by Posner & Park (2007), the nature of budget debates and 
negotiations is influenced by the calibre of MPs, including age, level of education, 
knowledge of issues, and personal power. In Kenya for example, MPs who had 
experience with child rights, such as Millie Odhiambo, a lawyer by profession, commented 
a lot about child rights during parliamentary debates. Included in the calibre of MPs is 
their capacity to read and interpret budget documents. One MP in Kenya admitted that: 
Most of us MPs lack budget analysis skills to scrutinize budgets. We come from different 
backgrounds. Some are social workers, some agriculturalists, others are nurses, and lawyers. 
We therefore rely on our research team and NGO partners, and sometimes the Parliamentary 
Budget Office to help us meaningfully comment on the budget. Besides, we often do not have 
the time to analyse voluminous budget documents (Kenya Interviewee 30, Member of 
Parliament, 2016). 
In part due to lack of skills and voluminous nature of budget documents, most MPs in all 
four countries tended to focus their analysis on what was verbally presented in Parliament 




the people read and understand detailed budget estimates for them to effectively perform 
their oversight role (IBP 2017; Parliamentary Centre 2011; Posner & Park 2007). To a 
great extent, the budget speech shaped much of the debate in the main house. An MP in 
South Sudan was open about this point:  
Most MPs do not have time to go through all the budget documents. We read the 
statement made by the Minister. This is what we usually focus on. Unfortunately for you, 
very rarely are child protection issues clearly spelt out in budget speeches (South Sudan 
Interviewee 13, Member of Parliament, 2018). 
Altogether, the above factors have a bearing on the extent to which MPs can 
independently and effectively scrutinise budgets before approval.  
According to the results of the 2017 Open Budget Survey34 conducted by the 
International Budget Partnership (IBP), Botswana’s Parliament exercises more legislative 
oversight on budgets than the other three countries with a score of 56 out of 100, followed 
by South Sudan (54/100), Kenya (50/100) and lastly Zimbabwe (46/100) as shown in 
Figure 16 (IBP 2017).35 One of the reasons for this modest performance is lack of timely 
financial and other information required to exercise effective legislative oversight. The 
extent to which MPs defend public spending on child protection, should therefore be 
understood within the context of the overall performance of parliaments in exercising 
budgetary oversight.  
 
34 The Open Budget Survey is the world’s most independent survey to measure level of budget transparency. The 
survey focuses on three elements: public access to key budget documents, public participation in budgeting and 
parliamentary oversight throughout the budget cycle. 
  
35 In this score, 0 is the worst performance, and 100 is the best. The same scoring method is used for the Open 





Source: Author, based on data from International Budget Partnership (2017,02) 
Recognising that MPs require specialised and in-house analytical support, Kenya and 
Zimbabwe have established Parliamentary Budget Offices (PBOs). The South Sudan 
Parliament also reaches out to civil society organisations such as Save the Children to 
equip MPs with skills on how to interpret budgets from a child rights perspective.  
Feedback from research participants in all four case study countries, however, 
suggests that there are challenges regarding the engagement between CSOs and MPs. 
One of the concerns is that MPs demand allowances for attending meetings convened by 
CSOs, even when they are for their own capacity-building. A considerable number of 
CSOs who participated in this study said that the demand for hefty allowances by MPs to 
attend meetings is a barrier to engagement and capacity-building on child protection 
related topics. This is aptly captured by one NGO official in Zimbabwe:  
MPs demand exorbitant allowances when they attend budget analysis meetings organised 
by CSOs and other stakeholders. If you are not offering ‘good money’ they do not attend 
your meetings. In the process, and sadly so, they deprive themselves of opportunities to 
learn about children’s rights and budgeting (Zimbabwe Interviewee 41, CSO, 2019). 
Building on the background above, the study will now examine the extent to which 
legislatures in the four case study countries sought to influence the level of public 
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In all four countries, there were two main ways through which MPs engaged with 
issues regarding public spending on child protection. These are: a) individual 
contributions during the full budget debate in the chamber/ main house; b) committee 
discussions and reports. Parliaments of all four countries have introduced a committee 
system, whereby MPs are divided into small thematic sub-groups which focus on specific 
issues such as education, health and social welfare. Chairpersons of these committees 
are democratically elected, and operations are guided by standing orders. In some cases, 
specialised committees are also established to deal with emerging issues of concern to 
the public. For example, in Zimbabwe, a thematic committee on gender and development 
and early marriages was established in 2014, after several NGOs, including the Women’s 
Coalition, had advocated for the same given high levels of gender-based violence and 
early marriages. In 2012, South Sudan launched a Parliamentary Lobby Group on 
Children, which was initially headed by Honourable Mary Nawai. This lobby group was 
used as a platform through which to advocate for improved investments in child focussed 
programmes and for the government to implement the Child Act (2008). With facilitation 
from Save the Children, members of the Lobby Group were trained in child responsive 
budgeting in 2011 and in 2014. The workshop training materials and programme shared 
with the researcher showed that MPs were made aware of the need to critically look at 
cross-cutting and usually neglected areas such as child protection and early childhood 
development.  
Committees provided opportunities for Parliamentarians to discuss budget 
estimates under a given sector or thematic area. Child protection matters were usually 
discussed in social welfare related committees such as the Local Government and Social 
Welfare Committee in Botswana; Labour and Social Welfare Committee in Kenya; 
Gender, Children and Social Welfare Committee in South Sudan; and the Public Service, 
Labour and Social Welfare Committee in Zimbabwe. By limiting discussions on child 
protection to social welfare committees, its connections to other sectors such as 
education, health, and justice was overlooked. Yet, child protection is a multi-sectoral 
matter which should be discussed in other sectoral committees as well. The outcomes of 
the discussions were summarised in committee reports, which were then presented in the 




The vibrancy of debate and level of detail in committee reports was also influenced 
by the interaction between a given committee and other stakeholders such as NGOs. The 
study found that in Kenya and Zimbabwe, social welfare committees usually invited NGOs 
involved in child protection to air their views about draft budget estimates and related 
fiscal policy proposals.  In Zimbabwe, child focused NGOs36 under the auspices of the 
Child Friendly National Budget Initiative (CFNBI), coordinated by the National Association 
of Non-Government Organisations (NANGO) consistently engaged the Public Service, 
Labour and Social Welfare and Budget Committees of Parliament with key messages 
about investments in children on a yearly basis. Among other things, they lobbied for 
“increased funding to the budget line on children in especially difficult circumstances, per-
capita grants to children in institutions and the Street Children Fund.”37  
However, some of the position papers reviewed by the researcher tended to be 
scanty, lacking enough depth to back the recommendations. Moreover, several pertinent 
child protection issues such as child trafficking, ending child marriages, children on the 
move, violence against children, and sexual abuse did not feature in position papers of 
NGOs. Moreover, and sadly so, NGOs too were caught up in the ‘child welfare trap’ 
discussed in Chapter Seven whereby they demanded more from government funding for 
social assistance than other elements of a national child protection system such as case 
management. Reports of relevant parliamentary committees reflected this bias by NGOs.  
 The study also observed that debate in committees and in the main house about 
allocations to child protection programmes was crowded out by more visible and 
‘politically savvy’ matters such as energy, water, agriculture subsidies, transport, health 
and social assistance. In Zimbabwe, for instance, since 2015, the Committee on Public 
Service, Labour and Social Welfare commented more on social assistance programmes 
such as ‘children in difficult circumstances’ and the Basic Education Assistance Module 
 
36 These include Child protection society, Save the Children, Justice for Children and the Zimbabwe National Council 
for the Welfare of Children. 
  





(BEAM) - an educational assistance programme to most deprived children - than other 
child protection programmes. The quote below speaks to the above issues:  
Cumulative arrears for the Basic Education Assistance Module for 2014, 2015 and 2016 
now stand at $72 million. The Ministry has been allocated only $10 million (about 10%) 
from a requirement of $105 million. This amount will result in only 161,102 children being 
assisted in 2017, from an estimated need of over 500,000 children. As many as 338,000 
children risk dropping out of school in 2017. Major donors DFID and USAID have stopped 
supporting BEAM hence the need for the government to support the programme. In 
addition to this constraint, children in difficult circumstances have been availed only 
$200,000 compared to the ideal requirement of $1,500,000.00, and this will adversely 
affect that social programme (Parliament of Zimbabwe 2017). 
The study could not establish the impact of committee discussions on budget 
decisions. A more comprehensive evaluation, outside the scope of this study is required. 
Nevertheless, what is apparent is that relatively meaningful discussions about child 
protection spending happened at the committee level and less in the main house of the 
respective Parliaments. One of the reasons why debate is not robust in the main house 
is that there is limited time for MPs to go into details of every issue discussed in committee 
sessions. What was common was that the chairperson of a given committee presented 
headline messages only. Unfortunately, for the most part, child protection was not visible 
in the summary reports presented during the budget discussion in parliament. Below is 
an example of a submission made in the Parliament of Zimbabwe by the Public Service, 
Labour and Social Welfare Committee, which demonstrates how child protection issues 
where summarised and presented:  
The total amount earmarked for children in difficult circumstances was far less than 
requested by the ministry. Only $1 million was availed against a bid of $30 million. These 
resources are mainly meant for orphans, vulnerable children, children in sexual 
exploitation, among others. Given the demographics of the country where children are a 
greater proportion of the population, the allocated resources will have less impact in 
resolving challenges of children in difficult situations (Parliament of Zimbabwe 2018). 
From the above extract, it is clear that the recommendations were top-line, lacking 




gap between cost estimates and budget allocations. Lastly, it exposes the welfare 
conception of child protection by politicians.  
Although this section is focused on the budget approval stage, it is also important 
to note that some MPs raised motions and questions about child protection even outside 
the budgeting session. Examples include Honourable Bogolo Joy Kenewendo in 
Botswana who moved a motion in the Parliament of Botswana for the creation of a ‘sex 
offender’s registry’. The motion was passed on 1 December 2017 (Waweru 2017). This 
was motivated by the increase of sexual assaults in the country. To her credit, Honourable 
Kenewendo also moved a motion for “the alignment of the Penal Code to the Children’s 
Act (2001)” which would deal with issues of sexual consent, child imprisonment, and 
incest among others.38  
In Kenya, Honourable Millie Odhiambo was cited by many respondents as an 
outspoken MP when it comes to issues of women and children’s rights, as much as 
Honourable Mary Nawai in South Sudan. Honourable Millie Odhiambo, for instance, 
proposed an amendment to the Marriage Act “compelling all men to publicly declare their 
children in and out of wedlock while alive and in case they don’t, the mothers should 
declare” (Wyclife 2018:01) Additionally, she was one of the MPs who supported the 
enactment of the Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act (2011), which was followed 
by the establishment of the Anti-Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) Board. According to 
Section 14 of the Act, the Anti-FGM Board will be financed from government and other 
resources. 
In Zimbabwe, Honourable Jessie Majome advocated the establishment of an ad 
hoc Parliamentary committee to end child marriage. By the end of 2016, the committee 
had mobilised 21 MPs (about 10% of all parliamentarians), from different political parties, 
to sign a declaration to end child marriage. In the same year, the committee assessed the 
situation of children’s homes and presented a report to Parliament on the 17th of 
November. However, the report did not mention the need for government to review its 
 
38 These two pieces of legislation had some contradictory clauses. For example, whilst corporal punishment is banned 





investments on child protection (Parliament of Zimbabwe 2018). Honourable Sessil 
Zvidzai, also advocated for the creation of “safe houses and legal aid to survivors of child 
marriages to cancel their marriages” in Zimbabwe (Mafa 2016:2). The push by MPs to 
end child marriage in Kenya, South Sudan and Zimbabwe is partly because of high-level 
engagements by institutions such as Girls Not Brides, UNFPA and UNICEF, under the 
auspices of the Global Partnership to End Child Marriage (2016).  
Other MPs who also spoke out on child protection issues include Honourable 
Tendai Biti, also a former Minister of Finance, who called upon the government to make 
concerted efforts to end child marriage (Biti 2016). In Zimbabwe, other MPs notably 
Honourable Bheki Sibanda, Angeline Masuku, Priscilla Misihairambwi-Mushonga and 
Zelerah Makari, from ruling and opposition parties, also voiced their concerns about child 
prostitution, early marriages and child sexual abuse (Mazire & Kusema, 28 September 
2014). The above examples of MPs speaking out on issues of child protection is 
something to be celebrated. The only challenge is that these discussions were not linked 
to budgeting processes.  
In all four countries, commemorative events such as the 16 Days of Activism 
Against Gender-Based Violence and the Day of the African Child were also used by MPs 
and other senior government officials as platforms to galvanize political support for 
addressing certain child protection risks such as sexual abuse and child marriage. Of 
course most of these events were bankrolled by donors and CSOs. During these events, 
ministers and MPs highlight important issues of concern, and sometimes offer solutions 
to the problems. The statement below by the Minister of Gender in South Sudan in 
December 2018 is indicative: 
All stakeholders, including the national champions in the fight against child marriage 
appointed by His Excellency, President Salva Kiir Mayardit, who have pledged to support 
the implementation of the Strategic National Action Plan to End Child Marriage in South 
Sudan must come together to immediately bring forth the comprehensive change outlined 
in the plan. The action plan includes legal reform and enforcement; ensuring access to 
quality education, and sexual and reproductive health information and services; and 




in whatever form to support the full implementation of the costed strategic plan (MoGCSW 
& UNFPA 2018).   
However, many politicians do not always mean what they say, nor do they do what they 
say. The above pronouncement was not accompanied by a commitment of resources to 
implement the plan.  
From the preceding paragraphs, it can be established that child protection issues 
of one form or another were discussed by MPs. To some degree, the discussions were 
shaped by big media stories of child abuse. Unfortunately, the discussions were mostly 
programmatic and less about public spending. This approach of following the news does 
not lead to strengthened national child protection systems. However, to their credit, MPs 
in the case study countries passed laws and motions on topics related to child protection. 
Apart from legislative breakthroughs, the study could not find any evidence in all four 
countries of MPs consistently speaking out on financing of child protection interventions 
as much as they did about social assistance, health, education and employment creation 
programmes. Apart from lack of political appeal some of the underlying reasons are poor 
conceptualisation of the subject matter and pressure from constituencies to focus on 
visible programmes which affect several constituencies. The study could not find any 
discernible differences in the way child protection issues were treated by MPs from ruling 
and opposition parties. In the final analysis, child protection is yet to be a major focus in 
budget discussions by parliamentarians in selected countries during budget approval. 
9.4 Concluding Remarks  
 
This chapter has argued that child protection spending is a victim, not of electoral politics 
as often postulated in studies on political economy of public spending (Wildavsky 1984; 
Hibbs 1981; Nordhaus 1975), but of fiscal politics at each stage of the budget cycle 
(Gasper et al. 2018; Norton & Elson 2002). From priority setting to budget approval, the 
fiscal politics at play undermined rather than advanced the case for more spending on 
child protection. However, the invisibility and under-funding of child protection in 
government budgets does not seem to be deliberate, but unintended consequence of 




appeal, among other factors. The penultimate reason for the under-funding of child 
protection is akin to the aphorism about the grass that suffers when elephants fight, that 
is, when big programmes and sectors compete for resources, or when things go in the 
wrong direction economically and politically, smaller programmes such as child protection 
suffer. Child protection budget lines are often sacrificed in favour of big and visible 
development issues such as roads, schools, cash transfers and drugs. The latter issues 
attract the interests of politicians most as they have a high likelihood of advancing their 
personal and political interests. 
A key conclusion from this chapter is that although issues of child abuse and 
exploitation are pertinent, when it comes to public budgeting, they are not on top of 
spending priorities of the top leadership. Most child protection programmes, except for 
social assistance programmes, do not feature in budget speeches and parliamentary 
debates, a confirmation that child protection is yet to have significant political traction with 
power holders. By emphasising certain programmes and ideologies political leaders 
unknowingly influenced the size and composition of child protection budgets. In the final 
analysis, it can be concluded that all four governments still have a long way to go to 
effectively make a case for, and to increase the political profile of child protection in public 
budgeting. The next and final Chapter discusses key findings and presents conclusions 














Conclusions: Towards a Political Economy Approach to 
Public Spending on Child Protection 
10.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections, with the first focusing on key conclusions from 
the study as guided by research questions. In the second section, key ideas on how a 
political economy approach can be used to influence the level of public spending on child 
protection are presented. The practical applications of ideas proffered in this study will 
depend on the socio-economic and political contexts of each country. The last section 
summarises the contributions of this study to the body of knowledge on child protection 
and provides pointers on areas for further research. As a prelude to the discussion, a 
short detour is necessary to refresh our memories about the aims, conceptual framework, 
and assumptions of the study. 
The aim of the study was to critically examine how the political economy of the state-
society complex has affected public spending on child protection in four African countries 
namely: Botswana, Kenya, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe. The background to this was 
that several studies (Folscher & Allan 2014; Muchabaiwa 2012; Pereznieto et al. 2011; 
Save the Children 2010) had revealed the painful reality that child protection services are 
insufficiently funded and, in some cases, completely invisible in government budgets. 
What was missing in existing literature mostly from child-focused organisations is 
knowledge of why this is the case? It is this gap in knowledge which motivated this study. 
To establish the empirical foundation for the investigation, the study started with a 
rigorous budget analysis spanning for seven years (2010-2017) to estimate the size and 
composition of annual budget allocations to child protection in each country. The analysis 
confirmed earlier observations by several authors, including those cited above that child 
protection is, indeed, inadequately funded in government budgets. This finding 
strengthened the resolve to investigate underlying reasons for this painful reality, at a time 




(UNICEF 2017). While there several studies to measure the size and composition of 
public spending on child protection (Avati et al. 2018; CPWG 2012; KIPPRA 2020, 2020b; 
Pereznieto et al. 2011; Save the Children 2015; UNICEF 2014, 2014b, 2018e; World 
Vision International 2021, etc) the researcher hardly found studies which 
comprehensively examined reasons for the under-funding of child protection from a 
political economy perspective. With this background, and cognisant of the political nature 
of budgeting, the researcher decided to investigate the underlying reasons for observed 
trends in public spending on child protection in the four case study countries through a 
political economy lens. Specifically, the investigation sought to answer four main research 
questions:  
• To what extent do socio-cultural and political constructions of childhood and 
children’s rights influence decisions on public spending on child protection? 
• How do configurations and functioning of the state machinery, including fiscal 
decentralisation, affect public spending on child protection? 
• How do interests, power, class alliances and constructions of hegemony by 
political elites and other stakeholders affect public spending on child protection? 
• How can a political economy approach be effectively applied to improve public 
spending on child protection in Africa?  
To answer the above research questions, a multi-disciplinary conceptual framework built 
from three interrelated political economy theories was used. The underlying logic of the 
three-tiered framework was that decisions on the size and composition of budget 
allocations to child protection are influenced by three composite political economy 
variables namely: a) prevailing socio-cultural and legal constructions of childhood, b) 
configurations and broad functioning of the state apparatus including issues of fragility, 
governance culture, and fiscal decentralisation, and c) political dynamics throughout the 
budget cycle, commonly known as fiscal politics. 
The study was premised on two critical assumptions, derived from a review of 
literature discussed in Chapter Two. The first is that a government budget is the most 
important public policy tool at the disposal of all governments to deliver public services 




OHCHR 2015, 2015b; UNCRC 2016). The reasoning behind this assumption is 
straightforward and irrefutable: provision of any public service costs money. Without 
committing resources, through a government budget, child protection policy commitments 
will remain empty promises. Undeniably, a budget - and how it is spent - is therefore one 
of the truest measures of a government’s real commitment to the creation of a protective 
environment for all children, in both development and emergency settings (OHCHR 2015; 
UN 2015). The second and most fundamental assumption which informed the conceptual 
framework of the study is that public budgeting is not a mere technical process of number 
crunching, but a deeply political process, influenced by a range of forces internal and 
external to the state-society complex (DFID 2007; Keefer & Khemani 2003; Norton & 
Elson 2002; Wildavsky 1984). Politics, by definition, is about who gets what, where, when 
and how of available resources – which are always seen to be in short supply (Gasper et 
al. 2018; Marx 1879). Thus, politics, which is intertwined with economics, penetrates to 
the core of public budgeting (Chang 1997; Diaz-Cayeros & Magalon 2003; Gasper et al. 
2018; Keefer & Khemani 2003). With this brief background, key conclusions from the 
study are discussed.  
10.1 Discussion on Key Findings  
 
10.1.1 Proliferation of Child Protection Policies, But No Corresponding Budgets  
Not surprisingly, and in line with earlier studies, the study found that the proliferation of 
child protection policies, laws, and national plans in all four countries has not been 
accompanied by sustained commitments of human and financial resources towards their 
implementation. It can be argued, therefore, that the presence of child protection policies 
and plans, although a good start,  is an insufficient measure of a government’s real 
commitment to tackling child maltreatment. If there is one area that the majority of 
research participants, whether from government or not, converged on, was the yawning 
gap between commitments on paper and budgets to deliver child protection services.  
In all four countries, child protection is neither a top spending priority of 
governments nor of opposition parties in both development and emergency settings: that 




protection undertaken in Chapter Six and subsequent discussions in Chapter Nine. An 
important caveat should however be made: the study is by no means saying that child 
protection should be the number one priority of all governments. Instead, its core 
argument is that child protection should get an appropriate policy attention, and a fair 
share of available resources, mindful of the catastrophic implications of inaction. Child 
protection was conspicuous by its absence from national development plans and in public 
pronouncements by presidents, their deputies, and ministers. The poor articulation of 
child protection in national development plans and vision documents indicates its low 
political profile and, to some extent, its mis-conceptualisation by the top leadership and 
the technocrats with whom they work.  
In none of the four countries studied was child protection high among the personal 
and institutional interests and development ideologies of the top leadership. For the most 
part, the top leadership was interested more in macro-economic issues such as poverty 
eradication and infrastructure creation that appeal to voters as well as their public finance 
advisors including within the IMF and the World Bank, than child protection programmes. 
Nor was child protection a priority of parliamentarians. Even though a considerable 
number of parliamentarians spoke out occasionally about the dangers of child 
maltreatment and harmful practices, most of them did not link these outcries with budget 
discussions. Hansard reports reviewed as part of this study exposed the underlying 
interests of parliamentarians forcing them to speak more about transport, security, 
education, and health, than child protection services. Characteristics of child protection 
services such as intangibility and localised nature did not seem to appeal to politicians. 
This was compounded by its poor conceptualisation.  
The huge gap between cost estimates in child protection related plans and annual 
budget allocations, discussed in Chapter Six, became a testament of the insufficiency of 
child protection budgets. Child protection budgets were not only a far outcry of what is 
needed but also increased at a slower rate than total government expenditure and 
spending in other sectors such as health. In Zimbabwe, for instance, child protection 
spending only increased by 0.13 percent for everyone percentage change in total 




care support and cash transfers increased at a rate lower than allocations to local 
government, defence, and public administration. In South Sudan, budget ceilings to the 
Ministry of gender and child welfare increased at a rate which was almost two times lower 
than the Ministry of defence between 2011 and 2017.  
Whilst the above results were somehow expected, there was a shocking aspect: 
child protection financing was crowded out even in ministries responsible for social and 
child welfare. In Zimbabwe, child protection was dwarfed by programmes such as youth 
empowerment, public works, compensation of war veterans and agriculture subsidies all 
under the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare which coordinates child protection issues. 
This finding was counterintuitive in that one would expect that people with a better 
understanding of child rights and the socio-economic consequences of child abuse and 
exploitation, typically found in social welfare ministries, would be at the forefront of 
pushing for increased spending on child protection. Unfortunately, child protection 
struggled to be top of spending priorities of social welfare ministries. In that case, one 
does not need to do any sophisticated analysis to know whether child protection 
programmes were prioritised in other ministries such as health, education, and justice or 
not. As one research assistant argued, child protection is largely a “by-the-way” 
(Zimbabwe Interviewee 12, CSO, 2016) issue in 'non-social welfare’ ministries such as 
education, home affairs, health, and agriculture. In all four countries, for instance, none 
of the education ministries had visible budget lines on child protection. This is rather 
unfortunate because there are so many cases of male teachers abusing female students, 
and of violence against children, including through bullying and corporal punishment.  
The wrong perception by ‘non-social welfare’ ministries that child protection was 
not their responsibility defeats the systems approach, which requires multiple ministries 
and departments to be involved in the planning and budgeting for child protection 
services. Unless there is a paradigm shift in the way child protection is understood, with 
all relevant institutions accepting their responsibility, there is a clear risk that this issue 
will continue to be siloed in social/ child welfare ministries. Sadly, the perception that child 




The under-funding of child protection services raises questions about the 
ownership of the numerous laws and plans shelved in various ministries and government 
departments. If the respective governments where truly committed to child protection, 
why then did they not accompany the development of plans with commitment of human, 
technical and financial resources? This is the question that some research participants 
rhetorically posed. Despite carrying government logos, and signatures of ministers, the 
initiation and development of many child protection plans was, to a remarkable extent, 
driven by donors and civil society organisations. To illustrate this point, as argued earlier, 
national strategies to end child marriage in South Sudan and Zimbabwe were developed 
with funding and technical assistance from the Girls Not Brides, UNFPA and UNICEF, 
under the auspices of the Global Partnership to End Child Marriage. Donor organisations 
such as USAID, European Union, and DFID have also been at the forefront of promoting 
the development of national plans of action for orphans and other vulnerable children for 
the past decade or so, and now behind the booming cash transfer industry.  
Even after the development of the above plans, much of the campaigns to stop 
violence against children, surveys to measure the prevalence of abuse, and 
programmatic responses have been championed by local and international NGOs, with 
external funding from donors from the minority world. With most of the work left to them, 
the NGOs have faithfully promoted the globalised definitions of child protection, 
developed by the minority world. This led some government officials and communities to 
view children’s rights, and aspects of child protection as ‘western agendas’ to be funded 
from donor resources. Some government officials even reached the extent of saying that 
they do not need to prioritise funding to some child protection programmes because 
donors are interested in such. It is this kind of thinking, which, to some extent, has fuelled 
donor-dependency of financing of child protection services as discussed in Chapter 
Seven.  
10.1.2 Budget Politics and Child Protection  
A central conclusion from this study, which confirms its main hypothesis, is that under-
funding of child protection is closely associated with the fiscal politics in each country at 




allocate meagre resources to child protection; but child protection is a victim of fiscal 
politics around the budget cycle. The much touted ‘lack of political will’ should, therefore, 
be understood within the framework of a wide range of political economy variables at play 
in both development and emergency settings. Throughout the budget cycle, the jostling 
for resources by ministries and departments worked against child protection in all four 
countries. In the first place, as indicated earlier, the interests of, and incentives available 
to politicians and the technocrats they work with undermined rather than advanced the 
case for more spending on child protection. The fact that child protection was not among 
the issues that interested the top leadership the most, at national and ministerial level, 
meant that social welfare ministries, and child protection programmes, consistently 
received low budget ceilings. Higher budget ceilings were given to ministries that are most 
visible such as transport, energy, water, health, housing, and education. Moreover, the 
perception that social or child welfare ministries are not powerful compared to local 
government and defense, for example, disadvantaged them when negotiating for higher 
budget ceilings. 
Power dynamics and the politics of positioning of programmes and departments 
within ministries – including social welfare - for funding did not work in favor of child 
protection. In most ministries with the responsibility for delivering certain services, child 
protection was dwarfed and outcompeted by other programmes that were seen to be 
appealing to the presidency and the ministerial leadership. The individual agency, 
perceived power of a departmental head and closeness to the minister and the presidency 
also played a role.  
To make matters worse, the study did not find any voting constituency pushing for 
increased spending on child protection in a robust and consistent way. This can be 
contrasted with farmers on the agriculture budget, students and teachers on the education 
budget and women on budgets for gender empowerment, to mention only a few 
examples. As discussed in Chapter Eight, although they tried hard, through their child 
friendly budgeting initiatives, child-focused CSOs were mostly unsuccessful in lobbying 
for more government spending on child protection. This was partly because they lacked 
a robust evidence base to use in making their case, poorly packaged child protection, and 




their ignorance of the technicalities, politics, and protocol of public budgeting. It appears, 
many of these organisations were punching above their weight. Owing to the 
ineffectiveness of child-focused CSOs and their counterparts in government, the case for 
improved spending on child protection was weak and often poorly communicated to 
budget makers, especially those in ministries of finance.  
In the final analysis, the nature of fiscal politics within ministries and government 
as a whole disadvantaged the case for child protection. The under-funding of child 
protection in all four countries, to a considerable degree, was an unintended consequence 
of its low political profile and lack of political appeal to those with the power to allocate 
national resources.  With this observation, it is fair to conclude that the low funding to child 
protection services and programmes was not because of political business cycles and 
associated electoral politics. Instead, the spending patterns reflected more the political 
and economic context in a given year as well as the prevailing interests and incentives 
available to those in positions of power on the one hand, and the political profile and 
agency of child welfare ministries when it comes to budget negotiations in a given year. 
This is because public spending on child protection did not change during election years 
as put forward by Hibbs (1977) and Nordhaus (1975). This shows that the influence of 
elections on macro-economic policies is more likely to be pronounced in the minority than 
majority world.  
The underfunding of child protection should, however, not be interpreted as a 
purely budgeting problem. It is also a result of the influence of deep-seated societal views 
about what constitutes child abuse and how it should be responded to on policy and 
budget decisions. These issues, discussed in the section which follow, go to the heart of 
sociocultural constructions of childhood, a central aspect of cultural political economy. 
 
10.1.3 Effects of Social Constructions of Childhood on Budgeting  
After analysing a wide range of responses by research participants, the study concludes 
that answers to why child protection is under-funded in government budgets cannot be 
entirely located in corridors of formal power. They are also found in belief systems, social 
norms, and widely held views about the treatment of children. Thus, to do justice to the 




institutions and processes, as well as in traditional and contemporary governance 
structures. This view resonates with Ekeh’s (1975: 91-93) argument that to understand 
development dynamics in post-colonial Africa one has to examine the ideologies and 
interdependencies of two publics which he called ‘primordial’ and ‘civic’ in reference to 
traditional and modern societies, with the latter represented by formal government 
institutions. The study unearthed a mosaic of underlying and informal forces shaping the 
child protection practice, and subsequently decisions on budget allocations which lie at 
the intersection of sociocultural constructions of childhood, religious beliefs, and 
patrimonialism.  
All four countries have underlying social norms, beliefs and community practices 
that shape their views on how children should be raised and treated. When hegemonic, 
these views have far-reaching implications on formal child protection policy and practice 
(Mason & Steadman 1997). The study established that some of the reasons behind the 
continuation of practices such as child marriage, FGM and corporal punishment, for 
example, have more to do with social arrangements, informal institutions and societal 
views on children than technicalities of budgeting. Politicians and policymakers, as 
members of society, are also likely to have their worldviews shaped by prevailing 
constructions of childhood. Their perspectives ultimately have a bearing on how child 
protection is conceptualised in government policies, plans, programmes, and budgets. 
This is despite existence of global conceptions of childhood and child protection. From 
the discussion in Chapter Seven, it was established that policy and budget makers take 
a cue from the communities they live in when they decide which child protection 
interventions to promote or not, and how so. 
Several examples of harmful practices in selected case study countries, anchored 
in prevailing socio-cultural constructions of childhood, were cited in the preceding 
chapters to illustrate how community views shape the acceptance of, and demand for, 
certain formal child protection services delivered by the government. In several cases, in 
all four countries, local constructions of childhood were not in harmony with the position 
of children in law as guided by international statutes such as the CRC (1989) and the 
ACRWC (1990). In Botswana, many of the people who participated in this study believed 




as a way of training and disciplining them. It was, therefore, hard for them to accept the 
prohibition of corporal punishment, let alone to believe that a whole government-funded 
programme was necessary to reverse what they have practiced for generations. Besides, 
as argued in Chapter Seven, many communities felt that issues such as parenting, and 
sexuality were better handled privately by families and traditional authorities than by 
governments. With this view, there is therefore no expectation for the government to 
commit resources from its budgets towards such causes.  
In addition to the above, prevailing constructions of childhood led to mis-
conceptualisations of child protection by policy and budget makers, mainly through 
welfare rather than rights lenses. The characterization of childhood as a time of 
dependency on parents and guardians for everything somehow underpins the child 
welfare approach prominent in all four countries. The erroneous equating of child 
protection with child welfare also resulted in the skewed composition of child protection 
budgets. In Botswana and Zimbabwe, the priority given to social welfare type of activities 
such as residential care, orphan care support, scholarships for the poorest children and 
food handouts exposes the welfare conception of child protection. Unfortunately, this 
came at the expense of other crucial elements of the national child protection system 
such as data and statistics, professional workforce, case management, and enforcement 
of child protection laws. The rights dimensions of child protection, including the creation 
of safe environments, dismantling of harmful practices as well as matters related to justice 
for victims were resultantly not given due attention in government budgets.  
To sum it up, a key conclusion from the study is that budget decisions by 
government officials are influenced significantly by social constructions of childhood. 
These are sustained by religious beliefs, traditional as well as education institutions, 
social norms, gendered power relations, and poverty. It would be a mistake to think that 
budget makers and child protection practitioners will behave very differently from the 
communities in which they live because their governments ratified international 
commitments on child rights such as the CRC (1989). Thus, by focusing on budget 
processes alone, researchers and child-focused organisations miss the systemic and 
structural issues perpetuating child abuse and consequently underfunding of child 




that an understanding of the prevailing socio-cultural constructions of childhood as well 
as conceptions of child protection by communities and government officials are an integral 
part of the political economy of public spending on child protection equation. The other 
aspect is the economic and political context, discussed below.  
 
10.1.4 Impacts of Economic and Political context on Budget Decisions 
The study confirmed earlier works by several writers including Collier (2007), Fritz et al. 
(2009), and the IMF (2018) that the political and economic situation of a country, 
especially high levels of fragility, directly impacts on the process and outcomes of public 
budgeting. From a child protection perspective, high levels of fragility, as experienced in 
South Sudan, and to some degree in Zimbabwe, affects revenue mobilisation, allocation 
and utilisation in many ways. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter Eight, fragility reduced the 
resources available from the government to invest in child protection as domestic revenue 
under-performed. With limited domestic resources, the provision of crucial child protection 
services, especially in South Sudan and Zimbabwe, was mostly financed by donors. High 
levels of fragility also force governments to focus on security, humanitarian assistance 
and programmes to ensure political survival.  
Thirdly, normal processes for budget planning, consultations and negotiations are 
disrupted. In South Sudan, for example, war literally stalled meetings of budget sector 
working groups, thereby paving way for unilateral decisions by the executive on how 
available public resources should be allocated. Child protection spending fell victim. 
Lastly, the political context had a bearing on the type of child protection programmes 
prioritised by each government. In war situations, for example, promotive programmes 
such as behavioural communication and preventive services were less prioritised than 
response interventions such as family tracing and re-integration, psychosocial support to 
children affected by armed conflict and related case management.  
 Chapter Eight, which discussed political economy from a governance perspective, 
is therefore significant in that it showed that financing and public expenditure patterns of 
child protection are influenced by economic and political context, governance structure 




by picking four countries with different economic and political situations. Context also 
determines the prevalence and incidence of certain harms to children. It also mediates 
the fiscal politics as it impacts on decision-making on how much should be allocated to 
child protection in development and humanitarian settings. The revenue situation in fragile 
countries was markedly different from economically and politically stable countries like 
Botswana. The role of donors in financing child protections services evidently mirrored 
the economic and political context. In complex emergencies, such as South Sudan, child 
protection programmes were almost wholly funded by donors, with the opposite holding 
true for middle income countries like Botswana. However, economic growth and stability 
in Botswana did not translate into increased funding to child protection, compared to other 
sectors. Another crucial factor is fiscal decentralisation, discussed below.  
On fiscal decentralisation, the study found that countries such as Botswana and 
Zimbabwe, with centralised public finance management systems budgeted less for child 
protection, as a share of the total government budget, than those with devolved systems 
like Kenya. Due to conflict it was not possible to collect data at sub-national level. 
Qualitative and quantitative evidence drawn from Kenya suggests that fiscal devolution 
has immense potential to increase the size of public spending on child protection and to 
enhance the responsiveness of governments to protection risks faced by children.  
Given the discussion in above preceding sections, it can thus be concluded that 
no single political economy variable can explain trends in public spending on child 
protection. Whilst interest based political economy theories, for instance, can be used to 
explain how incentives available to the top leadership influence spending priorities, they 
cannot fully explain the intricacies of fiscal politics within and between ministries. At the 
same time, theories on constructions of childhood, if not connected to those which relate 
to public finance management, have limited utility in the elucidation of the political nature 
of budget decisions. Utilised together, various political economy theories are arguably 
powerful in shedding light on the invisibility and underfunding of child protection in 
government budgets. The next section offers insights on how knowledge of the political 





10.2 Towards a Political Economy Approach to Influencing Public 
Spending on Child Protection 
 
To escape the criticism that studies on political economy have limited practical value as 
noted by DEVCO (2012), Fisher and Marquette (2014), Frey 2011, and Fritz et al. (2014) 
this section proffers a few ideas on how knowledge gained through this study can be used 
to influence decisions on public spending on child protection. Whilst relevant to a wider 
audience, the recommendations are particularly targeted at child welfare departments, 
agencies, and CSOs seeking to make the case for improved public spending on child 
protection. 
 
10.2.1 Better Appreciation of Political Economy Dynamics 
To begin, the political economy approach being advocated in this study makes a strong 
case for child rights organisations, donors and relevant government agencies to be 
deliberate in analysing a mosaic of forces, interests, incentives, and power dynamics 
which underlie decision-making on how public resources should be distributed. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, these forces could be formal or informal, political or economic, 
individual or institutional, and public or private. Political economy analyses as suggested 
by various authors, (DEVCO 2012; DFID 2009; Fisher & Marquette 2014; Nunberg & 
Abdollahian 2006) could be a good starting point. This exercise will be more useful if 
additional elements especially on socio-cultural constructions of childhood and 
governance dynamics, as suggested in this study are considered. The study posits that 
at the basic level, there are six key elements to monitor and analyse distilled from the 
three sets of political economy theories which guided this study. These are: a) personal 
and institutional interests and incentives available to those in positions of power whose 
voices count when it comes to budget decisions (Gasper et al. 2018; Harris & Booth 2013; 
Wayland 2006), b) power relations between and amongst different ministries and 
departments as they jostle for finite resources (Harris 2013; Keefer 2004), c) 
constructions of childhood (Boyden 2014; James & James 2004; Mason & Steadman 




of public finance management institutions, and f) global forces (Bruno 1994; Easterly 
2001).  
The appreciation of political economy dynamics should be extended to 
understanding the agency of key individuals and institutions responsible for budgeting for 
child protection. This is important because the capacity of government officials and their 
allies to navigate the murky, contested, and highly political spheres of budgeting depends 
on their personal knowledge, capacity, and connections. Here, a reflection on real and or 
perceived personal and institutional power, relationships, and knowledge of child 
protection is a critical endeavour. Additionally, it is crucial to map out the points of 
leverage, momentum-building opportunities, and institutional backings – within and 
outside government – required to advance the case for increased spending on child 
protection. 
To be effective in doing the above, child rights institutions should push themselves 
out of their comfort zones to raise their awareness about the messy reality of public 
budgeting, mindful of its technical and political nature. Familiarisation with the processes, 
relationships, tactics, legalities, and politics of budgeting is a must. This way, child rights 
institutions and ministries responsible for child protection are in a better position to 
appreciate what it takes to rise to the political ‘game’ of budgeting, whilst remaining 
technically grounded, and strategically employing a full array social, legal, economic and 
political arguments to mount a strong case for more and better spending on child 
protection. Playing victim all the time, and subsequently blaming ministries of finance for 
under-funding only perpetuates rather than solve the problem. 
The study is, however, not blindly suggesting that political economy analyses and 
accompanying actions are the magic bullets that will address the problem of under-
funding and invisibility of child protection in government budgets. Rather, its main 
argument is that being conscious of and deliberately understanding, interpreting and 
navigating political economy dynamics is a major step in the process of influencing 
decisions about public spending on child protection. Moreover, the political economy 
analyses being suggested here, should not be an end in themselves as they have no 




and implications deciphered and acted upon. In the paragraphs below, a few concrete 
suggestions are made on how child rights organisations can engage effectively with public 
budgeting issues. 
10.2.2 Positioning Child Protection Within Government  
Ministries and departments responsible for child protection should position themselves 
and their programmes within broader national development and fiscal policy discussions. 
The misunderstandings and lack of interest in child protection, especially by non-social 
welfare ministries, requires all relevant ministries with the responsibility to plan for and 
budget for specific child protection services and programmes to realise sooner rather than 
later that without positioning child protection in their ministries and within national 
spending priorities nothing will happen. Positioning in this context entails, among other 
things, connecting child protection to the development priorities of the top leadership, and 
enhancing the visibility of child protection in structures, processes and discourses on 
public finance and development. A critical step in doing this is to understand ideologies, 
persuasions and visions of the top leadership and then examining how these are 
connected to decision-making on budgets.  
The actions suggested above are key because at the heart of public budgeting is 
competition for attention and funding by various functions, programmes and institutions 
(Rubin 2013; Wildavsky 1984). This is the core of fiscal politics. As argued throughout 
this study, decision-making on resource allocation is not always straight forward. 
Decisions to cut back or increase spending on social assistance to children, rehabilitation 
of street children, gender justice or grants to institutions of care, depend on the perceived 
importance and positioning of a given issue, first within a ministry and secondly in the 
broader priorities of government. What this subsection is advancing is the imperative to 
reconstruct, based on insights and robust evidence, narratives about the social, economic 
and political benefits of child protection, and why a business as usual approach would be 
costly to governments and communities. The reconstruction should be extended to the 
primordial publics, using Ekeh’s (1975) parlance, in order to transform negative social 




A critical tool at the disposal of state and non-state actors, borrowed from the 
business world, which can be used to position child protection nationally and globally to 
financiers is an ‘investment case’. An investment case is a synthesis of key arguments 
on why an issue is critical, beneficial to society, and is doable to justify the commitment 
of human, financial, and technical resources (UNICEF 2015). An investment case also 
shows how much funding is required to address a given problem and where the funds 
can be found (Save the Children 2012). In developing the arguments, rigorous 
background analyses on technical and political economy dimensions are key. The 
investment case should strategically speak to underlying reservations and concerns by 
politicians and budget makers instead of being a ‘copy and paste’ job from other countries, 
now common in the development sector.  
Technically, an investment case includes analysis of costs of abuse, neglect, and 
other violence affecting children on their well-being, economies, social relations, and 
peace and stability of nations. Additionally, the analyses seek to quantify the social and 
economic costs of doing nothing or maintaining the status quo as well as benefits and 
social returns of combating child maltreatment. Recent studies by Mitra et al. (2020) and 
Wodon et al. (2018) which sought to quantify the negative costs of child marriage on 
health, learning, and productivity fit into this category of background analysis to inform 
the content of an investment case. This economic type of analysis will, however, need to 
be augmented by strategic use of moral, legal, and even political arguments. All this will 
be tied together by properly analysed, interpreted and packaged data about the 
prevalence and incidence of cases of child maltreatment.  
One may be wondering why is all this necessary. The answer is simple: one of the 
reasons why child protection is under-funded, which the study uncovered, is that the 
technical case for increased spending is weak and poorly communicated to top politicians 
and budget makers. The story from one official from Botswana who successfully 
prevented further cuts to the orphan care support programme discussed in Chapter Nine 
showed the importance of a strong investment case, which is communicated in an 
effective way. The communicative actions which follow the development of an investment 




influence the way public resources are distributed. Whilst the investment case-making 
stream of work is active in corridors of power, another strand is critical: reconstructing 
childhood and child protection narratives.   
10.2.3 Reconstructing Childhood and Child Protection      
Recognising the influence of socio-cultural constructions of childhood on child protection 
policy and practice, it is critical that child rights organisations find ways of shifting the 
views of communities and politicians about how children should be treated. As the study 
showed, some of the views are not in the best interests of children, with the potential to 
perpetuate child maltreatment. Such an endeavour would be extended to raising 
awareness on the actual meaning and practice of child protection, monitoring, and 
shaping views about what constitute child maltreatment, and how cases can be handled. 
Accordingly, the study recommends the strengthening of behaviour change 
communications to change the attitudes, beliefs and social norms about how children 
should be raised and protected from all forms of abuse and violence.  The communicative 
efforts should target a wide range of stakeholders, including but not limited to: 
academicians, communities, media, government officials, social workers and other 
professionals including economists and other technocrats in government.   
 Considering that all four countries are parties to global and regional child rights 
commitments such as the CRC (1989), they have no option but to align with the globalised 
constructions on childhood and child protection. This does, however, mean that 
policymakers should ignore contextual factors. As argued by Peleg (2018), there are limits 
to the universalisation of children’s rights. Alignment implies formulation of contextually 
relevant child protection laws and policies, but which are in harmony with the ACERWC 
(1990) and the CRC (1989). Also, the formulation of the policies and plans should be 
accompanied by a commitment of human, technical and financial resources to ensure 
their full implementation. As earlier highlighted in Chapter Two, article 4 of the CRC (1989) 
requires state parties to undertake measures to mobilize and commit available public 
resources “to the maximum extent possible and, where needed, within the framework of 




issue: the need to leverage global momentum on child protection to influence size and 
composition of spending.  
10.2.4 Leveraging Global Momentum on Child Protection 
With so many regional and global commitments on child protection, there is no better time 
than now for all four countries, and indeed other African states to leverage these to 
strengthen the case for more and better spending on child protection. In the past decade 
or so, world leaders have also set up institutions and processes advocating zero tolerance 
against child abuse. Mechanisms to mobilise finances globally to tackle violence against 
children have also been put in place. Yes, some of these commitments have in the past 
not been fully implemented, but that does not make them irrelevant. What child rights 
organisations should be asking themselves is: how best to use all these international 
commitments as instruments for community mobilisation, holding of duty bearers to 
account, and for budget advocacy. The worst that can happen is to throw the baby with 
the bath water because of past failures. For some African authorities to shun global 
conceptions of child protection and renege on their commitments, after appending their 
signatures agreeing to be bound by them, is to run away from one’s shadow.  If 
domesticated and acted upon the regional and international commitments can potentially 
move the needle. Here are a few examples discussed in previous chapters. 
Child protection is firmly part of the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development. 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) number five on gender equality commits United 
Nations member states to eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced 
marriage and female genital mutilation (Target 5.3). SDG 16 on peace, justice and strong 
institutions further commits member states to end abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all 
forms of violence against children (Target 16.2). Agenda 2030 on Sustainable 
Development constitute a significant milestone upon which calls for improved investments 
in child protection can be anchored. For this to happen, child rights institutions at national 
level have the responsibility to facilitate the translation of SDG commitments on child 
protection into national plans of action and budgetary allocations. In this journey, strategic 
and consistent engagements with legislators, judiciary and all relevant arms of the 




platforms related to child protection and financing for development to generate pressure 
on governments to increase spending on strengthening the national child protection 
system.  
Most fundamentally, there are several international commitments and guidance on 
how best governments can budget for child protection such as General Comment No 19 
of the CRC on ‘Public spending for the realisation of children’s rights’ as well as the 
Human Council Resolution on ‘Investing in the Rights of the Child’. Moreover, at regional 
level, the African Union (AU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
have condemned child marriage and have called upon their member states to accelerate 
their efforts to address this challenge and many other issues that put children at risk 
including by improving their investments in children.  
Additionally, there are also numerous tools developed by child focused 
organisations on how to measure, analyse and influence public spending on child 
protection at country level. Save the Children (2015) and UNICEF (2014), for example, 
have developed technical notes on how to track and measure spending on child 
protection, accompanied by guidance notes on how to produce child protection budget 
briefs and to develop budget advocacy strategies. Initiatives such as the Global 
Partnership to End Violence Against Children, the Global Partnership to End Child 
Marriage, the Global Child Protection Working Group and the Africa Inter-Agency Group 
on child protection are critical platforms for galvanising political will for increased 
investments in child protection. They are also essential for mobilising international public 
resources towards child protection and for defining minimum standards for efficient, 
effective and equitable spending on child protection in both development and 
humanitarian contexts. The bold move by regional institutions such as the AU of 
identifying champions for specific child protection issues is also commendable. In 2018, 
the AU appointed President Edgar Lungu of Zambia as the goodwill ambassador for the 
AU Campaign against child marriage. Such developments serve as opportunities to raise 
the political profile of key child protection issues at country and continental levels.  
Global and regional initiatives and commitments are potentially powerful tools for 
shaping and catalysing efforts to strengthen national child protection systems. If used 




benchmarks for governments to transform their spending patterns on child protection. 
Sub-regional organisations such as the African Union, Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC) as well as treaty bodies such 
as the CRC Committee and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child are also important in the promotion of relevant global initiatives and standards. 
Moving forward, the challenge at stake is for child rights institutions to take a step back 
and if needed go back to the drawing board to learn from past failures in using 
international commitments to shape national spending agendas. On their own, global 
standards, commitments and tools are nothing of practical value to public spending on 
child protection unless used and connected to other development discourses. 
10.2.5 Connecting Child Protection to Economic Development Discourses  
Earlier in this chapter the need to connect child protection to national development 
narratives was highlighted. This section extends the same argument by zeroing on 
linkages with economic development institutions, processes and discourses. This 
recommendation is informed by a realisation that economic ideas and institutions such as 
the African Development Bank, the IMF and the World Bank wield significant influence on 
public financing decisions than social development institutions. For a variety of reasons, 
beyond the scope of this study, some of which ideological, economic arguments tend to 
carry the day in development discourses more than rights and moral arguments. By 
highlighting this point, the study is by no means endorsing or giving primacy to the 
economic arguments of child protection. It is only challenging child protection practitioners 
to be pragmatic in order to tap into the potential of economic and business thinking when 
framing their investment cases as earlier discussed.  
At national level, the starting point is to ensure child protection is well represented 
in national development plans, with macro-economic consequences of child maltreatment 
clearly articulated. More evidence on costs of child maltreatment, returns on investments 
in child protection as well as the links between child protection and economic, and human 
capital development is required – much more than ever before. It is probably such 
quantitative evidence that can move number-crunchers in ministries of finance, and the 




 At an operational level, child rights organisations must tap into the expertise, 
influences and structures of international finance institutions such as the African 
Development Bank, the IMF and the World Bank. Also, they should not ignore national 
economic and development think tanks that advice governments on how they should raise 
and spend public resources. Through their influence on ministries of finance, the above 
and many other institutions can help elevate the position of child protection in national 
spending priorities. To arrive at this stage, child-focused organisations should be able to 
quantitatively and qualitatively show the links between implementation of protection rights 
and economic development, noting that financial institutions often falter when it comes to 
human rights issues (Stubbs & Kentikelenis 2017). Never again should child protection 
be “lost in economic translations” as metaphorically stated by one research participant 
(Zimbabwe Interviewee 31, CSO, 2018). Through collaborative efforts with international 
finance institutions in evidence generation, capacity building and advocacy, child rights 
organisations can help governments enhance their focus on child protection when they 
formulate medium-term expenditure plans and annual budgets.  
The good thing is that almost everything, in one way or the other, can be seen from 
an economic angle. Investing in children, and child protection in particular, should be seen 
as smart economics with demonstrable returns in the short, medium, and long term for 
individuals and nations (Fang et al. 2012; Mitra et al. 2020; UNICEF 2015f). Analysed 
through a demographic lens, the fact that children constitute almost half of the population 
of the four countries is argument enough to justify investments in order to reap the 
demographic dividend. If combined with other economic benefits of investing in children, 
this demographic point also has political dimensions. Children of today are tomorrow’s 
voters and labour force (Pereznieto et al. 2011). When engaging with economic 
institutions, child-focused organisations should do so not from a subservient position. 
Evidence from all four countries showed that when child rights organisations engaged 
with economists from ministries of finance, they did so as weaker partners. This 
compromised their effectiveness in influencing public spending decisions. By playing 
second fiddle, they risk being ignored or even bullied out of boardroom meetings wherein 




organisations are not on the table their issues will be marginalised or even mis-
conceptualised. 
10.2.6 Strengthening general measures of implementation of children’s rights 
To crown it all, delivering a protective operating environment for all children requires that 
governments strengthen all the general measures of implementation outlined in GC No 5 
of the UNCRC (2003). In addition to mobilising resources to deliver specific child 
protection services, governments should also invest in measures related to coordination, 
national plans of action (many of which are outdated for the case study countries), 
monitoring, participation of civil society, international cooperation, and education and 
awareness about child protection. In doing this, political economy dynamics should be 
well-understood, and properly navigated.  By implementing all the above general 
measures, the journey to strengthen national child protection systems would be 
accelerated. Isolated, disconnected, and one-off initiatives that are not anchored in, and 
sustained by, general measures of implementation are bound to be short-lived in their 
impacts, if not waste of time and resources.  For this reason, the ACERWC (2018), boldly 
noted the connection between availability of general measures of implementation and 
strong national child protection systems.  
10.3 Contributions to Knowledge and Areas for Further Studies  
 
The study has made an original contribution to studies on child protection, 
epistemologically and methodologically in several ways. Firstly, to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study in each of the selected countries to 
comprehensively explore the underlying reasons behind low public spending on child 
protection through a political economy lens. The study went beyond mere measurement 
of the size and composition of public spending on child protection being done by several 
organisations to investigate the underlying drivers and dynamics of budgeting for child 
protection. This way, the study delved deliberately into the complex, and often messy 




Second, the study has significantly pushed the frontiers of studies on the political 
economy of public spending by developing a composite theoretical framework that is 
interdisciplinary, as an acknowledgement of the complexity of both child protection and 
public budgeting. Unlike most studies on the political economy of public spending (Hibbs 
1981; Keefer & Khemani 2003; Nordhaus 1975, etc), whose theoretical frameworks are 
based on fiscal politics, and to some extent, political business cycles, this study brought 
socio-cultural constructions usually neglected as an integral element of the political 
economy of public spending. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, most studies on the 
political economy of public spending have focused too much on political incentives and 
power relations (Chang 1997; Diaz-Cayeros & Magalon 2003; Gasper et al. 2018), 
ignoring several issues falling within the realm of cultural and the normative international 
political economy. These include constructions of childhood and child maltreatment, 
international child rights commitments, and other global forces. By so doing, the study 
enriched insights about the political economy of public spending on child protection.  
Third, as highlighted in Chapter One, the study is significant in the sense that it 
goes beyond the most discussed social sectors namely health, education, nutrition, 
sanitation, and hygiene when it comes to public spending on children. Child protection is 
often times neglected in efforts to measure and monitor public spending on children 
(UNICEF 2020b). Through this study, the importance of focusing on public spending on 
child protection, in addition to other sectors, as a key aspect of human capital 
development, has been highlighted.  
Fourth, this study has contributed to the knowledge on how to strengthen national 
child protection systems by bringing in a political economy perspective.  By examining 
forces, interests and incentives surrounding decisions on how much governments in 
selected countries allocate to child protection, the study showed the complexity and 
functionalities of national child protection systems. It also highlighted systemic and 
structural issues that either enable or hinder effective operation of national child protection 
systems and general measures of implementation of children’s rights.  
Lastly, epistemologically, the study is significant in that it juxtaposed three 
constructs successfully, which are normally studied separately and with unique 




way, it was able to take child protection out of its usual comfort zone of social work to sit 
alongside politics and economics. Through the establishment of conceptual and empirical 
connections with studies on politics and economics, the study has shown that child 
protection budgeting is not merely a social work matter: it is as much an economic as it 
is a political issue. The study submits that a mechanical and functionalist approach to 
budgeting for child protection that ignores social, economic and political forces influencing 
allocation decisions will not work. It is this thinking which justified the use of a political 
economy approach to this investigation on why child protection is largely under-funded in 
selected countries.  
Although the study broadly explored the topic, not all aspects which relates to 
public spending on child protection were discussed. Accordingly, there are several areas 
for further research. Firstly, there is a need to go beyond budget allocations to further 
investigate issues of equity, efficiency, and effectiveness in child protection spending. As 
observed by Black et al. (2013) and Cangiano et al. (2013), in some countries there are 
huge variations between allocations and actual expenditures. Leakages and inefficiencies 
are also a common phenomenon in public spending in African countries (Chang & Grabel 
2014; IMF 2018; Lumumba 2008). Second, the voices of children in public spending on 
child protection cannot be ignored anymore in scholarly works of this nature, difficult as 
this may be. A study, involving the children themselves would shed light on their agency 
and opportunities to engage with and influence public budgeting processes.  
Third, the study only scratched the surface regarding the link between fiscal 
decentralisation and public spending on child protection. Several issues were left 
hanging. For example, how does child protection financing in urban areas compare with 
rural and peri-urban areas? Under what circumstances would decentralisation work 
effectively to improve child protection services? Lastly, a more focused study on the 
political economy of social cash transfer programmes, which take up a large share of child 
protection budgets in Botswana, Kenya and Zimbabwe, will be value-adding. On this 
topical issue, a myriad of questions abound which are yet to be examined 
comprehensively in academic literature. For instance, why are cash transfer programmes 




ownership and sustainability by African governments of these programmes? Lastly, how 
strong, programmatically, is the link between social and child protection? 
What this study has done is to kick start discussions on why political economy 
matters in child protection policy planning and budgeting. With this, the ball is thrown into 
the court of organisations that work with and for children to explore in practice how 
knowledge of the political economy of public spending dispensed above can radically 
change, for the better, the way they engage with, and seek to influence, budget decisions. 
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Annex 3: Research Consent Form 
 
University of Johannesburg 
Research Consent Form 
My name is Bob Libert Muchabaiwa, a PhD Student (201184172) in Development Studies at the University 
of Johannesburg, South Africa. I am undertaking a study on the ‘Political Economy of Public Spending on 
Child Protection in Botswana, Kenya, South Sudan and Zimbabwe’. The study seeks to critically examine 
how the political economy of the state-society complex affects public spending on child protection.  
I am kindly requesting you to participate in the study by way of responding to a number of research 
questions that relate to how various elements of the political economy such as interests, power, hegemony 
and role of the state and other stakeholders as well as conceptualizations of childhood and children’s rights 
influence the levels of public spending on child protection. This will be done through a face to face, Skype 
or telephone interview, at a place, date and time convenient to you. With your permission, the interview will 
be audio-recorded and handwritten notes taken.  
There are no risks involved with your participation. The researcher will do everything possible to protect 
your privacy, including use of pseudo names, where quotes will be found necessary. Your identity will not 
be revealed in any publication resulting from this study. In addition, findings and conclusions from the study 
will not be attributed to individual respondents. Your participation in this interview is voluntary. There is no 
remuneration for participation. Lastly, you may choose not to participate and withdraw at any time in the 
process of the interview.   
If you have any questions or concerns about this study or your rights as a research participant, please feel 
free to contact Prof Zusa Gruber (zosag@uj.ac.za) or Prof David Moore (dbmoore@uj.ac.za). For 
general  inquiries about  research questions please feel free to contact me on blmuchabaiwa@gmail.com 
or call +254703749017.  
Declaration by Research participant  
I have read this consent form and was given the opportunity to ask questions. I therefore voluntarily 
accept to participate in the interview. I have also allowed the researcher to record the interview and to use 
anonymous quotes in publications.  
Participant Name___________________________________________________ 
Participant’s signature_______________________________  Date:___________ 
 





Annex 4: Research Questionnaire/ Interview guide 
 
My name is Bob Libert Muchabaiwa, a PhD Student (201184172) in Development Studies at the 
University of Johannesburg, South Africa. I am undertaking a study on the ‘Political Economy of 
Public Spending on Child Protection in Botswana, Kenya, South Sudan and Zimbabwe’. The study 
seeks to critically examine how the political economy of the state-society complex affects public 
spending on child protection. I am kindly requesting you to participate in the study by way of filling 
in the below questionnaire. There are no risks involved with your participation. Your identity will 
not be revealed in any publication resulting from this study. In addition, findings and conclusions 
from the study will not be attributed to individual respondents. Your participation in this interview 
is voluntary. You may withdraw at any time. For any questions email blmuchabaiwa@gmail.com 
Background information 
 
Country                                                                   . 
 
Institution/ Sector represented 
CSOs        Government        UN           Donor/IFIs        . Other  …….. 
 
Gender 
Male         Female         Other          . 
 
Section A: Political profile of child protection 
1.  To what extent do you think child protection issues such as violence against children, 









2. Looking at the past 5 years, do you think child protection interventions have received 
a fair share of available public resources in government budgets? Is there any 
evidence to support your claim? 
 
 
Section B: Constructions of childhood, children’s rights and child protection 
3. How are issues of childhood and children’s rights generally viewed by communities 
in this country?  
 
 
4. How do political parties view children’s rights issues? Does child protection feature in 
their political manifestos?  
 
 
5. In what ways, if at all, does the above socio-cultural and political constructions of 
childhood and children’s rights affect the way local and national governments budget 




Section C:  Interests and incentives available to those in power when allocating public 
resources. 
 
6. In your own view, what are the main economic, political or other factors that influence the 







7. Are there any interests and incentives available to those in power that influence 





Section D:  Power relations between different levels and structures of 
government 
8. In your own view, whom, within government, exerts significant influence on how public 
resources should be allocated and why, formally and informally?  
 
 
9. In what ways have power relations between the executive and the legislature; central 
and sub-national governments; as well as different departments and ministries 
enabled or hindered effective budgeting on child protection in this country?  
 
 
10. To what extent do members of parliament defend and promote increases and equity 
in budgeting, including on child protection? Any examples?  
 
 
Section E:  Autonomy, capacity and responsiveness of public finance institutions to 
budget effectively for child protection 
 
11. To what extent do you think the treasury/Ministry of Finance has the autonomy, space and 
capacity to allocate resources in an effective and  equitable way, including to poorest and 








12. To what extent do you think public finance management laws and policies are followed for 




Section F: Influence of structural issues: conflict, poverty, inequality and insecurity 
13. In what ways, if at all, has poverty affected the way public resources are allocated, 
including to child protection interventions? Any examples?  
 
 
14. In what ways, if at all, have the following issues: conflict, insecurity and state fragility 
affected levels of budget allocations on child protection?  
 
 
Section G:  Agency of state institutions responsible for children’s rights to negotiate 
for more and better spending on child protection 
 
15. How influential is the government department responsible for children’s services in 
promoting and defending budget allocations to child protection? Any examples? 
 
 
16. Is there a functional National Council or Independent Commission on children’s issues? If 




17. How effectively do different arms of government coordinate their advocacy for more and 






Section H:  Fiscal decentralization and devolution of power 
18. Do you think child protection is visible enough in sub-national government plans and 
receives a fair share of available public resources?  
 
 
19. In this country, in your view, the medium to long term, do you think fiscal 
decentralization/devolution will lead to more and better spending on child protection 
and why?   
 
 
Section I:  Capacity and Agency of Non-State actors to influence budget decisions 
20. How effective have local and international child focused civil society 
organisations been in advocating for increased and improved public spending on 
child protection? Any examples of success stories?  
 
 
Section J:  Role of international commitments and actors 
21. How influential is UNICEF and other donors been when it comes to influencing 
budget decisions in this country? Any examples? 
 
 
22. In your own view, how influential is the World bank and other regional and 
international finance and development institutions when it comes to influencing 






23. How influential are international commitments such as SDGs, AU and UN 
commitments on decision making on how public resources are allocated in this 
country? Any examples? 
 
 
24. How influential are international child rights commitments and instruments such as 
the UNCRC, General Comments and concluding observations from state party 




Sections K:  Recommendations: Application of political economy approach to public 
spending on child protection 
 
25. What do you think should be the key child protection spending priorities for the next 
five years in this country? 
 
 
26. What are your recommendations on how child protection can be made a political and 
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